Of all the UN organs, the Security Council (SC) is considered the most authoritative and therefore the most important body. The SC is charged with the maintenance of peace and security in the world, and it has the ability to enforce its resolutions by using economic sanctions and even military force. Originally the SC had 11 members, but in 1966 its membership increased to 15 member-states to account for the enlargement of the United Nations. Five of the 15 seats in the SC are permanent and carry veto power with them. The United States, Great Britain, France, China, and Russia are the permanent 5 (P-5), which means they hold veto power over the rest of the SC. The other 10 seats are divided in such a way as to allow for equal geographical representation, and countries in a region rotate every two years following regional elections and a vote in the General Assembly. These 10 nonpermanent seats do not have veto power.

Many countries agree that there is a need to reform the SC, but not many agree on the details of how it should be done. The issue that is most frequently raised by reformers is the current “end of WWII” bias within the SC. Critics point out that the five countries hold a superior position as a result of not only having a permanent seat in the SC, but also because they wield veto power. So the question for this debate is not whether to reform the Security Council, but how to reform it. Let us consider some of the current proposals by member-states:

• Numerous countries, such as Japan and Germany, make the case that they deserve permanent membership on the SC based on their economic presence within the organization. They argue that they are some of the largest contributors to UN operations and, therefore, ought to have a permanent seat on the council. Adding these two industrialized countries alone, however, would increase the Northern bias in the SC, which is yet another criticism of the UN body.
• Others believe that permanent seats should be added/reformed to represent each continent; but which country will represent each continent? Competition exists, for instance, between Brazil and Argentina for South America; Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa for Africa; and India and other Asian countries for Asia. Can one country really be reflective of the beliefs and values of entire continent or region of the world?
• Italy has proposed adding a new level of membership in the SC instead of adding more permanent members. This would mean that in addition to the P-5 and the 10 nonpermanent seats, there would be another group of “upper-level” nonpermanent seats. This new tier of membership would be open for rotation for the 20 to 30 countries that make subsequent contributions for UN operations, especially peacekeeping missions. This proposal is appealing to the P-5 and also to many midsize countries.
• Canada has also submitted a proposal arguing that there is a need to expand the SC and to allow for more permanent seats, with new members chosen according to clear and objective regional criteria. The Canadian proposal discusses two types of criteria: sheer economic size and regional weight, and economic development and human rights record. Canada believes that it is more important to give the membership to a large, influential country than to a small country, even if the latter is more developed but has no regional influence.
• In summer 2003 Great Britain came up with an SC reform proposal that adds five more permanent seats and four nonpermanent seats. The five added permanents were Brazil, South Africa, Japan, Germany, and India. The criteria of the British proposal were not fairness or equality, but a more accurate picture of the distribution of power in the world today.

The other issue on the table is veto power. Most reformers agree that there is no need to add more countries with veto power, but rather to gradually abolish the veto altogether, eliminating the power biases of the P-5.

The Canadian proposal supports no addition of veto-carrying seats and also suggests some limitations on the P-5 veto power, such as the need for a double/triple veto to defeat any resolution or limiting the veto power for decisions about peacekeeping and enforcement only.

A proposal from Chile suggests a time limit on the veto power and offers the year 2030 as a target date to abolish all veto rights. Colombia put forth a plan for overriding a veto in the SC by a 2/3 vote in the General Assembly.

Mexico argues that the veto privilege was only accepted in 1945 because all the other countries had no real choice.

But most countries agree that there should be some process here and that the P-5 should not be coerced into giving up the veto power. Many believe that some sort of two-stage process is necessary in order to assure P-5 compliance. This process would begin with the P-5 agreeing not to use its veto power and then in a few years veto power would be formally abolished. The problem with putting an end to the veto system is that such a decision will have to win the approval of the P-5 and they are expected to try and fight the process. Asking these five countries to voluntarily give up some of their power will certainly require skillful negotiators.

Which of the previous proposals do you think is most fair? Is democratic equality a priority? Should the SC even be concerned with fairness, or should efficiency take priority? Use the following links to help you support your position on this debate. Be sure you take a position on both the issue of permanent membership and the issue of the veto power.

UN Security Council Web site
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/

Reform debate issues from the Global Policy Forum
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/debateindex.htm

Article on reforming the United Nations from the Economist
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3444899

Recent news analysis from BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4675823.stm