Doing Philosophy: An Introduction Through Thought Experiments, 2/e

Theodore Schick, Muhlenberg College
Lewis Vaughn

The Problem of Personal Identity

You Can't Step Into the Same River Twice: Self as Process

Multiple Choice


1	Shoemaker's brain transplant thought experiment shows that
		A)	brains cannot be divided.
		B)	where our brains go, we go.
		C)	brain transplants destroy personal identity.
		D)	brains in different bodies become different persons.


2	Split brain experiments suggest that
		A)	the brain theory is inadequate.
		B)	each skull contains two persons.
		C)	two can be one.
		D)	our psychology is grounded in our brain.


3	Parfit suggests that what really matters in survival is
		A)	immortality.
		B)	memory.
		C)	numerical identity.
		D)	psychological continuity.


4	Parfit concludes that if there were two of you—two who were psychologically and physically indistinguishable—then
		A)	one of you would have to die.
		B)	having two of you would be better than having you be completely obliterated.
		C)	survival would be impossible.
		D)	you would not exist at all.


5	Numerical identity
		A)	does not seem to be necessary for survival.
		B)	does not seem to be necessary for responsibility.
		C)	does not seem to be all there is to personal identity.
		D)	all of the above.

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