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UNIT 1 The Multipolar International System

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- 1. The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America,** G. John Ikenberry, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2011
Ikenberry argues that “although the **United States**’ position in the **global system** is changing, the **liberal international order** is alive and well,” and “**China** and other **emerging great powers** do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order” because they have prospered from it, since it is “an international mutual aid society.” China, **India** and **Brazil** have benefitted from a liberal international order that is based on the **Westphalian** concept of state **sovereignty**, decentralization, **balance of power**, and a system of **open trade and free markets**. 3
- 2. NATO after Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times,** Anders Fogh Rasmussen, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2011
There has been “a **relative decline of European defense spending compared to that of emerging powers or the United States**.” The author stresses that the operation in **Libya** has underscored the unpredictability of threats that Europe faces, and the need for smart defense in a time of financial austerity. 9
- 3. Sino-Indian Relations: A Troubled History, An Uncertain Future,** Jeff M. Smith, *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2011
Smith writes that “[**China and India**] share a long and more importantly, contested **border**, and a close proximity that can magnify grievances, encourage friction, and perpetuate a **zero-sum** mentality.” The author observes that “China and India’s primary disputes may be on land and at sea, but their parrying stretches beyond **geographic boundaries**, into **cyberspace, the media, and international diplomacy**.” 12
- 4. Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,** Aaron L. Friedberg, *The National Interest*, July/August 2011
The author contends that “Seen from **Beijing**, Washington is a dangerous, crusading, **liberal**, quasi-independent power that will not rest until it imposes its views on the entire planet,” and that “the **United States** and the **People’s Republic of China** are locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for **power** and influence, not only in **Asia**, but around the world.” 17
- 5. Welcome to the Post-Western World,** Stephen F. Szabo, *Current History*, January 2011
The author predicts the development of “A more pluralistic, less structures **security system** that “[**will incorporate**] a decline in **America’s power** [and] a rapid increase in **China’s relative power**, but without an accompanying willingness or ability to take on global responsibilities.” 23

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide.

6. **Can the BRICs Become a Bloc?**, Timothy M. Shaw, *China Monitor*, June 2010
 Shaw stresses “the importance of the **BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)**, has **increased** in recent years but questions remain as to how cohesive is this new “**global middle?**” Nevertheless, the BRICs contribute to new **multilateralism** as an **embryonic bloc** “especially given the decline of **United States unilateralism.**”

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UNIT 2 Democratization

Unit Overview

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7. **The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak’s Reign Came to an End**, Dina Shehata, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2011

The author writes that “. . . **Mubarak’s** downfall was the result of three factors: increasing **corruption and economic exclusion, the alienation of the youth, and the 2010 elections and divisions among the Egyptian elite** over questions of succession.” However, Shehata observes that the **revolution** has not resulted in a complete change, leaving the **military** and **state bureaucracy** in control.

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8. **The Rise of the Islamists: How Islamists Will Change Politics, and Vice Versa**, Shadi Hamid, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2011

Truly **democratic governments** formed after the **popular revolutions** in the **Middle East** will “include significant representation of mainstream **Islamic** groups. **The United States** may discover “more convergence of interest than it expects.”

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9. **Arab Autocrats May Be Tottering, but the World’s Tyrants Aren’t All Quaking in Their Steel-Toed Boots**, Graeme Robertson, *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2011

The author writes that ruthless **dictatorships** are “one of the most enduring **political archetypes** [that have persisted into] the twenty-first century.” Nonetheless, the **Arab revolutions** have offered a spark of hope, one that has clearly worried dictators in places as far off as **Moscow** and **Beijing**.

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10. **After Gaddafi: How Does a Country Recover from 40 Years of Destruction by an Unchallenged Tyrant?**, Dirk Vandewalle, *Newsweek*, March 7, 2011

Vandewalle stresses that **Gaddafi** “has hollowed out the **Libyan state**, eviscerated all opposition in **Libyan society**, and in effect created a political tabula rasa on which a new free people will now have to scratch out a future.”

45

11. **Danger: Falling Tyrants**, Jeffrey Goldberg, *The Atlantic*, June 2011

The author engages in a case study of **Tunisia**, but also stresses that “as **dictatorships** crumble across the **Middle East**, what happens if **Arab democracy** means the rise of **radical Islamism?**”

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12. **Bangladesh’s Quest for Political Justice**, Jalal Alamgir, *Current History*, April 2010

Alamgir writes that “**Bangladesh’s** foremost political achievement has been the institutionalization of **free and fair elections**. But two basic ingredients of **democratic consolidation** have been missing: commitment to **human rights** and **equality** before the law.”

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13. **The Great Democracy Meltdown: Why the World Is Becoming Less Free**, Joshua Kurlantzick, *The New Republic*, June 9, 2011
The author states “the truth is that the **Arab Spring** is somewhat of a smokescreen . . . for **democratic meltdowns, not democratic revolutions**, that are now the norm”. Kurlantzick observes that the number of **electoral democracies** has declined to the lowest point since 1995. The Obama administration has downgraded **democracy promotion**, and there has been a rise in **isolationist** sentiment in the United States. 62
14. **Failed States: The 2011 Index**, *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2011
Three **African states—Somalia, Chad, and Sudan**—once again top this year’s **Failed States Index**, the annual ranking prepared by the Fund for Peace. 66



UNIT 3 Foreign Policy and Terrorism

Unit Overview 68

15. **Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?: Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times**, Daniel W. Drezner, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2011
Drezner argues that the Obama administration does have a **grand strategy**, which consists of **multilateral retrenchment** and **counterpunching**. Counterpunching consists of responding to international provocations and “**balancing against rising threats**.” Obama has “linked **U.S. Foreign policy to American exceptionalism**” and the biggest problem with Obama’s new grand strategy is the troublesome **domestic politics** of the **United States**. 71
16. **Samantha and Her Subjects**, Jacob Heilbrunn, *The National Interest*, May/June 2011
Heilbrunn stresses that presidential adviser, Samantha Power, is the key promoter of **humanitarian intervention** in a **civil war** to prevent **genocide**, and is “one of the advisers most responsible for pushing Obama to intervene in **Libya**.” 76
17. **Change in the Middle East: Its Implications for US Policy**, Michael Singh, *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2011
The author writes that “. . . the **United States** will need to redouble its efforts to address **threats** to its interests and **conflicts** in the **region**, alongside both local partners and **allies in Europe** and elsewhere” and will need to persuade “**its [nondemocratic] allies that political reform** is in the interests of their countries as well as themselves.” 82
18. **After Osama bin Laden: They Got Him**, *The Economist*, May 7, 2011
According to some observers, **Al Qaeda** is under severe pressure, smaller than it has been for years, and less capable of carrying out operations in the West. Al Qaeda, however, has mutated from a hierarchical pyramid organization into branches and franchises, such as **Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)**, **al-Qaeda in Iraq**, and **al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb**.” Even with bin Laden dead, most counterterrorism professionals expect that little will change. The most important question however, concerns the form that global jihad will now take. 86



UNIT 4 War, Arms Control, and Disarmament

Unit Overview 92

19. **Iraq, from Surge to Sovereignty: Winding Down the War in Iraq**, Emma Sky, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2011
The author concludes that “**Iraq** still has a long way to go before it becomes a stable, **sovereign** and self-reliant country” and fears that “Iraq could once again dissolve into violence without continued **U.S.** support.” 95

20. **Will America Lose Afghanistan—Again?**, Gary M. Bowman, *Current History*, April 2011
Bowman argues that the generals have provided poor advice to President Obama, because “. . . the generals oversold the troop **surge’s** potential to quickly and sustainably alter the **balance of forces** in **Afghanistan**,” which has resulted in “an irresolvable dilemma about how to leave Afghanistan while not conceding the country to the **Taliban insurgents**.” The author concludes that “the surge has led to demonstrable military progress, but it will be squandered unless combat troops remain in place through 2012.” 100
21. **Sudan on the Cusp**, Richard S. Williamson, *Current History*, May 2011
The author observes that “Many challenges lie ahead for the **new independent nation** and for what remains of the old **Sudan**, as well as for the neighboring countries, the wider region, and the international community,” and that “. . . the two most critical issues are **oil**—revenue sharing and the future of the **Abeyi region**.” 105
22. **A World without Nuclear Weapons Is a Joint Enterprise**, James Goodby, *Arms Control Today*, May 2011
Goodby writes that “With the entry into force of the **New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)** between **Russia and the United States**, the time has come to widen the conversation about eliminating **nuclear weapons** to include other nuclear-armed states and states with advanced **civil nuclear weapons programs**.” 110



UNIT 5

International Organization, International Law, and Human Security

Unit Overview 116

23. **A Pipe Dream?: Reforming the United Nations**, Thomas G. Weiss, *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2011
Weiss observes that “. . . the dramatic transformation of the **world organization**, and not mere tinkering, is required if we are to address **transboundary problems** that threaten **human survival and dignity**.” The author concludes that “. . . the **United Nations** still matters for its **norms, legitimacy, and idealism** . . . [and] urgently needs to reinvent itself . . . to be a vital force in global affairs.” 119
24. **Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal Court?: Finding the Prosecutor Who Can Set It Straight**, David Kaye, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2011
Kaye writes that “The future of the **ICC**, which was created in 1998 to deal with **war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide**, depends on an effective prosecutor, as **China, Russia, and the United States** are not members of the ICC, and the Court does not enjoy the backing of the **Security Council**.” 124
25. **The Pink Hijab**, Robin Wright, *The Wilson Quarterly*, Summer 2011
The article focuses on the **Egyptian activist**, Dalia Ziada, a member of the “pink **hijab** generation,” which consists of “young women committed to their faith, firm in their femininity, and resolute in their **rights**.” 130
26. **Feminism by Treaty**, Christina Hoff Sommers, *Policy Review*, June & July 2011
The author engages in a rather critical discussion of U.S. consideration of the **Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)** and points out that “The American Bar Association and Amnesty International insist that it is wrong to suggest that CEDAW would supersede American Law, while opponents to the **Treaty** argue that many of its rules would “conflict with our traditions of individual freedom.” 134

27. **The Persistence of Genocide**, David Rieff, *Policy Review*, February & March 2011

Rieff engages in a very critical analysis of the report of the **United States Institute for Peace's** task force on **genocide**, concluding that “. . . the solutions they propose are not real solutions, the history they touch on is not actual history, and the world they describe is not the real world.”

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UNIT 6 International Political Economy

Unit Overview

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28. **The Global Financial System and the Challenges Ahead**, Josef Ackermann, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Winter 2011

The author concludes that “**The global financial system** has recovered from the depths of the crisis” but cautions that “. . . the stabilization of **financial markets** is a precarious one” and that “parallel to these market developments, the institutional and regulatory framework for **global financial markets** is being reshaped.” The author also adds that the financial crisis of 2008 has reshaped **economic geography**, and for example, “Today, four of the world’s biggest banks by market value are **Chinese** . . .”

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29. **One for All, All for One: The Euro in Crisis**, Franco Pavoncello, *World Affairs*, May/June 2011


Pavoncello engages in an analysis of the origins of the **euro crisis**, and how **Greece's** financial difficulties have called into question the future of the **Eurozone**. The author observes that “Greece provoked the sudden realization that a **default of sovereign debt of Eurozone countries** was possible if not probable,” but concludes that **Europe** will not allow the “demise of the **euro**.”

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30. **Haiti: Testing the Limits of Government Aid and Philanthropy**, Carol Adelman, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Spring/Summer 2011

The author writes that “**Foreign aid**, which does not include **nongovernment aid** from private sources, accounted for 13 percent of **Haiti's GNI** in 2008.” Adelman concludes that “Given its **dependency** on foreign aid, if there is any hope for Haiti, it may be in new aid approaches that seek to work from the bottom up. Including the **local community** and **local government**.”

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UNIT 7 Global Environmental Issues

Unit Overview

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31. **A Climate Coalition of the Willing**, Thomas Hale, *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2011

Hale observes that “intergovernmental efforts to limit the gases that cause **climate change** have all but failed.” The author concludes that “by constructing a coalition of willing actors, the **international community** can make second-best, but still worthwhile progress toward mitigating climate change without a **multilateral treaty**.”

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32. **The Implications of Fukushima: The European Perspective**, Caroline Jorant, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July, 2011

Jorant writes that “the effects of the tragedy at **Japan's Fukushima power plant** will continue to reverberate over the upcoming weeks, months, and years. And . . . the consequences of the disaster go beyond Japan—like **Chernobyl** and **Three Mile Island**, Fukushima will reshape **nuclear agendas and policies** in countries around the world.”

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33. The New Geopolitics of Food, Lester R. Brown, *Foreign Policy*,
May/June 2011

Brown argues that a breakdown in the **food system** could come at any time as the world goes through a transition from a condition of **food surplus to food scarcity**. The author predicts that food scarcity will result in more **revolutions** and turmoil, like those in the **Arab Middle East in 2011**.

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Test-Your-Knowledge Form

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