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1 |  |  Upon taking office, President John Kennedy met the challenges of the Cold War by: |
|  | A) | Ordering a buildup of nuclear weapons, modernizing conventional forces, and developing counterinsurgency capabilities. |
|  | B) | Withdrawing from American defense commitments such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). |
|  | C) | Opening relations with the People's Republic of China. |
|  | D) | Pursuing Detente with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. |
|  | E) | All of the above. |
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2 |  |  Throughout his tenure in office, Kennedy: |
|  | A) | Eagerly took up the burden in Vietnam. |
|  | B) | Chose a cautious middle course that expanded America's role in Vietnam but kept it limited. |
|  | C) | Swung wildly from a desire to shed America of its Vietnam commitment to an insistence on deploying massive numbers of troops to that nation. |
|  | D) | Pursued a negotiated solution in South Vietnam. |
|  | E) | All of the above. |
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3 |  |  In 1961, the Kennedy administration confronted Cold War crises in all of the following places EXCEPT: |
|  | A) | Laos. |
|  | B) | Berlin. |
|  | C) | The Congo. |
|  | D) | India. |
|  | E) | Cuba. |
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4 |  |  Vietnam assumed a position of greater importance in the eyes of the Kennedy administration in 1961 because: |
|  | A) | Khruschev's speech in support of wars of national liberation appeared to presage more aggressive Communist behavior in the developing world. |
|  | B) | Kennedy had become increasingly concerned about the steadily growing Communist insurgency in rural South Vietnam |
|  | C) | Vietnam appeared to be a better place than Laos to make a stand against Communism in Southeast Asia. |
|  | D) | Setbacks in Laos and at the Bay of Pigs increased the symbolic importance of thwarting Communism in Vietnam. |
|  | E) | All of the above. |
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5 |  |  The Taylor-Rostow Mission of 1961 recommended all of the following EXCEPT: |
|  | A) | A massive commitment of American combat troops. |
|  | B) | The deployment of an 8,000-man "logistical task force" to serve as a symbol of American intentions under the guise of flood relief. |
|  | C) | Increased American military and economic assistance. |
|  | D) | The commitment of highly trained American advisors to help the South Vietnamese government better combat the Communist insurgency. |
|  | E) | Improved training for Civil Guard and Village Self-Defense Corps troops. |
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6 |  |  After receiving the Taylor-Rostow report, Kennedy opted to: |
|  | A) | Deploy the "logistical task force" General Taylor had first proposed. |
|  | B) | Expand the Laos negotiations to include Vietnam. |
|  | C) | Begin regular bombing attacks against North Vietnam. |
|  | D) | Publicly announce that his administration was washing its hands of South Vietnam. |
|  | E) | Approve a limited commitment of aid and advisers. |
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7 |  |  The strategic hamlet program included: |
|  | A) | Land reform. |
|  | B) | The provision of schools and medical facilities to isolated villages. |
|  | C) | The relocation of peasants to isolate them from the National Liberation Front (NLF). |
|  | D) | The reinstitution of village elections. |
|  | E) | All of the above. |
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8 |  |  American assistance to the South Vietnamese military in 1962 including all of the following EXCEPT: |
|  | A) | Chemical defoliants. |
|  | B) | Helicopters. |
|  | C) | Biological weapons. |
|  | D) | Armored personnel carriers. |
|  | E) | Hundreds of aircraft. |
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9 |  |  At the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, South Vietnamese forces: |
|  | A) | Used their advanced weapons and mobility to decisively defeat a well-armed NLF battalion. |
|  | B) | Suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of a better-equipped Viet Cong force. |
|  | C) | Failed to destroy a Viet Cong unit despite overwhelming air and artillery support and a ten-to-one superiority in men. |
|  | D) | Occupied a deserted village that the guerrillas had long since abandoned. |
|  | E) | Impressed their American advisors with their great bravery under fire. |
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10 |  |  The strategic hamlet program: |
|  | A) | Succeeded in protecting the villagers of South Vietnam from attacks by Chinese insurgents. |
|  | B) | Was skillfully implemented by the Diem government. |
|  | C) | Turned the tide in the struggle for the control of rural South Vietnam. |
|  | D) | Proved to be a poorly implemented effort that failed either to incorporate meaningful land reform or to provide sufficient security for village residents. |
|  | E) | Greatly interfered with the NLF's efforts to infiltrate rural villages. |
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11 |  |  During 1962, reporters such as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan: |
|  | A) | Agreed with Ambassador Frederick Nolting and General Paul Harkins that the U.S. had stemmed the Communist tide in South Vietnam. |
|  | B) | Questioned the importance of containing Communism in South Vietnam. |
|  | C) | Argued that the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments were losing the war. |
|  | D) | Called on the Kennedy Administration to expand the war by bombing North Vietnam. |
|  | E) | Pressed successfully for direct negotiations between Hanoi and Washington. |
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12 |  |  The Hilsman-Forrestal report of early 1963: |
|  | A) | Occupied a middle ground between critical press reports and optimistic embassy assessments. |
|  | B) | Agreed with the conclusion of reporters such as David Halberstam that the U.S. was losing the war. |
|  | C) | Argued for wholesale changes in American policy. |
|  | D) | Called for the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. |
|  | E) | Urged Kennedy to commit American combat formations to South Vietnam. |
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13 |  |  Friction between the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments in the spring of 1963 was highlighted by: |
|  | A) | Diem's demand that the U.S. remove all of its advisers from South Vietnam. |
|  | B) | Sporadic fighting between U.S. advisers and South Vietnamese soldiers. |
|  | C) | U.S. insistence that Diem step down in favor of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. |
|  | D) | Ngo Dinh Nhu's public proposal that the U.S. withdraw 5,000 men from South Vietnam. |
|  | E) | All of the above. |
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14 |  |  According to the author, the 1,000-man troop withdrawal proposal that the Kennedy Administration debated in 1963 was: |
|  | A) | Part of JFK's secret plan to end American involvement in South Vietnam following his reelection in 1964. |
|  | B) | The first step in the phased withdrawal of American forces made possible by the defeat of the Viet Cong. |
|  | C) | A sign that Kennedy understood the failure of America's effort in Vietnam. |
|  | D) | A political ploy to ease domestic concerns and to reassure Diem that the U.S. was not trying to take over his government. |
|  | E) | All of the above. |
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15 |  |  Following the May 8, 1963, incident in Hue, Buddhist monks and their supporters protested the Diem government by: |
|  | A) | Staging highly publicized self immolations and mass protests. |
|  | B) | Waging guerrilla war. |
|  | C) | Openly allying with the Viet Cong. |
|  | D) | Assassinating high officials and burning down government buildings. |
|  | E) | All of the above. |
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16 |  |  On August 21, 1963, the Diem government: |
|  | A) | Reconciled with the Buddhists. |
|  | B) | Demanded that the U.S. pull its troops out of South Vietnam. |
|  | C) | Refused to promise outgoing Ambassador Frederick Nolting that it would not take further repressive actions against the Buddhists. |
|  | D) | Launched massive raids on pagodas in Hue, Saigon, and other cities that resulted in the arrest of over 1,400 monks. |
|  | E) | Opened negotiations with North Vietnam aimed at effecting a political solution to the ongoing war with the NLF. |
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17 |  |  The controversial August 24, 1963 cable to incoming Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge: |
|  | A) | Strongly reaffirmed unqualified American support for the Diem government. |
|  | B) | Argued that the U.S. needed to end its commitment to South Vietnam. |
|  | C) | Indicated that the U.S. would back a coup by South Vietnamese generals if Diem refused to kick his brother Nhu out of the government. |
|  | D) | Called for Lodge to press Diem mildly for democratic reforms. |
|  | E) | Urged that American advisers be permitted to take part in combat. |
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18 |  |  In the fall of 1963 the Buddhist crisis and the emerging rift with the Diem government led the Kennedy Administration to: |
|  | A) | Give serious consideration to ending America's commitment to South Vietnam. |
|  | B) | Drift toward backing coup in South Vietnam despite sharp divisions among top policymakers. |
|  | C) | Open direct negations with Hanoi aimed at finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis in South Vietnam. |
|  | D) | Support enthusiastically a French neutralization proposal for South Vietnam. |
|  | E) | Contemplate a massive American invasion of North Vietnam. |
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19 |  |  According to the author, French President Charles de Gaulle's neutralization proposal: |
|  | A) | Constituted a lost chance to avoid American involvement in the Vietnam War. |
|  | B) | Was part of a clever Soviet ploy designed to trap the U.S. into a no-win situation. |
|  | C) | Won Kennedy's full support after he concluded that America could not achieve its objectives in South Vietnam. |
|  | D) | Had little chance of success given the lack of interest either side had in meaningful negotiations. |
|  | E) | All of the above. |
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20 |  |  The Kennedy Administration's move in October 1963 to recall CIA Station Chief John Richardson and to make selective cuts in the aid it provided to South Vietnam: |
|  | A) | Indicated strong continued American support of Diem. |
|  | B) | Failed to have an impact in Saigon. |
|  | C) | Signaled American support for a coup d'etat by South Vietnamese generals. |
|  | D) | Was only a slap on the wrist designed to appease domestic critics angry at Diem's repression of the Buddhists. |
|  | E) | Prompted Ngo Dinh Nhu to seize power in a bloodless coup. |
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21 |  |  With his top advisers sharply divided in October 1963 between those who continued to support Diem and those who advocated his removal, Kennedy: |
|  | A) | Sided strongly with Diem supporters such as General Paul Harkins. |
|  | B) | Unequivocally backed those who sought Diem's removal from power. |
|  | C) | Ignored Vietnam in disgust. |
|  | D) | Pursued a truly even-handed compromise policy. |
|  | E) | Followed a compromise policy that left matters in Ambassador Lodge's hands and thereby ensured U.S. support for a coup d'etat against Diem. |
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22 |  |  In the aftermath of the November 1, 1963 coup d'etat, Diem and Nhu: |
|  | A) | Left South Vietnam for exile under a promise of safe conduct. |
|  | B) | Were brutally murdered in the back of an armored personnel carrier. |
|  | C) | Fled from South Vietnam with the help of sympathetic American officials such as Ambassador Lodge. |
|  | D) | Committed accidental suicide. |
|  | E) | Escaped into the jungles of South Vietnam to join the National Liberation Front. |
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23 |  |  During his time as president, John F. Kennedy: |
|  | A) | Reduced America's commitment to South Vietnam. |
|  | B) | Neither increased nor reduced substantially America's commitment to South Vietnam. |
|  | C) | Set in motion a plan for a complete withdrawal from South Vietnam. |
|  | D) | Increased America's commitment to South Vietnam dramatically and bequeathed to Lyndon Johnson a problem far more dangerous than the one he had inherited. |
|  | E) | Bravely pursued a neutralist solution to the problem of South Vietnam at great political cost. |
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