Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, "Excerpts from Address," November 28, 1984.
As the Cold War heated up in Africa, Central America, Asia, and the Middle East due to U.S. sponsorship of covert action in areas of "low-intensity conflict," a dispute brewed among U.S. policy advisors as well. Unlike Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger resisted the use of force in combating subversion. Weinberger's criticisms of the more aggressive policies of his colleagues were founded in academic research indicating the folly of engaging in potential Vietnams. In his November 1984 address, the Secretary summarized his views on the use of force, carefully delineating the circumstances under which it would be justified. He pointed to the difficulties in establishing a strong mandate for using force given the historical struggle between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. He also reproved the American tendency to act unilaterally rather than in unison with its allies. In the hopes of avoiding unsuccessful and compromising entanglements,he suggested a list of qualifications by which the United States should determine its willingness to commit forces overseas.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 28
Following are excerpts from the prepared text of an address by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club today, as made available by the Defense Department:
Under what circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out our national policy?
Our policy has always been to work hard for peace but to be prepared if war comes. Because we face a spectrum of threats -- from covert aggression, terrorism and subversion to overt intimidation, to use of brute force -- choosing the appropriate level of our response is difficult. Once a decision to employ some degree of force has been made, and the purpose clarified, our Government must have the clear mandate to carry out that decision until the purpose has been achieved.
The issue of which branch of government has authority to define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970's Congress demanded and assumed a far more active role in the making of foreign policy and in the decision-making process for the employment of military forces abroad than had been thought appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality of decison-making authority in the executive branch has been compromised by the legislative branch to an extent that actively interferes with that process. At the same time, there has not been a corresponding acceptance of responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions concerning the employment of military forces.
Not Defender of World
Recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. So while we may and should offer substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to our allies in their time of need and help them maintain forces to deter attacks against them -- usually we cannot substitute our troops or our will for theirs.
In those cases where our national interests require us to commit combat forces, we must never let there be doubt of our resolution. When it is necessary for our troops to be committed to combat, we must commit them in sufficient numbers and we must support them as effectively and resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops to combat we must do so with the sole object of winning.
Once it is clear our troops are required, because our vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just that.
Just as clearly, there are other situations where United States combat forces should not be used. I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad.
6 Major Tests
First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning.
Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that.
Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win but just to be there.
Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.
Sounding a Caution
These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased negatively for a purpose -- they are intended to sound a note of caution. When we ask our military forces to risk their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is morally required.
In many situations we may apply these tests and conclude that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one should interpret what I am saying here today as an abdication of America's responsibilities -- either to its own citizens or to its allies.
While these tests are drawn from lessons we have learned from the past, they also can -- and should -- be applied to the future. The President will not allow our military forces to creep -- or be drawn gradually into a combat role in Central America or any other place in the world. And indeed our policy is designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement. This means we will need sustained Congressional support to back and give confidence to our friends in the region.
I believe the tests I have enunciated here today can, if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this gradualist incremental approach, which almost always means the use of insufficient force.