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1 | |
At its Ninth Plenum held in December 1963, the North Vietnamese Central Committee decided to: |
| | A) | Order the National Liberation Front (NLF) to increase political and military attacks on the South Vietnamese government. |
| | B) | Increase the infiltration of men to South Vietnam. |
| | C) | Commit People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) regular units to the war in South Vietnam. |
| | D) | Gamble that a quick move could result in the rapid collapse of South Vietnam. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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2 | |
In his first formal statement of Vietnam policy, National Security Council Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273, Lyndon Johnson: |
| | A) | Candidly acknowledged that the situation in South Vietnam was a civil war, but still called on the U.S. to assist the South Vietnamese government. |
| | B) | Ordered a total reevaluation of American involvement in South Vietnam. |
| | C) | Maintained steadfastly that South Vietnam was the victim of an externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy, and made defeating that menace America's central objective in South Vietnam. |
| | D) | Continued American support for the Saigon government, but ordered preparations for American air attacks on Hanoi if necessary. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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3 | |
The military junta that overthrew the Diem regime: |
| | A) | Vigorously prosecuted the war with the NLF. |
| | B) | Worked harmoniously and aggressively to establish an effective government. |
| | C) | Sought to expand the role of American advisors. |
| | D) | Energetically promoted democracy in South Vietnam. |
| | E) | Was overthrown on January 29, 1964 by General Nguyen Khanh. |
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4 | |
Upon taking office, President Johnson: |
| | A) | Viewed Vietnam as an exciting challenge that he could use to establish his legacy and secure election in 1964. |
| | B) | Saw Vietnam as a minor problem easily solved through more efficient management. |
| | C) | Perceived Vietnam to be an unwanted intrusion that he had to deal with lest it interfere with his ambitious domestic political agenda. |
| | D) | Brought in new top-level foreign policy advisors to replace policymakers such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk who had orchestrated Kennedy's Vietnam policy. |
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5 | |
President Johnson refused to grant a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) request for direct American air and ground operations in early 1964 because: |
| | A) | He felt that direct American participation in the conflict would lead the South Vietnamese to let the United States fight the war for them. |
| | B) | He had little enthusiasm for getting involved in a land war in Asia. |
| | C) | Such a course would threaten his ambitious social agenda. |
| | D) | American participation in Vietnam would result in hostile propaganda throughout the world. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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6 | |
Approved on March 17, 1964, National Security Council Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288: |
| | A) | Called for a reappraisal of policy that sharply if temporarily slowed America's growing involvement in Vietnam. |
| | B) | Laid the groundwork for direct American participation in South Vietnam. |
| | C) | Restated America's goal of preventing South Vietnam from falling to Communism, and called for a program to put that nation on a war footing. |
| | D) | Raised the possibility of neutralizing South Vietnam through diplomacy. |
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7 | |
President Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf incident to: |
| | A) | Press for a complete reappraisal of America's Vietnam policy. |
| | B) | Begin a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam. |
| | C) | Bring alleged North Vietnamese aggression to the attention of the United Nations. |
| | D) | Win Congressional approval of a resolution authorizing him to use American forces in Vietnam. |
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8 | |
Hanoi responded to the Tonkin Gulf incident by: |
| | A) | Ordering PAVN units to move into South Vietnam to support a planned final drive for victory scheduled for the spring of 1965. |
| | B) | Pursuing negotiations in hopes of unifying Vietnam peacefully. |
| | C) | Ordering the NLF to scale back its activities in South Vietnam so as to prevent further bombing raids on North Vietnam. |
| | D) | Launching air attacks against American aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf. |
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9 | |
President Johnson opposed escalating the war in the fall of 1964 because: |
| | A) | His political position was sufficiently secure that he could resist hawkish calls for increased American involvement. |
| | B) | The establishment of a sufficiently stable and strong government in South Vietnam rendered that course unnecessary. |
| | C) | Guerilla aggression in South Vietnam had abated as a result of a Communist peace offensive. |
| | D) | He believed that the South Vietnamese government was far too weak to handle an expanded war at that time. |
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10 | |
Undersecretary of State George Ball objected to air attacks against North Vietnam for all of the following reasons EXCEPT: |
| | A) | Bombing would not likely improve morale in South Vietnam. |
| | B) | North Vietnam might respond with a strategic air offensive of its own. |
| | C) | Hanoi could counter by sending its well-trained soldiers into South Vietnam. |
| | D) | Bombing would not likely force Hanoi to yield to American wishes. |
| | E) | Air attacks might prompt Communist China to intervene in support of North Vietnam. |
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11 | |
In December 1964, President Johnson approved: |
| | A) | A massive commitment of American troops to combat operations in South Vietnam. |
| | B) | An immediate naval blockade of North Vietnam. |
| | C) | A two-phase plan that called for the limited bombing of North Vietnam and Laos followed by a large-scale air offensive and a naval blockade. |
| | D) | Secret negotiations designed to end America's unlimited commitment to South Vietnam. |
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12 | |
The February 1965 National Liberation Front attack on a U.S. Army barracks in Pleiku: |
| | A) | Served as a convenient pretext for the Johnson Administration to begin the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign. |
| | B) | Awoke American officials to the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and to the necessity of quickly expanding American involvement. |
| | C) | Spurred the Administration to begin an open, public debate over its Vietnam policy. |
| | D) | Led LBJ to contemplate reducing America's commitment to South Vietnam. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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13 | |
Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected strongly to General William Westmoreland's urgent, February 1965 request in for the deployment of American Marines to protect the air base at Danang because of his: |
| | A) | Strong feeling that the U.S. needed to commit a substantially larger force to South Vietnam. |
| | B) | Belief that the deployment would discourage aggressive action by South Vietnamese troops. |
| | C) | Opposition to the use of American troops in the defense of static positions. |
| | D) | Fears that the deployment would put the U.S. on a slippery slope leading inevitably to more and larger deployments. |
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14 | |
Taylor's enclave strategy: |
| | A) | Proposed a limited commitment of American forces to coastal base areas designed to prevent a quick Communist victory and to give South Vietnam time to build up its forces. |
| | B) | Marked a step back from large-scale involvement. |
| | C) | Was self-consciously designed to spur further American intervention. |
| | D) | Called for aggressive offensive actions in the strategic Central Highlands. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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15 | |
President Johnson opposed basing American intervention in South Vietnam on a declaration of war because: |
| | A) | He believed that following such a course might trigger a Chinese or Soviet response. |
| | B) | He felt that a declaration of war would undermine his domestic Great Society reform program. |
| | C) | He and his advisors believed that foreign policy concerns were too complicated and important to be left to public debate. |
| | D) | He feared that a declaration of war might fuel public demands for an unlimited war against North Vietnam. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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16 | |
In the spring of 1965, the Johnson Administration sought to blunt criticism of its Vietnam policy through all of the following EXCEPT: |
| | A) | Withdrawing troops from South Vietnam. |
| | B) | Making dramatic peace initiatives such as Johnson's April 7, 1965, speech at Johns Hopkins University. |
| | C) | Organizing seminars on college campuses at which officials could present the Administration's case. |
| | D) | Approving a five-day bombing halt. |
| | E) | Inviting foreign leaders, newspaper editors, and congressmen to the White House to discuss the Administration's Vietnam policy. |
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17 | |
In May 1965, a new government came to power in South Vietnam headed by: |
| | A) | Ngo Dinh Nhu. |
| | B) | Phan Huy Quat. |
| | C) | Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu. |
| | D) | Nguyen Chanh Thi. |
| | E) | Bui Diem. |
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18 | |
George Ball opposed committing American troops to offensive operations in the summer of 1965 by raising all of the following objections EXCEPT: |
| | A) | His doubts that the U.S. could defeat the enemy. |
| | B) | His belief that the U.S. could effect a favorable diplomatic solution through a summit with Soviet leader Alexei Kosygin. |
| | C) | His assertion that direct military involvement would lead to a long war and would result in an open-ended American commitment. |
| | D) | His belief that once committed, the U.S. could not retreat from Vietnam without suffering a humiliating diplomatic loss of face. |
| | E) | His contention that even intervention on a massive scale could not force Hanoi to negotiate. |
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19 | |
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara justified committing American ground troops to offensive operations in the summer of 1965 by arguing that doing so would: |
| | A) | Quickly and decisively defeat the Communists. |
| | B) | Overawe the Communists, who would surrender rather than face defeat at the hands of the mighty American military. |
| | C) | Avert immediate defeat, and have a pretty good chance of creating conditions conducive to a favorable solution in the future. |
| | D) | Cost the U.S. nothing, while mollifying domestic critics who were calling for decisive action. |
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20 | |
LBJ's decision in July 1965 to commit American troops to offensive operations and to expand the air war constituted: |
| | A) | A minor escalation of American involvement in Vietnam. |
| | B) | A limited step based on the assumption that no further escalation would be necessary. |
| | C) | A cunningly devised ploy to divide Hanoi and Beijing. |
| | D) | An open-ended commitment that cleared the way for the U.S. to take the lead in fighting the war. |
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21 | |
LBJ accompanied his decision to authorize offensive American military operations in South Vietnam with: |
| | A) | A low-key announcement designed to avoid whipping up public opinion. |
| | B) | A mobilization of the reserves and a call up of the National Guard. |
| | C) | A declaration of national emergency aimed at building popular support for war. |
| | D) | A tax increase designed to pay for the war. |
| | E) | A congressional resolution formally endorsing his decision. |
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2002 McGraw-Hill Higher Education