Secretary of State George P. Shultz, "U.S.-Soviet Relations in a Changing World," March 15, 1988.
The new Soviet leader who replaced Chernenko represented the new generation of Soviet officials who aspired to reform the Soviet Union and redress the causes of its decay. One of the few U.S. officials to recognize this shift in Soviet leadership was Secretary of State Shultz. Many policymakers viewed with disdain the possibility of negotiating with the Soviets, but Shultz recommended that Reagan take advantage of the opening. The rapid diffusion of technology and the integration of the world economy, as well as the renewed commitment to American strength pursued under the Republican president, placed the United States in an advantageous position to reshape the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State credited Gorbachev for facilitating the progress recently achieved in U.S.-Soviet relations, which included disarmament agreements and programs of bilateral collaboration and exchange. Shultz confirmed the United States' continuing adherence to the goal of seeing the Soviet Union transformed into a more democratic society, while promoting the steady pursuit of a competitive yet cooperative relationship.
MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP
By GEORGE P. SHULTZ, U.S. Secretary of State
Delivered before the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, February 5, 1988
Our relationship with the Soviet Union has preoccupied American foreign policy for nearly half a century. Few public figures in the post-war world have done so much as Scoop Jackson to shape American thinking about that relationship. So I was pleased and honored to be invited here by the Henry M. Jackson School of International Affairs.
Scoop Jackson believed passionately in democracy, and saw clearly the threat that totalitarianism posed to it. He argued that the Soviet challenge came in many forms, and that there was a close relationship among all the Soviet policies and actions that gave us concern, from the Soviet Union's accumulation of military power, to its projection of that power outside its borders, to its denial of the individual's fundamental rights and freedoms. He fought with great energy and skill to marshall the will and resources of the Western democracies to protect their freedom and advance their vision of a peaceful and just world.
Scoop Jackson believed that the West must be realistic about the Soviet Union. He had faith in the West's ability to muster the strength to deal with that reality. He saw that if we maintained both our strength and our realism, and dealt forthrightly with East-West differences, we might ultimately shape the conditions for a new Soviet-American relationship that would secure both peace and freedom.
This vision of the problem and the solution has stood up well. America has restored its strength and stayed realistic; this in turn has had a remarkable impact on the pace, scope and productivity of U.S.-Soviet relations. The change in the tempo of U.S.-Soviet relations is also occurring as part of a larger transformation of our world. The changes sometimes are subtle, sometimes dramatic. The U.S.Soviet relationship both influences and is deeply affected by these changes.
The emerging features of global change are evident all around us:
The rapidity both of technological innovation and the means to distribute that technology on a global scale. Scientific, economic and political matters are now global in dimension.
Increasing economic interdependence, combined with the appearance of new centers of economic wealth, particularly in Asia.
The dispersion of poltical power, although key elements of the bipolar, post-war world endure.
And the common thread in all these changes: The imperative of knowledge -- its discovery, its transmission as information, and the education needed to use it. The speed of human transactions is accelerating. Openness and communication are key to the creation and mastery of change.
The net result is a strong and encouraging trend toward democracy, openness and freedom, both within and among nations. The countries that are advancing economically, socially and politically these days are those which have adopted greater freedom in the marketplace and in their political institutions. In a world where information and innovation are the engines for modernity, societies that suppress innovation and imprison information are falling farther and farther behind.
The changes now taking place in the communist world are, in this sense, profoundly reactive, a halting and anxious attempt to catch up to the dynamism and creativity of the West. We bear much of "new thinking" these days. We should be clear what it represents. It is an effort to come to grips with the reality of a world being shaped not by the Soviet Union and its allies, but by the community of free nations -- and the force of freedom.
One consequence of this change is fresh hope for an eventual end to the grim experiment with totalitarianism that, for most of the 20th Century, has mocked mankind's hopes for a human community based on peace and freedom. But that experiment Is still with us, and must be dealt with. This means that the American-Soviet relationship will remain a central U.S. concern for decades to come.
The question we confront is whether we can fashion a U.S.Soviet relationship that permits both of us to devote our energies less to confronting one another, and more to mastering the challenges of global change, both in our countries and as important powers in a complex international environment.
The world which emerged after World War 11 was a bipolar world. The gravitational pull exerted by the concentration of economic and military power in two such different systems as those of the U.S. and Soviet Union was enormous. The principal limitation on the actions of the two former allies was the power of the other.
Restraining the abuse of Soviet military power was the focal point of U.S. foreign policy after 1945. Containment sought to deal with the problem directly, and led to the establishment of NATO and a global system of alliance relationships. U.S. efforts to revive the world economic system helped deny Moscow options for expansion.
But the bipolar world which emerged in the post-war era has been steadily eroded by accelerating changes on a global scale -changes which have widely dispersed political, economic and military power. The rigidly centralized Soviet system, with its insistence on maintaining a monopoly on information, was incompatible with many of the most important trends.
Nevertheless, until quite recently, the Soviet Union largely blinded itself to the significance of these trends. Soviet achievement of strategic parity, and improvements in living standards over the immediate post-war era, coupled with perceptions of U.S. weakness after our withdrawal from Vietnam, temporarily masked the Soviet Union's growing systemic problems and irrelevance as a model for the developing world.
Thus, Soviet leaders talked of a shift in the "correlation of forces," and moved aggressively at home and abroad:
The Soviets continued to place an excessive emphasis on military strength, with a military build-up which showed no signs of abating even after the achievement of strategic parity, and which appeared designed for Soviet expansion at the expense of the security of other nations;
Moscow continued to rely on force -- or the provision of the means of force -- to extend its influence abroad. This tendency reached its height, but by no means its end, with the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.
Repression of dissidence at home reached a post-Stalin peak in the final years of the Brezhnev leadership, in contravention of solemn Soviet international undertakings, and despite the growing trend toward democracy and openness throughout the world.
By the late 1970s, however, Soviet practices began to confront changing realities. Even the Soviets now describe this period as one of stagnation and misdirection.
The United States, for its part, initially attempted to preserve a one-dimensional detente which had not served as a brake on Soviet unilateralism. But after this period of hesitation, America responded.
In electing Ronald Reagan, Americans in 1980 served notice that they were prepared to do what was necessary to contain Soviet expansionism, albeit in a world greatly different from that which emerged from the ashes of the second world war.
From his earliest days, President Reagan has pursued a three-tracked strategy.
Of critical importance was the restoration of American strength -modernizing our armed forces, rebuilding the confidence and unity of our alliances, strengthening our economy, encouraging the growth of democracy and freedom throughout the world. Western firmness and vigilance were necessary then, are so now, and must continue.
We sought to bring America's restored strength to bear in accordance with a realistic appraisal of the nature of Soviet society and its policies. Rather than focus only on the weapons build-up that is a symptom of the East-West conflict, the Administration sought to confront the full range of issues which affected the relationship. Thus:
Rather than satisfying ourselves with half-steps on arms control, we set out to achieve agreements which would actually reduce arsenals, enhance security, and be effectively verifiable;
Rather than rail ineffectually against intervention by Soviet forces and Soviet clients in the developing world, we worked with those prepared to defend their freedom to demonstrate that the price of adventurism was high and lasting;
Rather than treat human rights as an embarrassing afterthought, we recognized that these issues are a permanent and positive component of international relations that is central both to our vision of the world and to our security. We have made them an integral part of the dialogue, one that takes genuine pride of place in discussions at all levels.
Rather than treating bilateral relations as inducements or rewards for Soviet moves in other areas, we have established high standards of reciprocity of benefit in exchanges.
Our emphasis on strength and realism did not preclude dialogue with Moscow. Indeed, we sought to make that dialogue productive in bringing the Soviet Union to understand the importance of changes in its approach to issues in which the U.S. -- and the world -had a legitimate interest. We have insisted that the dialogue cover the full range of such interests, from arms control and regional issues to human rights and bilateral affairs, and we have sharply defined American objectives in each of these areas.
We have stressed that all of the broad areas of this agenda are closely related, in the conviction that a stable and constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship can be achieved and sustained only if Moscow is willing to take concrete steps to resolve critical problems. The Soviets seem increasingly to understand that reality.
While the interrelationships among the areas are strong and inescapable, we have also maintained flexibility in how we pursue our interests in each. We do not accept the assumption that linkages can be applied indiscriminately, however tempting it might be to try linkage when there is progress in some areas but not in others.
Clearly, we recognize that exceptional circumstances may arise where progress in one area must be made contingent on another, especially in the face of Soviet actions which undermine the foundation of a stable peace.
Yet it is impossible to see how we might expect to get anywhere with a policy which dictates that nothing can be solved until everything is solved. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is too difficult and complex to make that a practical option.
The flaws of indiscriminate linkage as an instrument of policy have been demonstrated over the years. As a policy, it deprives us of the opportunity to pursue realistic agreements that serve Western interests. It yields the initiative to the Soviets to set the pace and scope of relations with us and with our allies. It disrupts the consistency and discipline that are essential for successful Western pursuit of a long-term strategy for a more peaceful and democratic world.
And most important, linkage as practiced in the past has not worked. If, for example, the Soviet Union leaves Afghanistan, it will not do so because the U.S. imposed a grain embargo or withholds arms reduction agreements that make sense for Western security. Rather, the Soviets will return the fate of Afghanistan back to the Afghan people because the Afghans have struggled with courage and determination, and because the world community, led by the U.S., ultimately has responded where it matters -- directly on the ground, with material and political support.
Despite such outrages as the Soviet downing of a Korean airliner in 1983, or Soviet espionage against our embassy in Moscow, President Reagan persevered in our agenda, keeping our arms control negotiators in Geneva, and our high-level dialogue with Moscow on track. One result is the INF Treaty, which fulfills our negotiating objectives and will make an impressive contribution to U.S. and allied security.
Rather than break contact, we have tailored our responses to the issue at hand. For instance, after the downing of KAL 007, we suspended Soviet Aeroflot service to the United States, even as our arms control negotiators returned to Geneva. We sought new procedures to ensure that a similar tragedy would not recur. We achieved solid results -- an improved civil aviation agreement that guarantees equal benefits for the American carrier, and an agreement on civil air safety in the North Pacific that benefits everyone flying to Japan and Korea.
Thus, our approach is to recognize the interrelationship of our interests in arms reductions, human rights, regional affairs and bilateral relations, and to work toward a global environment in which real, measurable progress is attainable in all. When we have reached agreements that further our interests, we have signed them, while pressing forward with unfinished business. This, in turn, has imparted a consistency and reliability to American foreign policy that have contributed to the confidence of our friends and allies, created strong incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate realistically, and have produced concrete agreements that enhance Western security.
By the end of the President's first term, the U.S. and the West had begun to shape new conditions. Even before Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, the Soviet Union had begun to respond. Having failed by threat and boycott to force the West to negotiate arms control on Soviet terms, the Soviets returned to the bargaining table at the Nuclear and Space Talks 1985. Within the Soviet Union itself, the realities of a resurgent self-confident United States, of a turn to democracy free enterprise throughout the developing world, of the inability of Soviet client regimes to consolidate their hold on power, and of a rising chorus of international condemnation of Soviet human rights practices, had created a crisis of confidence.
Increasingly, Soviet citizens -- and ultimately their leaders came to realize that the Soviet system was no longer working and that the Soviet Union risked failing further behind. The process of coming to terms with present day realities accelerated once General Secretary Gorbachev came to power.
And in terms of concrete results across the broad agenda the Reagan Administration had been pursuing, the record has grown increasingly impressive.
The Soviet Union has accepted our realistic and comprehensive framework for dealing in practical ways with the issues that divide East and West. By encompassing the full range of' issues in U.S.-Soviet relations, this framework has given structure and direction -- an agenda -- to our dialogue. Clear dialogue by itself is not enough; what counts is a change in Soviet conduct. But establishing the framework was an important step toward the progress that has followed.
We have concluded the INF Treaty, which is remarkable I both for its goal of eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles, and for its unprecedented verification measures.
We have made important strides toward conclusion of a treaty that would cut in half the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals.
We have improved government-to-government communications by upgrading the Hotline and through the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow.
We have seen some modest progress on human rights and humanitarian issues, and we have established regular exchanges of views on regional conflicts, subjects which the Soviets once dismissed as off-limits or of secondary importance to arms control.
We have breathed new life into a program of bilateral cooperative programs ranging from people- to-people contacts among young people, to improved air service between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., to scientific, cultural and educational exchanges. These programs help lower the artificial barriers the Soviets have long maintained and can enrich both countries.
This is a hopeful beginning to a long and purposeful effort to establish a new pattern of more constructive relations.
It is much in vogue now -- perhaps I should say in "Time" -- to attribute to Gorbachev the credit for this progress. Clearly the Soviet Union contributed, and we welcome that. As President Reagan once said, "it takes two to tango." Both sides benefit from this process, as they must if it is to endure. We are watching with great interest the Soviet experiment with "openness" and "restructuring," and hope these evolving concepts result in changes which address American concerns. We already see some evidence that they might.
Yet the truth is that the agreements that have been reach recently. and the prospects for future progress, are founded in, American "new thinking" and innovation both in our broad strategy and in our solutions to specific problems.
All of the agreements I just mentioned stem from American initiatives and ideas. And there are more, such as deep cuts in strategic nuclear arms, the prospects for negotiated solutions to regional conflicts, and changes in Soviet human rights practices, that have served Western interests well.
Moreover, the process now underway in U.S.-Soviet relations has occurred because it enjoys the broad support of the American people. For the first time in years, American policy towards the Soviet Union enjoys a strong domestic consensus. If this consensus can be maintained -- and it should be American policy toward the Soviet Union will be bolstered by an almost unprecedented continuity and stability, and continue to be dynamic and creative in pursuing real solutions to problems.
A better relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may indeed be possible. Such a relationship would be marked by the candor to recognize our differences, the initiative to solve them where we can, and the ability to manage our differences peacefully where competition endures, as surely it will. During one of his visits to Washington last fall, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze may have been thinking along these same lines. He made a point which left a strong impression on me.
He noted that over the past several years, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had taken a remarkable number of steps in various areas. We had reached a point, he concluded, where our quantitative progress had created the possibility of a qualitative change in the nature of the relationship. We seemed to be moving, he said, toward a more normal relationship.
I have since thought a lot about the Foreign Minister's words, and I have decided that I both disagree and agree.
I find it difficult to believe that our relations with the Soviet Union will ever be "normal" in the sense that we have normal relations with most other countries. There are only two superpowers in the world. We are vastly different in the ways we view the role of the individual in our societies, and in the ways we relate to other countries. The relationship between us will always be unique. It seems unlikely that the U.S.-Soviet relationship will ever lose what always has been and is today a strongly wary and at times adversarial element.
Nor do I think that the accumulation of individual agreements or cooperative arrangements will by itself result in a quantum leap to a qualitatively different kind of relationship. The differences between us and the suspicions they generate are too deep. Experience has proved that agreements alone cannot bridge such a divide.
But I believe there is a sense in which the Foreign Minister was right. The case can be made that we are near a threshold of a sustainable U.S.-Soviet relationship. On the U.S. side, there is for the first time in many years a strong consensus on how we should deal with the Soviet Union. On the Soviet side, there may be -- for the first time ever, and as a result of necessity -- a willingness to reexamine Soviet security and other interests in ways that are closer to international norms.
One often hears the question, "does the U.S. want reform in the Soviet Union to succeed or fail?" I believe that posing the question in that way misses the point. We have worked long to put in place a policy that is both flexible and resilient enough to adapt to changing circumstances, and to expand cooperation whenever the Soviets are ready to reach realistic agreements. In short, we are well positioned to deal with the best and worst of Soviet behavior.
As interesting as the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union may be, our concern must be with the way these changes affect, in concrete terms, the interests embodied in our broad agenda. We must deal with the Soviet Union as it is, not as we wish it to be. The Soviet system is just beginning an attempt at economic reform. It has barely scratched the surface at structural political reform. We have not seen changes that suggest the Soviet Union has altered its historical objective of altering the international system to its advantage.
Thus, we should welcome change in the Soviet Union -- and wish the Soviet people well -- precisely to the extent that the Soviet effort at modernization squares with American hopes for a safer world and a More productive U.S.-Soviet relationship. We are convinced, moreover, that progress in the areas of greatest interest to the U.S. and the world would also best serve the people of the Soviet Union.
What, realistically, can we expect in U.S.-Soviet relations during a period of change within the Soviet Union and on a global basis?
Our ultimate goal has not changed -- a Soviet Union which deals with other countries and with its own people through dialogue rather than intimidation. This would be a sweeping change, one which would reverse much of this century's international politics. That destination is distant, and getting there will confront us with many ambiguities about the scope, durability and meaning of change in the Soviet Union and in the international environment.
Thus, it would be mistaken and unrealistic to expect to replace, in the foreseeable future, the international security system. Our security, freedom and prosperity will continue to rest on nuclear deterrence, on our system of alliances, on our efforts to expand and strengthen democracy and a free international economy, and above all on our own strength and will to defend our interests and values.
We can, however, work at building a relationship with the Soviet Union that, while remaining competitive, also is less dangerous. Measured progress across our four-part agenda with the Soviet Union provides a blueprint to this end, a framework for steps that will strengthen international stability and foster the conditions for future progress.
These near-term goals are attainable over the coming months and years if we, as a nation, pursue them patiently, steadily and seriously, and if the Soviet Union works with equal dedication to modernizing its relationship with the rest of the world. Achieving these goals would go far toward correcting the Soviet excesses of the last decade or so.
On the military side, our objective over the next few years is to deal with the consequences of the massive Soviet military build-up since the mid-1970s. This will require a continued, strong effort by the U.S. and our allies to modernize and strengthen conventional and nuclear deterrence. A robust defense budget -- as well as strong security and economic assistance -- are crucial if we are to continue to foreclose Moscow's other options. At the same time, we see greater opportunities than ever before to achieve balanced, effective, verifiable arms control agreements that would redress existing imbalances and impart greater stability and predictability to the military aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
The INF treaty would eliminate entirely an important element of the Soviet military build-up of the 1970s, the deployment of the SS-20 missile, as well as the older SS-4 missiles and the threat posed by the Soviets' shorter-range INF missiles. Ratification and full implementation of the Treaty will contribute substantially to Western security.
The next step is a verifiable treaty which cuts U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms in half and establishes a stable strategic nuclear balance. We will work hard to complete a treaty by the time President Reagan goes to Moscow this year. The Soviet Union has pledged a similar effort. Many of the critical elements for such a treaty are already in sight, but much remains to be done, particularly in the area of verification. Completing a treaty in the next few months will depend greatly on Soviet willingness to work cooperatively and creatively with us to solve these complex problems.
We also will continue a vigorous SDI program to see whether strategic stability might rest increasingly on defensebased deterrence rather than exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation. This program is essential both because of Soviet strategic defense programs, and because it may establish a basis in the future for a safer way to secure international peace.
We and our allies will persevere in efforts to achieve greater stability and openness regarding conventional military forces in Europe; to achieve a truly global and verifiable ban on chemical weapons; to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and to seek realistic, step-by-step progress on nuclear testing, beginning with needed verification improvements to the existing limitations in the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties.
We will continue to insist on concrete Soviet steps toward the freer flow of information, people and ideas set out in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the follow-on documents of the Helsinki process. Without detracting from the positive steps that have been taken in recent months. we will not shrink from insisting that those families who remain divided be allowed to join their loved ones, that those who wish to emigrate be let go, that religious believers be allowed to practice their religion, and that their rights be guaranteed by appropriate institutional safeguards.
To Americans, the human rights issue will only be resolved when old abuses are cured and new ones cease to emerge. Given the nature of the Soviet system, that situation may be years off, but there can and must be steady progress toward it. Further, as the President stated in his Berlin initiative last June, one place we will look for a real change of policy is in Eastern Europe.
On regional affairs, we cannot assume that the Soviet Union has abandoned its traditional inclination to extend its political writ and cast its military shadow over other regions of the world, Thus, the U.S. must be prepared to support those who are willing to fight for their freedom and self-determination. If, however, the Soviet Union is willing to rethink past positions, we will lend our hand to efforts to bring peace and national reconciliation to regions now torn by conflict.
On the pivotal question of Afghanistan, the Soviets have professed to recognize the importance of a prompt withdrawal of Soviet forces and of the need to allow the Afghan people to determine their own fate. We look to the Soviet leaders to act on this recognition and to put forward promptly a plan for the rapid, complete and irreversible removal of Soviet forces by the end of this year.
Similarly, we will press the Soviet Union to contribute concretely to efforts to bring negotiated political solutions to other regions of the world where Soviet clients are fighting their own people and their neighbors.
On the bilateral side of the relationship, we have already put in place a framework of agreements which serve concrete U.S. interests -- on civil aviation, on space cooperation, and on exchange activities in the cultural and scientific fields. At the Washington Summit, the President and the General Secretary identified additional areas where the two sides have much to contribute to each other. Some of these involve potentially valuable activities to deal with changes in our world -- for instance, bilateral and multilateral efforts to study the consequences of changes in the global climate and environment, to explore the prospects for nuclear fusion as an unlimited source of energy, and to harness the potential of such areas of increasing importance as the Arctic.
What can we do to maximize our chances of realizing these objectives?
Our principal job is to continue shaping conditions that will affect Soviet behavior. Western strength and vigilance are key to this.
If we do our job at shaping those conditions, the overall framework which we have already put in place can continue to be an important means to our goals. It is more important than ever that both sides share a certain common approach if we are to create the kind of qualitatively different relationship we seek.
During General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Washington, I shared with him, in the form of a luncheon toast, a set of guidelines which might apply to both sides as we build on our accomplishments thus far. They are worth repeating.
First: The U.S.-Soviet relationship is as important as it Is unique. It is important because we each bear an immense burden of leadership in the world. It is unique because the nuclear era demands that we engage each other despite our profound differences. As General Secretary Gorbachev said in his book, "There is no getting away from each other."
Second: Our relationship will continue to be a difficult one to manage. We have contrasting philosophies, political systems, and national interests. Our basic values, systems and interests will persist, even as the necessity to work together increases.
Third: We must be realistic, avoiding extremes, either of hostility or euphoria, through the ups and downs of our relations. The best approach to dealing with one another is to be down-to-earth, pragmatic and businesslike in seeking to solve concrete problems.
Fourth: We must speak with clarity and candor to one another about our differences. This is why we have always stressed to the Soviets the fundamental importance we attach to human rights, as set forth in the universal declaration and the Helsinki Final Act. As the European Community heads of government stated December 5: "Respect for human rights and freedom is a prerequisite for confidence, understanding and cooperation." We have spoken with candor about regional issues, as well. The Soviets have not hesitated to speak their mind to us. And we have made some progress. As President Reagan has said, we owe each other the tribute of candor, and candor will help us get results.
Fifth: We must look to the future without neglecting the lessons of the past. Too often, we face the past and back into the future. In five to ten years, our world will be vastly different from the one we know today, and from the post-war world of the past 40 years, which has conditioned so much of our thinking.
This leads to a sixth point: The recognition that openness to ideas, information an contacts is the key to future success. The conceptual breakthroughs embodied in the INF treaty's provisions for verification and on-site verification are but one example of the powerful pull which openness is already exerting in a key area of U.S.-Sovient relations.
I concluded my toast by urging that the United States and the Soviet Union seek steady progress toward a more open, more predictable, more stable and constructive relationship. In this time of change, I argued, new patterns of interaction also offer new opportunities for cooperation and progress, and we should grasp those opportunities.
The General Secretary did not say whether or not he agreed with me. But I am convinced, and experience has shown, that an approach which is less realistic, an approach which is less flexible, an approach which is less forward-looking, will be inadequate to the task.
I am also convinced that, for our part, Americans can approach the challenges and opportunities posed by the current moment in U.S.-Soviet relations with the same leadership, confidence and innovation that have characterized our national approach to change in other areas, from politics to technology.
Americans are not afraid of change or new thinking -- in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. Two hundred years ago, we enshrined the concept of new thinking in our national life, and we have lived by it since. We have thrived precisely because we have challenged and questioned and have not shied away from change, but have thirsted for it. We have, as Scoop Jackson advocated, been forthright about both the challenges we confront and about the changing environment in which they play out. We have been strong in dealing with the challenges -- and always, we have tried to make things better, to advance the American vision of a more democratic, more peaceful and more prosperous world.
Today, we recognize that a potentially important experiment is getting underway in the Soviet Union. It suggests the possibility of a far more satisfactory U.S.-Soviet relationship than we have known in the post-war era, a relationship which could be a constructive element in a changing world.
Americans are willing to work with dedication and creativity to fashion such a relationship. It is a goal which is achievable, if the Soviet leadership is willing to join us in making change for the better a permanent reality.