I.
| Introduction |
II.
| Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry |
| A. | Theoretical Basis for Limit Pricing | B. | Limit Pricing May Fail to Deter Entry | C. | Linking the Pre-Entry Price to Post-Entry Profits | | 1. | Commitment Mechanisms | | 2. | Learning Curve Effects | | 3. | Incompl ete Inf ormati on | | 4. | Reputation Effects | D. | Dynamic Considerations |
|
III.
| Predatory Pricing to Lessen Competition |
IV.
| Raising Rivals' Costs to Lessen
Competition |
| A. | Strategies Involving
Marginal Cost | B. | Strategies Involving Fixed Costs | C. | Strategies for Vertically
Integrated Firms | | 1. | Vertical Foreclosure | | 2. | The Price-Cost Squeeze |
|
V.
| Price Discrimination as a Strategic Tool |
VI.
| Changing the Timing of Decisions or the Order of Moves |
| A. | First-Mover Advantages | B. | Second-Mover Advantages |
|
VII. | Penetration Pricing to Overcome Network Effects |
| A. | What is a Network? | B. | Network Externalities | C. | First-Mover Advantages Due to Consumer Lock-in | D. | Using Penetration Pricing to "Change the
Game" |
|
VIII.
| Answering the Headline |
IX.
| Summary |
X.
| Key Terms and Concepts |
XI.
| Conceptual and Computational Questions |
XII.
| Problems and Applications |
XIII.
| Case-Based Exercises |
XIV.
| Selected Readings |