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1 | |
The 1968 Tet Offensive can be best characterized as: |
| | A) | A decisive victory for the United States and South Vietnam. |
| | B) | A tactical victory for the United States, but a psychological and political triumph for Hanoi. |
| | C) | A minor military effort on the part of the National Liberation Front (NLF). |
| | D) | A highly successful drive by American forces into Laos. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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2 | |
According to the author, the Tet Offensive was: |
| | A) | A desperate effort on North Vietnam's part to achieve victory in the face of impending defeat. |
| | B) | A strictly military operation with no diplomatic component whatsoever. |
| | C) | A very limited operation designed to improve the Communists' tactical position in the war. |
| | D) | A major effort that the Communists hoped would spark a "general uprising" among the people of South Vietnam. |
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3 | |
In the fall of 1967 Hanoi prepared for the Tet Offensive by doing all of the following EXCEPT: |
| | A) | Besieging the Marine base at Khe Sanh. |
| | B) | Opening negotiations with the U.S. designed to create dissension between Washington and Saigon. |
| | C) | Attacking the town of Dak To in the Central Highlands. |
| | D) | Ordering NLF forces to infiltrate into South Vietnamese cities and towns. |
| | E) | Launching a massive armored drive designed to split South Vietnam in two. |
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4 | |
The Tet Offensive led General William Westmoreland to propose: |
| | A) | Withdrawing American troops from what had become a losing war. |
| | B) | Massively increasing the number of American troops in South Vietnam and expanding the war to include major operations in Laos and Cambodia as well as an attack across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). |
| | C) | Shifting the burden of the fighting to South Vietnamese troops. |
| | D) | A return to the enclave strategy. |
| | E) | The use of biological weapons against the enemy's sanctuaries. |
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5 | |
According to the author, General Earle Wheeler's February 1968 report to Washington: |
| | A) | Was intentionally pessimistic so as to persuade President Johnson to approve the deployment of substantial reinforcements to South Vietnam. |
| | B) | Characterized the Tet Offensive as a decisive victory for the United States. |
| | C) | Constituted the first time that a high-ranking military officer advocated withdrawal from South Vietnam. |
| | D) | Had little impact on Johnson who was preoccupied with his re-election campaign. |
| | E) | Called on Johnson to dismiss Westmoreland for incompetence. |
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6 | |
Alain Enthoven of Systems Analysis responded to Wheeler's call for more troops by: |
| | A) | Arguing that additional forces were unnecessary in the wake of America's overwhelming victory in the Tet Offensive. |
| | B) | Asserting that America was poised to achieve a quick victory through a modest increase in the airwar. |
| | C) | Making an impassioned plea for a more moral foreign policy. |
| | D) | Pointing out that North Vietnam could easily match any additional American deployments and could control its losses. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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7 | |
Following the Tet Offensive, Pentagon civilians: |
| | A) | Called for the United States to redouble its effort in order to achieve a total victory against North Vietnam. |
| | B) | Supported General Wheeler's call for additional deployments to Vietnam. |
| | C) | Proposed a "population security" strategy that would have American forces undertake limited operations designed to defend South Vietnam's major population centers. |
| | D) | Demanded that President Johnson authorize the mining of Haiphong harbor. |
| | E) | Advanced a daring plan to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail through a combined airborne and armored thrust into southern Laos. |
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8 | |
In the wake of the Wheeler report and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford's recommendations, the Johnson Administration: |
| | A) | Began to consider a partial bombing halt, a new peace initiative, and a policy of turning the war over to the South Vietnamese through "Vietnamization." |
| | B) | Committed itself to total victory. |
| | C) | Concluded that victory in Vietnam could not be achieved. |
| | D) | Opened negotiations with Hanoi aimed at extracting the U.S. from Vietnam. |
| | E) | Decided to deploy immediately 206,000 additional soldiers to South Vietnam in preparation for a new, end-of-war offensive. |
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9 | |
Following the Tet Offensive, the American press: |
| | A) | Helped the Administration restore popular support for the war through intensely jingoistic reporting. |
| | B) | Maintained its support the war, but with less enthusiasm. |
| | C) | Continued to hold a variety of diverse opinions about the war, but became far more critical of ongoing American involvement. |
| | D) | Had no impact on public opinion. |
| | E) | Embarked on a concerted campaign to destroy American confidence in Lyndon Johnson. |
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10 | |
President Johnson nearly lost the March 12, 1968, New Hampshire primary to: |
| | A) | Hubert Humphrey. |
| | B) | Eugene McCarthy. |
| | C) | Richard Nixon. |
| | D) | Robert Kennedy. |
| | E) | Joseph McCarthy. |
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11 | |
The gold crisis of March 1968: |
| | A) | Spurred the Administration to redouble its effort in South Vietnam so as to retain access to that increasingly important market. |
| | B) | Forced General Westmoreland to divert scarce troops to defend South Vietnam's suddenly vital gold mines. |
| | C) | Played an important part in President Johnson's decision to turn down General Westmoreland's request for additional troops. |
| | D) | Was a smoke screen that Johnson used to justify denying Westmoreland any further deployments. |
| | E) | Was a serious economic crisis, but was largely unrelated to the war in Vietnam. |
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12 | |
By March 1968, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford had: |
| | A) | Become the principle Administration advocate for an expanded war. |
| | B) | Publicly broke with President Johnson over the war. |
| | C) | Emerged as one of the major leaders of the antiwar movement. |
| | D) | Concluded that America needed to extricate itself from Vietnam because the war was damaging the nation's economic position and spurring domestic unrest. |
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13 | |
During his March 31, 1968, speech, President Johnson announced all of the following EXCEPT: |
| | A) | A partial bombing halt. |
| | B) | The phased withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam. |
| | C) | His administration's willingness to discuss peace at any time. |
| | D) | That he had named W. Averell Harriman as his personal peace representative. |
| | E) | His decision not to run for re-election in 1968. |
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14 | |
According to the author, Johnson's March 31, 1968, speech: |
| | A) | Marked Johnson's decision to abandon the goal of securing an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam in favor of extricating America from the war at any cost. |
| | B) | Ended any hope for a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam conflict. |
| | C) | Represented a shift in tactics designed to achieve the same end—the maintenance of a non-Communist South Vietnam—through different means. |
| | D) | Made no meaningful change to America's Vietnam policy. |
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15 | |
During 1968, all of the following individuals believed that America could wring major concessions from Hanoi by sustaining military pressure EXCEPT: |
| | A) | Dean Rusk. |
| | B) | Walt Rostow. |
| | C) | Ellsworth Bunker. |
| | D) | Clark Clifford. |
| | E) | William Westmoreland. |
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16 | |
The Peace talks between the U.S. and North Vietnam that began in Paris on May 13, 1968: |
| | A) | Quickly achieved a major breakthrough. |
| | B) | Secured a deal in which North Vietnam would pull its troops out in exchange for a total bombing halt. |
| | C) | Achieved an agreement that was subsequently undermined by NLF hard-liners. |
| | D) | Resulted in a comprehensive solution that would neutralize all of Southeast Asia. |
| | E) | Immediately deadlocked. |
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17 | |
The U.S. sought to bolster its negotiating position in the summer of 1968 by: |
| | A) | Stepping up ground operations in South Vietnam. |
| | B) | Launching the Accelerated Pacification Campaign to gain control of rural areas. |
| | C) | Initiating the Chieu Hoi Program. |
| | D) | Arresting NLF political cadre through the Phoenix Program. |
| | E) | All of the above. |
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18 | |
Following the Tet Offensive and America's subsequently accelerated military operations in the summer of 1968, the South Vietnamese government: |
| | A) | Greatly expanded its control over heretofore Communist-dominated rural areas. |
| | B) | Undertook secret negotiations with the NLF designed to neutralize South Vietnam. |
| | C) | Experience a series of bloody coup d'etat. |
| | D) | Remained as divided and ineffective as ever. |
| | E) | Welcomed the American negotiations with North Vietnam. |
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19 | |
In the fall of 1968, American and North Vietnamese negotiators agreed to a deal in which: |
| | A) | The U.S. would unilaterally halt bombing raids against North Vietnam in exchange for reduced infiltration across the DMZ, the end of communist rocket attacks on South Vietnamese cities, and the start of serious peace talks. |
| | B) | Both North Vietnam and the U.S. would withdraw its troops from South Vietnam. |
| | C) | America would stop bombing North Vietnam in exchange for Hanoi's recognition of South Vietnam. |
| | D) | America would limit its bombing to territory below the 20th parallel in exchange for a North Vietnamese promise to begin meaningful negotiations. |
| | E) | The U.S. would stop bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in exchange for an NLF promise to participate in a coalition government. |
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20 | |
According to the author, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu publicly opposed the October deal that Harriman had brokered in part because: |
| | A) | He perceptively recognized that Harriman's proposal was a bad one for the United States. |
| | B) | He believed that North Vietnam's defeat in the Tet Offensive had tipped the military balance sufficiently to allow South Vietnam to fend off any future attacks. |
| | C) | He sought instead to secure a sweeping diplomatic solution that would end the war through the establishment of a coalition government in South Vietnam. |
| | D) | Nixon campaign officials secretly promised him that South Vietnam would get a better deal under a Republican Administration. |
| | E) | He despised Harriman and would do anything to thwart him. |
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2002 McGraw-Hill Higher Education