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1 | |
The United States' approach to fighting the Vietnam War: |
| | A) | Brilliantly related American military power to the central task of building an effective South Vietnamese government. |
| | B) | Was consciously designed to inflict the maximum number of civilian deaths possible. |
| | C) | Was never appropriate for the war because the U.S. merely assumed that applying its superior military power would achieve victory. |
| | D) | Was more political than military in nature. |
| | E) | Greatly overestimated North Vietnam's military strength. |
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2 | |
The Rolling Thunder bombing campaign: |
| | A) | Had no impact on North Vietnam. |
| | B) | Crippled North Vietnam's well-developed munitions industry through massive strikes. |
| | C) | Caused a staggering $6 billion in damage. |
| | D) | Had little impact on North Vietnam, but completely disrupted the infiltration of men and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. |
| | E) | Inflicted about $600 million in damage to North Vietnam. |
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3 | |
The Johnson Administration's decision to pursue a gradualist approach to the air war permitted North Vietnam to do all of the following EXCEPT: |
| | A) | Establish a large munitions industry. |
| | B) | Build a powerful air defense system. |
| | C) | Implement alternative transportation systems. |
| | D) | Protect critical resources. |
| | E) | Persist in the war despite the damage the U.S. was inflicting. |
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4 | |
The USSR began to provide North Vietnam with substantial military assistance beginning in 1965 because: |
| | A) | It hoped to tie the U.S. down in Southeast Asia so that unopposed Soviet forces could pursue opportunities in Europe and the Middle East. |
| | B) | An American defeat in Southeast Asia would set the stage for a real thaw in the Cold War. |
| | C) | Moscow wished to prevent America from establishing a strong position on the border of its close fraternal ally, China. |
| | D) | Assistance to North Vietnam would prove Soviet credibility in the face of hostile Chinese propaganda and give the USSR the chance to test new weapon systems. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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5 | |
Beijing assisted North Vietnam in its war with the U.S. by: |
| | A) | Having its fighter aircraft intercept American attack planes over the Tonkin Gulf. |
| | B) | Sending "volunteers" to join People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units fighting in South Vietnam. |
| | C) | Providing huge amounts of supplies and munitions and by deploying 320,000 troops to help North Vietnam rebuild and defend its transportation network. |
| | D) | Having Chinese divisions engage American Marines along the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). |
| | E) | Threatening to invade Taiwan. |
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6 | |
The Rolling Thunder air war did all of the following EXCEPT: |
| | A) | Result in the loss of over 950 American aircraft between 1965 and 1968. |
| | B) | Stop the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. |
| | C) | Provide Hanoi with American hostages in the form of downed airmen. |
| | D) | Cost the United States $9.60 for each $1 of damage inflicted. |
| | E) | Give Hanoi a tremendous propaganda advantage. |
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7 | |
Through his Search and Destroy strategy, General William Westmoreland: |
| | A) | Abandoned the U.S. Army's traditional, conventional approach to warfare in favor of a small-unit counterinsurgency strategy. |
| | B) | Sought to lure North Vietnamese units into populated areas where the U.S. could easily effect their destruction. |
| | C) | Pursued a typical, conventional strategy designed to eliminate the military threat to South Vietnam by locating and destroying North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (NLF) units. |
| | D) | Avoided engaging enemy main force units in favor of police activities designed to uproot and destroy the NLF's political apparatus. |
| | E) | Launched a conventional, tank-led invasion across the DMZ into North Vietnam. |
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8 | |
President Lyndon Johnson's "many flags" campaign to secure troop commitments to Vietnam from America's Pacific allies: |
| | A) | Was a resounding success that resulted in large numbers of allied troops joining American forces in South Vietnam. |
| | B) | Met with outright hostility from previously steadfast allies such as Thailand, Australia, and South Korea. |
| | C) | Was publicly supported by American allies, but did not result in the commitment of any soldiers. |
| | D) | Was a disappointment that resulted in the deployment of only 71,000 troops. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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9 | |
American forces used which of the following in Vietnam: |
| | A) | IBM computers programmed to predict when and where the enemy would attack. |
| | B) | Defoliants such as Agent Orange designed to destroy the dense jungle that provided the enemy with cover. |
| | C) | Massive air support including napalm and B-52 raids. |
| | D) | Huge amounts of artillery fire. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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10 | |
From 1965 to 1968, North Vietnam: |
| | A) | Matched American escalations by sending more troops south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and by maintaining the military pressure so as to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. units. |
| | B) | Sought to engage in traditional, set-piece battles in which its forces could decisively defeat the Americans. |
| | C) | Proved unable to match the massive American escalation that took place between 1965 and 1968. |
| | D) | Sought to minimize combat with the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces so as to keep its casualties down. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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11 | |
The principle index the United States used to chart success in Vietnam was: |
| | A) | The movement of the front line and the capture of key geographical objectives. |
| | B) | A sophisticated measurement of the proportion of South Vietnamese peasants who were loyal to the Saigon government. |
| | C) | The strength and stability of the South Vietnamese government. |
| | D) | The "body count." |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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12 | |
The American attrition strategy: |
| | A) | Was so destructive that North Vietnam proved unable to replace its losses and thus could not match American escalation. |
| | B) | Quickly turned the tide and gave the United States the strategic advantage. |
| | C) | Permitted General Westmoreland to put the enemy on the defensive and thereby allowed him to shift forces to the key task of pacification. |
| | D) | Rapidly decimated the critical NLF political infrastructure. |
| | E) | Proved able to achieve no more than a stalemate. |
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13 | |
With the Americanization of the war in 1965, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN): |
| | A) | Became more dependent than ever on the U.S. |
| | B) | Underwent a period of intensive retooling from which it emerged stronger than ever. |
| | C) | Was divided into small units that were then integrated into the American command under a system pioneered during the Korean War. |
| | D) | Shrank dramatically in size to become a highly mobile, elite striking force. |
| | E) | Undertook a series of spoiler attacks into North Vietnam that threw the enemy off balance. |
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14 | |
In 1966, Nguyen Cao Ky solidified his political position by: |
| | A) | Having Nguyen Van Thieu assassinated. |
| | B) | Secretly negotiating with the NLF. |
| | C) | Holding and winning legitimate, free elections. |
| | D) | Sending South Vietnamese Marines to Da Nang to put down a Buddhist rebellion. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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15 | |
The Revolutionary Development (RD) program suffered from all of the following EXCEPT: |
| | A) | Difficulties recruiting sufficient personnel. |
| | B) | Attacks on RD cadre by NLF guerrillas. |
| | C) | Bureaucratic problems and insufficient funding. |
| | D) | Boorish behavior by nearby ARVN units that undercut the program's good work. |
| | E) | The efforts of top South Vietnamese officials to turn the RD program into a conduit for lucrative diamond smuggling. |
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16 | |
The Americanization of the war that began in 1965: |
| | A) | Made an estimated 4 million Vietnamese refugees in their own country. |
| | B) | Fueled severe crime and corruption. |
| | C) | Led to an explosion of prostitution and to the creation of seedy bar districts. |
| | D) | Undermined South Vietnam's fragile economy. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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17 | |
North Vietnam's diplomatic position—the Four Points—conditioned negotiations on: |
| | A) | The rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from all of Southeast Asia, the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, free elections, and amnesty for all NLF members. |
| | B) | A development loan of $2 billion dollars, the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, American acceptance of Peaceful Coexistence, and the end of the strategic hamlet program. |
| | C) | The withdrawal of American troops form South Vietnam, the end of all acts of war against North Vietnam, the dismantling of American bases, and the resolution of South Vietnam's internal affairs on the basis of the NLF's program. |
| | D) | The immediate reunification of Vietnam. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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18 | |
Antiwar liberals opposed American participation in the war for all of the following reasons EXCEPT: |
| | A) | Their belief that the employment of weapons such as napalm was inhumane. |
| | B) | Their conviction that America had betrayed its bedrock principles by supporting a corrupt and repressive regime in South Vietnam. |
| | C) | Their conclusion that U.S. escalation violated a number of international agreements including the United Nations Charter and the 1954 Geneva Accords. |
| | D) | Their doubts in the validity of the domino theory on which the Johnson Administration justified intervention. |
| | E) | Their belief that the war was but the latest example of the way in which American capitalism brutally exploited people all across the globe. |
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19 | |
According to the author, the antiwar movement: |
| | A) | Failed to turn the American people against the war, but did compel a debate that eventually led policymakers and the public to give serious consideration to ending American involvement in Vietnam. |
| | B) | Almost single-handedly forced the U.S. to deescalate its involvement in Vietnam. |
| | C) | Turned the American people against the war and thus encouraged a wavering North Vietnamese government to press on toward victory. |
| | D) | Had no impact whatsoever on the course of the war. |
| | E) | Divided America to the point that a civil war nearly erupted in the summer of 1967. |
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20 | |
In the summer of 1967, General William Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: |
| | A) | Admitted that their program had failed and consequently called for a return to the enclave strategy. |
| | B) | Asked for 200,000 additional troops, a limited call up of the reserves, and an escalation of the war that would include operations in Laos and across the DMZ into North Vietnam. |
| | C) | Demanded a declaration of war designed to rally the American people behind continued involvement. |
| | D) | Asked President Johnson to seek a diplomatic solution to the war. |
| | E) | Resigned to protest the President's refusal to call up the reserves or provide the troops they believed necessary to achieve victory. |
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21 | |
By the summer of 1967, the chief opponent in the Johnson Administration to the continuation of the Vietnam War was: |
| | A) | Secretary of State Dean Rusk. |
| | B) | Vice President Hubert Humphrey. |
| | C) | Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles. |
| | D) | Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. |
| | E) | Senator Robert Kennedy. |
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22 | |
The San Antonio peace formula: |
| | A) | Conditioned America's willingness to negotiate on the prior withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam. |
| | B) | Indicated Washington's willingness to pull all of its troops out of South Vietnam in exchange for the start of meaningful negotiations. |
| | C) | Made clear America's willingness to stop the bombing campaign "with the understanding" that meaningful discussions would follow and that Hanoi would not exploit the cessation to accelerate infiltration into the south. |
| | D) | Amounted to a complete repudiation of Washington's prior goal of maintaining a non-Communist South Vietnam. |
| | E) | Was designed to appease the antiwar movement at home and did not reflect a meaningful change in America's bargaining position. |
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23 | |
The CIA's Operation CHAOS: |
| | A) | Was illegal and a violation of the agency's charter. |
| | B) | Uncovered links between Hanoi and the peace movement. |
| | C) | Provided overwhelming evidence that most major antiwar groups were under the direct control of the USSR. |
| | D) | Was an ugly but necessary action during time of war. |
| | E) | Effectively broke the back of the NLF's political organization in the Mekong Delta. |
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2002 McGraw-Hill Higher Education