

CHAPTER

# 9

# Prejudice

DISLIKING OTHERS



“Prejudice. A vagrant opinion without visible means of support.”

—Ambrose Bierce, *The Devil's Dictionary*, 1911

Prejudice comes in many forms—for our own group and against some other group: against “northeastern liberals” or “southern rednecks,” against Arab “terrorists” or American “infidels,” and against people who are fat or homely or single.

Consider some striking examples:

- *Religion.* In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Americans with a strong national identity expressed the most disdain for Arab immigrants (Lyons & others, 2010). And if told a job applicant is Muslim, many managers are not inclined to hire or pay well (Park & others, 2009). “Muslims are one of the last minorities in the U.S. that it is still possible to demean openly,” observed columnist Nicholas Kristof (2010) as antagonism toward Islamic mosques flared. In Europe, most non-Muslims express concern about “Islamic extremism” and perceive poor Muslim-Western relations (Pew, 2011). Middle Eastern Muslims reciprocate the negativity toward “greedy” and “immoral” Westerners and frequently report not believing that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks (Wike & Grim, 2007; Pew, 2011).
- *Obesity.* When seeking love and employment, overweight people—especially White women—face slim prospects.

What is the nature and power of prejudice?

What are the social sources of prejudice?

What are the motivational sources of prejudice?

What are the cognitive sources of prejudice?

What are the consequences of prejudice?

Postscript: Can we reduce prejudice?

In correlational studies, overweight people marry less often, gain entry to less-desirable jobs, and make less money (Swami & others, 2008). In experiments where some people's photo images are widened to make them appear overweight, they are perceived as less attractive, intelligent, happy, self-disciplined, and successful (Gortmaker & others, 1993; Hebl & Heatherton, 1998; Pingitore & others, 1994). Weight discrimination, in fact, exceeds racial or gender discrimination and occurs at every employment stage—hiring, placement, promotion, compensation, discipline, and discharge (Roehling, 2000). Negative assumptions about and discrimination against overweight people help explain why overweight women and obese men seldom (relative to their numbers in the general population) become the CEOs of large corporations or get elected to office (Roehling & others, 2008, 2009, 2010). As children, the obese are more often bullied, and as adults, they are more often depressed (de Wit & others, 2010; Lumeng & others, 2010; Luppino & others, 2010; Mendes, 2010).

- *Sexual orientation.* Many gay youth—two-thirds of gay secondary school students in one national British survey—report experiencing homophobic bullying (Hunt & Jensen, 2007). The U.S. National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health revealed that gay and lesbian teens are much more likely to be harshly punished by schools and courts than are their straight peers, despite being less likely to engage in serious wrongdoing (Himmelstein & Brückner, 2011). Among adults, one in five British lesbians and gays report having been victimized by aggressive harassment, insults, or physical assaults (Dick, 2008). In a U.S. national survey, 20 percent of gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons reported having experienced a personal or property crime owing to their sexual orientation, and half reported experiencing verbal harassment (Herek, 2009).
- *Age.* People's perceptions of the elderly—as generally kind but frail, incompetent, and unproductive—predispose patronizing behavior, such as baby-talk speech that leads elderly people to feel less competent and act less capably (Bugental & Hehman, 2007).
- *Immigrants.* A fast-growing research literature documents anti-immigrant prejudice among Germans toward Turks, the French toward North Africans, the British toward West Indians and Pakistanis, and Americans toward Latin American immigrants (Pettigrew, 2006). As we will see, the same factors that feed racial and gender prejudice also feed dislike of immigrants (Pettigrew & others, 2008; Zick & others, 2008).



# WHAT IS THE NATURE AND POWER OF PREJUDICE?

Understand the nature of prejudice and the differences between prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination.

Prejudice is distinct from stereotyping and discrimination. Social psychologists explore these distinctions and the different forms that prejudice assumes today.

## Defining Prejudice

Prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, racism, sexism—the terms often overlap. Let's clarify them. Each of the situations just described involved a negative evaluation of some group. And that is the essence of **prejudice**: a preconceived negative judgment of a group and its individual members. (Some prejudice definitions include *positive* judgments, but nearly all uses of "prejudice" refer to *negative* ones—what Gordon Allport termed in his classic book, *The Nature of Prejudice*, "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization" [1954, p. 9].)

Prejudice is an attitude. As we saw in Chapter 4, an attitude is a distinct combination of feelings, inclinations to act, and beliefs. It can be easily remembered as the ABCs of attitudes: *affect* (feelings), *behavior tendency* (inclination to act), and *cognition* (beliefs). A prejudiced person may *dislike* those different from self and *behave* in a discriminatory manner, *believing* them ignorant and dangerous.

The negative evaluations that mark prejudice often are supported by negative beliefs, called **stereotypes**. To stereotype is to generalize. To simplify the world, we generalize: The British are reserved. Americans are outgoing. Professors are absent-minded. Here are some widely shared stereotypes uncovered in research:

- During the 1980s, women who assumed the title of "Ms." were seen as more assertive and ambitious than those who called themselves "Miss" or "Mrs." (Dion, 1987; Dion & Cota, 1991; Dion & Schuller, 1991). After "Ms." became the standard female title, the stereotype shifted. It's married women who keep their own surnames that are seen as assertive and ambitious (Crawford & others, 1998; Etaugh & others, 1999).
- Public opinion surveys reveal that Europeans have had definite ideas about other Europeans. They have seen the Germans as relatively hardworking, the French as pleasure-loving, the British as cool and unexcitable, the Italians as amorous, and the Dutch as reliable. (One expects these findings to be reliable, considering that they come from Willem Koomen and Michiel Bähler, 1996, at the University of Amsterdam.)
- Europeans also view southern Europeans as more emotional and less efficient than northern Europeans (Linssen & Hagendoorn, 1994). The stereotype of the southerner as more expressive even holds within countries: James Pennebaker and his colleagues (1996) report that across 20 Northern Hemisphere countries (but not in 6 Southern Hemisphere countries), southerners within a country are perceived as more expressive than northerners.

Such generalizations can be more or less true (and are not always negative). The elderly *are* generally more frail. Southern countries in the Northern Hemisphere do have higher rates of violence. People living in the south in those countries do report being more expressive than those in the northern regions of their country. Teachers' stereotypes of achievement differences in students from different gender, ethnic, and class backgrounds tend to mirror reality (Madon & others, 1998). "Stereotypes," note Lee Jussim, Clark McCauley, and Yueh-Ting Lee (1995), "may be positive or negative, accurate or inaccurate." An accurate stereotype may even

### prejudice

A preconceived negative judgment of a group and its individual members.

### stereotype

A belief about the personal attributes of a group of people. Stereotypes are sometimes overgeneralized, inaccurate, and resistant to new information (and sometimes accurate).

#### FAMILIAR STEREOTYPES:

"HEAVEN IS A PLACE WITH AN AMERICAN HOUSE, CHINESE FOOD, BRITISH POLICE, A GERMAN CAR, AND FRENCH ART. HELL IS A PLACE WITH A JAPANESE HOUSE, CHINESE POLICE, BRITISH FOOD, GERMAN ART, AND A FRENCH CAR."

—ANONYMOUS, AS REPORTED

BY YUEH-TING LEE (1996)

be desirable. We call it “sensitivity to diversity” or “cultural awareness in a multicultural world.” To stereotype the British as more concerned about punctuality than Mexicans is to understand what to expect and how to get along with others in each culture. “Accuracy dominates bias,” notes Lee Jussim (2012). “The social perception glass (of people judging others) is about 90 percent full.”

The 10 percent problem with stereotypes arises when they are *overgeneralized* or just plain wrong. To presume that most American welfare clients are African American is to overgeneralize, because it just isn’t so. To presume that single people are less conscientious and more neurotic than partnered people, as did people in one German study, was wrong, because it just wasn’t so (Greitemeyer, 2009). To presume that people with disabilities are incompetent and asexual, as did Oregonians in another study, misrepresents reality (Nario-Redmond, 2010). To stigmatize the obese as slow, lazy, and undisciplined is inaccurate (Puhl & Heuer, 2009, 2010). To presume that Muslims are terrorists, priests are pedophiles, and evangelicals hate homosexuals overgeneralizes from the worst examples of each.

*Prejudice* is a negative *attitude*; **discrimination** is negative *behavior*. Discriminatory behavior often has its source in prejudicial attitudes (Dovidio & others, 1996; Wagner & others, 2008). Such was evident when researchers analyzed the responses to 1,115 identically worded emails sent to Los Angeles area landlords regarding vacant apartments. Encouraging replies came back to 89 percent of notes signed “Patrick McDougall,” to 66 percent from “Said Al-Rahman,” and to 56 percent from “Tyrell Jackson” (Carpusor & Loges, 2006). Other researchers have followed suit. When 4,859 U.S. state legislators received emails shortly before the 2008 election asking how to register to vote, “Jake Mueller” received more replies than “DeShawn Jackson,” though fewer from minority legislators (Butler & Broockman, 2011). Likewise, Jewish Israeli students were less likely to alert the sender to a misaddressed email that came from an Arab name and town (“Muhammed Yunis of Ashdod”) rather than from one of their own group (“Yoav Marom of Tel Aviv”) (Tykocinski & Bareket-Bojmel, 2009).

As Chapter 4 emphasized, however, attitudes and behavior are often loosely linked. Prejudiced attitudes need not breed hostile acts, nor does all oppression spring from prejudice. **Racism** and **sexism** are institutional practices that discriminate, even when there is no prejudicial intent. If word-of-mouth hiring practices in an all-White business have the effect of excluding potential non-White employees, the practice could be called racist—even if an employer intended no discrimination. When job ads for male-dominated vocations feature words associated with male stereotypes (“We are a dominant engineering firm seeking individuals who can perform in a competitive environment”), and job ads for female-dominated vocations feature the opposite (“We seek people who will be sensitive to clients’ needs and can develop warm client relationships”), the result may be institutional sexism. Without intending any prejudice, the gendered wording helps sustain gender inequality (Gaucher & others, 2011).

### discrimination

Unjustified negative behavior toward a group or its members.

### racism

(1) An individual’s prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior toward people of a given race, or (2) institutional practices (even if not motivated by prejudice) that subordinate people of a given race.

### sexism

(1) An individual’s prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior toward people of a given sex, or (2) institutional practices (even if not motivated by prejudice) that subordinate people of a given sex.

## Prejudice: Implicit and Explicit

Prejudice provides one of the best examples of our *dual attitude* system (Chapter 2). We can have different explicit (conscious) and implicit (automatic) attitudes toward the same target, as shown by 500 studies using the Implicit Association Test (Carpenter, 2008). The test, which has been taken online by some 6 million people, assesses “implicit cognition”—what you know without knowing that you know (Greenwald & others, 2008). It does so by measuring people’s speed of associations. Much as we more quickly associate a hammer with a nail than with a pail, so the test can measure how speedily we associate “White” with “good” versus “Black” with “good.” Thus, people may retain from childhood a habitual, automatic fear or dislike of people for whom they now express respect and admiration. Although explicit attitudes may change dramatically with education, implicit attitudes may linger, changing only as we form new habits through practice (Kawakami & others, 2000).

A raft of experiments—by researchers at Ohio State University and the University of Wisconsin (Devine & Sharp, 2008), Yale and Harvard universities (Banaji, 2004), Indiana University (Fazio, 2007), the University of Colorado (Wittenbrink, 2007; Wittenbrink & others, 1997), the University of Washington (Greenwald & others, 2000), the University of Virginia (Nosek & others, 2007), and New York University (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999)—have confirmed that prejudiced and stereotypic evaluations can occur outside people’s awareness. Some of these studies briefly flash words or faces that “prime” (automatically activate) stereotypes for some racial, gender, or age group. Without their awareness, the participants’ activated stereotypes may then bias their behavior. Having been primed with images associated with African Americans, for example, they may then react with more hostility to an experimenter’s (intentionally) annoying request.

Critics contend that the Implicit Association Test lacks sufficient validity to assess or label individuals (Blanton & others, 2006, 2009). The test is more appropriate for research, which has shown, for example, that implicit biases predict behaviors ranging from acts of friendliness to work evaluations (Greenwald & others, 2009). In the 2008 U.S. presidential election, both implicit and explicit prejudice predicted voters’ support for Barack Obama, and his election in turn led to some reduction in implicit prejudice (Bernstein & others, 2010; Payne & others, 2010).

Keeping in mind the distinction between conscious, explicit prejudice and unconscious, implicit prejudice, let’s examine two common forms of prejudice: racial prejudice and gender prejudice.

## Racial Prejudice

In the context of the world, every race is a minority. Non-Hispanic Whites, for example, are only one-fifth of the world’s people and will be one-eighth within another half-century. Thanks to mobility and migration over the past two centuries, the world’s races now intermingle, in relations that are sometimes hostile, sometimes amiable.

To a molecular biologist, skin color is a trivial human characteristic, one controlled by a minuscule genetic difference. Moreover, nature doesn’t cluster races in neatly defined categories. It is people, not nature, who label Barack Obama, the son of a White woman, as “Black.”

Most folks see prejudice—in other people. In one Gallup poll, White Americans estimated 44 percent of their peers to be high in prejudice (5 or higher on a 10-point scale). How many gave themselves a high score? Just 14 percent (Whitman, 1998).

### IS RACIAL PREJUDICE DISAPPEARING?

Which is right: people’s perceptions of high prejudice in others, or their perceptions of low prejudice in themselves? And is racial prejudice becoming a thing of the past?

Explicit prejudicial attitudes can change very quickly.

- In 1942, most Americans agreed, “There should be separate sections for Negroes on streetcars and buses” (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1956). Today the question would seem bizarre, because such blatant prejudice has nearly disappeared.
- In 1942, fewer than a third of all Whites (only 1 in 50 in the South) supported school integration; by 1980, support for it was 90 percent.
- In 1958, 4 percent of Americans of all races approved of Black-White marriages—as did 86 percent in 2011 (Jones, 2011).

Considering what a thin slice of history is covered by the years since 1942, or even since slavery was practiced, the changes are dramatic. In Britain, overt racial prejudice, as expressed in opposition to interracial marriage or having an ethnic minority boss, has similarly plummeted, especially among younger adults (Ford, 2008).

African Americans’ attitudes also have changed since the 1940s, when Kenneth Clark and Mamie Clark (1947) demonstrated that many African Americans held anti-Black prejudices. In making its historic 1954 decision declaring segregated

“ALTHOUGH OUR  
[CONSCIOUS] MINDS ARE  
IN THE RIGHT PLACES, AND  
WE MAY TRULY BELIEVE  
WE ARE NOT PREJUDICED,  
OUR HEARTS AREN’T QUITE  
THERE YET.”

PREJUDICE RESEARCHER,  
JOHN DOVIDIO, *TIME*, 2009




FIGURE :: 9.1

### Changing Racial Attitudes of White Americans from 1958 to 2011

Abraham Lincoln's ghostly embrace of Barack Obama visualized the Obama mantra: "Change we can believe in." Two days later, Obama stood on steps built by the hands of slaves, placed his hand on a Bible last used in Lincoln's own inauguration, and spoke "a most sacred oath"—in a place, he reflected, where his "father less than 60 years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant."

Source: Data from Gallup Polls (brain.gallup.com).

"I CANNOT LET THE  
MOMENT OF REJOICING  
PASS WITHOUT ENTER-  
ING IN THE RECORD MY  
PROFOUND APPRECIATION  
OF YOUR PART IN SETTING  
STRAIGHT THE COURSE OF  
AMERICAN HISTORY."

—LETTER TO KENNETH CLARK,  
FROM CITY COLLEGE OF  
NEW YORK PRESIDENT BUELL  
GALLAGHER, AFTER THE 1954  
SUPREME COURT SCHOOL  
DESEGREGATION DECISION

*Psychologists usually capitalize Black and White to emphasize that these are socially applied race labels, not literal color labels for persons of African and European ancestry.*

schools unconstitutional, the Supreme Court found it noteworthy that when the Clarks gave African American children a choice between Black dolls and White dolls, most chose the White. In studies from the 1950s through the 1970s, Black children were increasingly likely to prefer Black dolls. And adult Blacks came to view Blacks and Whites as similar in such traits as intelligence, laziness, and dependability (Jackman & Senter, 1981; Smedley & Bayton, 1978).

People of different races also now share many of the same attitudes and aspirations, notes Amitai Etzioni (1999). More than 8 in 10 in both groups agree that "to graduate from high school, students should be required to understand the common history and ideas that tie all Americans together." Similar proportions in the two groups seek "fair treatment for all, without prejudice or discrimination." And about two-thirds of both groups agree that moral and ethical standards have been in decline. Thanks to such shared ideals, notes Etzioni, most Western democracies have been spared the ethnic tribalism that has torn apart places such as Kosovo and Rwanda.

Shall we conclude, then, that racial prejudice is extinct in countries such as the United States, Britain, and Canada? Not if we consider the 6,604 reported hate crime incidents during 2009 (FBI, 2008, 2009). Not if we consider the small proportion of Whites who, as Figure 9.1 shows, would not vote for a Black presidential candidate. Not if we consider the 6 percent greater support that Obama would likely have received in 2008, according to one statistical analysis of voter racial and political attitudes, if there had been no White racial prejudice (Fournier & Tompson, 2008).

So, how great is the progress toward racial equality? In the United States, Whites tend to contrast the present with the oppressive past, perceiving swift and radical progress. Blacks tend to contrast the present with their ideal world, which has not yet been realized, and perceive somewhat less progress (Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006).

### SUBTLE FORMS OF PREJUDICE

Prejudice in subtle forms is even more widespread than blatant, overt prejudice. Modern prejudice often appears subtly, in our preferences for what is familiar, similar, and comfortable (Dovidio & others, 1992; Esses & others, 1993a; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).

Some experiments have assessed people's *behavior* toward Blacks and Whites. As we will see in Chapter 12, Whites are equally helpful to any person in need—except when the needy person is remote (for instance, a wrong-number caller with





Although prejudice dies last in socially intimate contacts, interracial marriage has increased in most countries, and 77 percent of Americans now approve of “marriage between Blacks and Whites”—a sharp increase from the 4 percent who approved in 1958 (Carroll, 2007). Among 18- to 29-year-old Whites, 88 percent approve (Pew, 2010a). In 2008, 1 in 7 American marriages—six times the 1960 rate—were between people of differing race or ethnicity (Pew, 2010b).

an apparent Black accent who needs a message relayed). Likewise, when asked to use electric shocks to “teach” a task, White people have given no more (if anything, less) shock to a Black than to a White person—except when they were angered or when the recipient couldn’t retaliate or know who did it (Crosby & others, 1980; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981).

Thus, prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory behavior surface when they can hide behind the screen of some other motive. In Australia, Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, blatant prejudice has been replaced by subtle prejudice (exaggerating ethnic differences, feeling less admiration and affection for immigrant minorities, rejecting them for supposedly nonracial reasons) (Pedersen & Walker, 1997; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005a). Some researchers call such subtle prejudice “modern racism” or “cultural racism.”

On paper-and-pencil questionnaires, Janet Swim and her co-researchers (1995, 1997) have found a subtle (“modern”) sexism that parallels subtle (“modern”) racism. Both forms appear in denials of discrimination and in antagonism toward efforts to promote equality (as in agreeing with a statement such as “Women are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights”).

We can also detect bias in behavior:

- To test for possible labor market discrimination, M.I.T. researchers sent 5,000 résumés out in response to 1,300 varied employment ads (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). Applicants who were randomly assigned White names (Emily, Greg) received one callback for every 10 résumés sent. Those given Black names (Lakisha, Jamal) received one callback for every 15 résumés sent.
- Other experiments have submitted fictitious pairs of women’s resumes to 613 Austrian clerical openings, and pairs of men’s resumes to 1,714 Athens, Greece, openings and 1,769 American job openings (Drydakis, 2009; Tilcsik, 2011; Weichselbaumer, 2003). By random assignment, one applicant in each pair acknowledged, among other activities, volunteering in a gay-lesbian organization. In response, callbacks were much less likely to the gay-involved applicants. In the American experiment, for example, 7.2 percent of applicants whose



*In several American states, Black motorists have represented a minority of the drivers and speeders on interstate highways, yet they have been most often stopped and searched by state police (Lamberth, 1998; Staples, 1999a, 1999b). In one New Jersey Turnpike study, Blacks made up 13.5 percent of the car occupants, 15 percent of the speeders, and 35 percent of the drivers stopped.*

activities included being “Treasurer, Gay and Lesbian Alliance,” received replies, as did 11.5 percent of those associated with a different left-seeming group (“Treasurer, Progressive and Socialist Alliance”).

- In one analysis of traffic stops, African Americans and Latinos were four times more likely than Whites to be searched, twice as likely to be arrested, and three times more likely to be handcuffed and to have excessive force used against them (Lichtblau, 2005).

Modern prejudice even appears as a race sensitivity that leads to exaggerated reactions to isolated minority persons—overpraising their accomplishments, over-criticizing their mistakes, and failing to warn Black students, as they would White students, about potential academic difficulty (Crosby & Monin, 2007; Fiske, 1989; Hart & Morry, 1997; Hass & others, 1991).

It also appears as patronization. For example, Kent Harber (1998) gave White students at Stanford University a poorly written essay to evaluate. When the students thought the writer was Black, they rated it *higher* than when they were led to think the author was White, and they rarely offered harsh criticisms. The evaluators, perhaps wanting to avoid the appearance of bias, patronized the Black essayists with lower standards. Such “inflated praise and insufficient criticism” may hinder minority student achievement, Harber noted. In follow-up research, Harber and his colleagues (2010) found that Whites concerned about appearing biased not only rate and comment more favorably on weak essays attributed to Black students, they also recommend less time for skill development. To protect their own self-image as unprejudiced, they bend over backward to give positive and unchallenging feedback.


## AUTOMATIC PREJUDICE

How widespread are automatic prejudiced reactions to African Americans? Experiments have shown such reactions in varied contexts. For example, in clever experiments by Anthony Greenwald and his colleagues (1998, 2000), 9 in 10 White people took longer to identify pleasant words (such as *peace* and *paradise*) as “good” when associated with Black rather than White faces. The participants consciously expressed little or no prejudice; their bias was unconscious and unintended. Moreover, report Kurt Hugenberg and Galen Bodenhausen (2003), the more strongly people exhibit such implicit prejudice, the readier they are to perceive anger in Black faces (Figure 9.2).

### FIGURE :: 9.2

#### Facing Prejudice

Where does the anger disappear? Kurt Hugenberg and Galen Bodenhausen showed university students a movie of faces morphing from angry to happy. Those who had scored as most prejudiced (on an implicit racial attitudes test) perceived anger lingering more in ambiguous Black than White faces.





Automatic prejudice. When Joshua Correll and his colleagues invited people to react quickly to people holding either a gun or a harmless object, race influenced perceptions and reactions.

Critics note that unconscious *associations* may only indicate cultural assumptions, perhaps without *prejudice* (which involves negative feelings and action tendencies). But some studies find that implicit bias can leak into behavior:


- In a Swedish study, a measure of implicit biases against Arab-Muslims predicted the likelihood of 193 corporate employers not interviewing applicants with Muslim names (Rooth, 2007).
- In a medical study of 287 physicians, those exhibiting the most implicit racial bias were the least likely to recommend clot-busting drugs for a Black patient described as complaining of chest pain (Green & others, 2007).
- In a study of 44 Australian drug and alcohol nurses, those displaying the most implicit bias against drug users were also the most likely, when facing job stress, to want a different job (von Hippel & others, 2008).

In some situations, automatic, implicit prejudice can have life or death consequences. In separate experiments, Joshua Correll and his co-workers (2002, 2006, 2007)

*Some people more quickly learn positive associations (and more slowly learn negative associations) to neutral stimuli. Such people tend to exhibit little implicit racial bias (Livingston & Drwecki, 2007).*

"I CANNOT TOTALLY GRASP ALL THAT I AM. . . . FOR THAT DARKNESS IS LAMENTABLE IN WHICH THE POSSIBILITIES IN ME ARE HIDDEN FROM MYSELF."

—ST. AUGUSTINE,  
CONFESSIONS, 398 A.D.



and Anthony Greenwald and his co-workers (2003) invited people to press buttons quickly to “shoot” or “not shoot” men who suddenly appeared onscreen holding either a gun or a harmless object such as a flashlight or a bottle. The participants (both Blacks and Whites, in one of the studies) more often mistakenly shot harmless targets who were Black. (Follow-up computerized simulations revealed that it’s Black *male* suspects—not females, whether Black or White—that are more likely to be associated with threat and to be shot [Plant & others, 2011].)

In the aftermath of London police shooting dead a man who *looked* Muslim, researchers also found Australians more ready to shoot someone wearing Muslim headgear (Unkelbach & others, 2008). If we implicitly associate a particular ethnic group with danger, then faces from that group will tend to capture our attention and trigger arousal (Donders & others, 2008; Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008; Trawalter & others, 2008).

In a related series of studies, Keith Payne (2001, 2006) and Charles Judd and colleagues (2004) found that when primed with a Black rather than a White face, people think guns: They more quickly recognize a gun and they more often mistake a tool, such as a wrench, for a gun. Even when race does not bias perception, it may bias reaction—as people require more or less evidence before firing (Klauer & Voss, 2008).

Jennifer Eberhardt and her colleagues (2004) demonstrated that the reverse effect can occur as well. Exposing people to weapons makes them pay more attention to faces of African Americans and even makes police officers more likely to judge stereotypical-looking African Americans as criminals. These studies help explain why in 1999, Amadou Diallo (a Black immigrant in New York City) was shot 41 times by police officers for removing his wallet from his pocket.

It also appears that different brain regions are involved in automatic and consciously controlled stereotyping (Correll & others, 2006; Cunningham & others, 2004; Eberhardt, 2005). Pictures of outgroups that elicit the most disgust (such as drug addicts and the homeless) elicit brain activity in areas associated with disgust and avoidance (Harris & Fiske, 2006). This suggests that automatic prejudices involve primitive regions of the brain associated with fear, such as the amygdala, whereas controlled processing is more closely associated with the frontal cortex, which enables conscious thinking. We also use different bits of our frontal lobes when thinking about ourselves or groups we identify with, versus when thinking about people that we perceive as dissimilar to us (Jenkins & others, 2008; Mitchell & others, 2006).

Even the social scientists who study prejudice seem vulnerable to automatic prejudice, note Anthony Greenwald and Eric Schuh (1994). They analyzed biases in authors’ citations of social science articles by people with selected non-Jewish names (Erickson, McBride, etc.) and Jewish names (Goldstein, Siegel, etc.). Their analysis of nearly 30,000 citations, including 17,000 citations of prejudice research, found something remarkable: Compared with Jewish authors, non-Jewish authors had 40 percent higher odds of citing non-Jewish names. (Greenwald and Schuh could not determine whether Jewish authors were overciting their Jewish colleagues or whether non-Jewish authors were overciting their non-Jewish colleagues, or both.)

## Gender Prejudice

How pervasive is prejudice against women? In Chapter 5 we examined gender-role norms—people’s ideas about how women and men *ought* to behave. Here we consider gender *stereotypes*—people’s beliefs about how women and men *do* behave. Norms are *prescriptive*; stereotypes are *descriptive*.

### GENDER STEREOTYPES

From research on stereotypes, two conclusions are indisputable: Strong gender stereotypes exist, and, as often happens, members of the stereotyped group accept the stereotypes. Men and women agree that you *can* judge the book by its sexual



cover. In one survey, Mary Jackman and Mary Senter (1981) found that gender stereotypes were much stronger than racial stereotypes. For example, only 22 percent of men thought the two sexes equally “emotional.” Of the remaining 78 percent, those who believed females were more emotional outnumbered those who thought males were more emotional by 15 to 1. And what did the women believe? To within 1 percentage point, their responses were identical.

Remember that stereotypes are generalizations about a group of people and may be true, false, or overgeneralized from a kernel of truth. In Chapter 5 we noted that the average man and woman do differ somewhat in social connectedness, empathy, social power, aggressiveness, and sexual initiative (though not in intelligence). Do we then conclude that gender stereotypes are accurate? Sometimes stereotypes exaggerate differences. But not always, observed Janet Swim (1994). She found that Pennsylvania State University students’ stereotypes of men’s and women’s restlessness, nonverbal sensitivity, aggressiveness, and so forth were reasonable approximations of actual gender differences.

Gender stereotypes have persisted across time and culture. Averaging data from 27 countries, John Williams and his colleagues (1999, 2000) found that people everywhere perceive women as more agreeable, and men as more outgoing. The persistence and omnipresence of gender stereotypes have led some evolutionary psychologists to believe they reflect innate, stable reality (Lueptow & others, 1995).

Stereotypes (beliefs) are not prejudices (attitudes). Stereotypes may support prejudice. Yet one might believe, without prejudice, that men and women are “different yet equal.” Let us therefore see how researchers probe for gender prejudice.

### SEXISM: BENEVOLENT AND HOSTILE

Judging from what people tell survey researchers, attitudes toward women have changed as rapidly as racial attitudes have. As Figure 9.3 shows, the percentage of Americans willing to vote for a female presidential candidate has roughly paralleled the increased percentage willing to vote for a Black candidate. In 1967, 56 percent of first-year American college students agreed that “the activities of married women are best confined to the home and family”; by 2002, only 22 percent agreed (Astin & others, 1987; Sax & others, 2002). Thereafter, the home–family question no longer seemed worth asking.

Alice Eagly and her associates (1991) and Geoffrey Haddock and Mark Zanna (1994) also report that people don’t respond to women with gut-level negative emotions as they do to certain other groups. Most people like women more than men.

“ALL THE PURSUITS OF MEN ARE THE PURSUITS OF WOMEN ALSO, AND IN ALL OF THEM A WOMAN IS ONLY A LESSER MAN.”

—PLATO, *REPUBLIC*, 360 B.C.

“WOMEN ARE WONDERFUL PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY ARE [PERCEIVED AS] SO NICE. [MEN ARE] PERCEIVED AS SUPERIOR TO WOMEN IN AGENTIC [COMPETITIVE, DOMINANT] ATTRIBUTES THAT ARE VIEWED AS EQUIPPING PEOPLE FOR SUCCESS IN PAID WORK, ESPECIALLY IN MALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS.”

—ALICE EAGLY (1994)




FIGURE :: 9.3

### Changing Gender Attitudes from 1958 to 2011

Source: Data from Gallup Polls ([gallup.com/poll/4729/presidency.aspx](http://gallup.com/poll/4729/presidency.aspx)).

They perceive women as more understanding, kind, and helpful. A *favorable* stereotype, which Eagly (1994) dubs the *women-are-wonderful effect*, results in a favorable attitude.

But gender attitudes often are ambivalent, report Peter Glick, Susan Fiske, and their colleagues (1996, 2007) from their surveys of 15,000 people in 19 nations. Gender attitudes frequently mix a *benevolent sexism* (“Women have a superior moral sensibility”) with *hostile sexism* (“Once a man commits, she puts him on a tight leash”).

## GENDER DISCRIMINATION

Being male isn’t all roses. Compared to women, men are three times more likely to commit suicide and be murdered. They are nearly all the battlefield and death row casualties. They die five years sooner. And males represent the majority with mental retardation or autism, as well as students in special education programs (Baumeister, 2007; S. Pinker, 2008).

One heavily publicized finding of discrimination against women came from a 1968 study in which Philip Goldberg gave women students at Connecticut College several short articles and asked them to judge the value of each. Sometimes a given article was attributed to a male author (for example, John T. McKay) and sometimes to a female author (for example, Joan T. McKay). In general, the articles received lower ratings when attributed to a female. That’s right: Women discriminated against women.

Eager to demonstrate the subtle reality of gender discrimination, I obtained Goldberg’s materials in 1980 and repeated the experiment with my own students. They (women and men) showed no such tendency to deprecate women’s work. So Janet Swim, Eugene Borgida, Geoffrey Maruyama, and I (1989) searched the literature and corresponded with investigators to learn all we could about studies of gender bias in the evaluation of men’s and women’s work. To our surprise, the biases that occasionally surfaced were as often against men as women. But the most common result across 104 studies involving almost 20,000 people was *no difference*. On most comparisons, judgments of someone’s work were unaffected by whether the work was attributed to a female or a male. Summarizing other studies of people’s evaluations of women and men as leaders, professors, and so forth, Alice Eagly (1994) concluded, “Experiments have *not* demonstrated any *overall* tendency to devalue women’s work.”

Is gender bias fast becoming extinct in Western countries? Has the women’s movement nearly completed its work? As with racial prejudice, blatant gender prejudice is dying, but subtle bias lives.

Violate gender stereotypes, and people may react. People take notice of a cigar-smoking woman and a tearful man, and denigrate a White rapper (Phelan & Rudman, 2010). A woman whom people see as power hungry suffers more voter backlash than does a similarly power-hungry man (Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010).

In the world beyond democratic Western countries, gender discrimination is not subtle. Two-thirds of the world’s unschooled children are girls (United Nations, 1991). In some countries, discrimination extends to violence, even prosecuting rape victims for adultery (UN, 2006).

But the biggest violence against women may occur prenatally. Around the world, people tend to prefer having baby boys. In the United States, in 1941, 38 percent of expectant parents said they preferred a boy if they could have only one child; 24 percent preferred a girl; and 23 percent said they had no preference. In 2011, the answers were virtually unchanged, with 40 percent still preferring a boy (Newport, 2011). With the widespread use of ultrasound to determine the sex of a fetus and the growing availability of abortion, these preferences are, in some countries, affecting the number of boys and girls. In China, where 95 percent of orphanage children are girls (Webley, 2009), the 118 boys born for every 100 girls has led to an excess of 32 million under-20 males. These are tomorrow’s “bare branches,”

**Question:** “Misogyny” is the hatred of women. What is the corresponding word for the hatred of men?

**Answer:** In most dictionaries, no such word exists.

as the Chinese think of them—bachelors who will have trouble finding mates (Hvistendahl, 2009, 2010, 2011; Zhu & others, 2009). This “gender genocide” is not found only in China. Taiwan, Singapore, India, and South Korea likewise have millions of “missing women” (Abrevaya, 2009). In response, China has made sex-selective abortions a criminal offense.

To conclude, overt prejudice against people of color and against women is far less common today than it was in the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, techniques that are sensitive to subtle prejudice still detect widespread bias. And in parts of the world, gender prejudice makes for misery. Therefore, we need to look carefully and closely at the social, emotional, and cognitive sources of prejudice.

## SUMMING UP: What Is the Nature and Power of Prejudice?

- *Prejudice* is a preconceived negative attitude. *Stereotypes* are beliefs about another group—beliefs that may be accurate, inaccurate, or overgeneralized but based on a kernel of truth. *Discrimination* is unjustified negative behavior. *Racism* and *sexism* may refer to individuals’ prejudicial attitudes or discriminatory behavior, or to oppressive institutional practices (even if not intentionally prejudicial).
- Prejudice exists in subtle and unconscious guises as well as overt, conscious forms. Researchers have devised subtle survey questions and indirect methods for assessing people’s attitudes and behavior to detect unconscious prejudice.
- Racial prejudice against Blacks in the United States was widely accepted until the 1960s; since that time it has become far less prevalent, but it still exists.
- Similarly, prejudice against women has lessened in recent decades. Nevertheless, strong gender stereotypes and a fair amount of gender bias are still found in the United States and, to a greater degree, elsewhere around the world.

## WHAT ARE THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF PREJUDICE?

Understand and examine the influences that give rise to and maintain prejudice.

Prejudice springs from several sources. It may arise from differences in social status and people’s desires to justify and maintain those differences. It may also be learned from our parents as they socialize us about what differences they believe matter between people. Our social institutions, too, may maintain and support prejudice. Consider first how prejudice can function to defend self-esteem and social position.

### Social Inequalities: Unequal Status and Prejudice

A principle to remember: *Unequal status breeds prejudice*. Masters view slaves as lazy, irresponsible, lacking ambition—as having exactly those traits that justify the slavery. Historians debate the forces that create unequal status. But after those inequalities exist, prejudice helps justify the economic and social superiority of those who have wealth and power. Tell me the economic relationship between two groups, and I’ll predict the intergroup attitudes. Upper-class individuals are more likely than those in poverty to see people’s fortunes as the outcomes they have earned, thanks to skill and effort, and not as the result of having connections, money, and good luck (Kraus & others, 2011).



"PREJUDICE IS NEVER EASY  
UNLESS IT CAN PASS ITSELF  
OFF FOR REASON."

—WILLIAM HAZLITT  
(1778–1830), "ON PREJUDICE"

Historical examples abound. Where slavery was practiced, prejudice ran strong. Nineteenth-century politicians justified imperial expansion by describing exploited colonized people as "inferior," "requiring protection," and a "burden" to be borne (G. W. Allport, 1958, pp. 204–205). Six decades ago, sociologist Helen Mayer Hacker (1951) noted how stereotypes of Blacks and women helped rationalize the inferior status of each: Many people thought both groups were mentally slow, emotional and primitive, and "contented" with their subordinate role. Blacks were "inferior"; women were "weak." Blacks were all right in their place; women's place was in the home.

Theresa Vescio and her colleagues (2005) tested that reasoning. They found that powerful men who stereotype their female subordinates give them plenty of praise, but fewer resources, thus undermining their performance. This sort of patronizing allows the men to maintain their positions of power. In the laboratory, too, patronizing benevolent sexism (statements implying that women, as the weaker sex, need support) has undermined women's cognitive performance by planting intrusive thoughts—self-doubts, preoccupations, and decreased self-esteem (Dardenne & others, 2007).

Peter Glick and Susan Fiske's distinction between "hostile" and "benevolent" sexism extends to other prejudices. We see other groups as *competent* or as *likable*, but often not as both. These two culturally universal dimensions of social perception—likability (warmth) and competence—were illustrated by one European's comment that "Germans love Italians, but don't admire them. Italians admire Germans, but don't love them" (Cuddy & others, 2009). We typically *respect* the competence of those high in status and *like* those who agreeably accept a lower status. In the United States, report Fiske and her colleagues (1999), Asians, Jews, Germans, nontraditional women, and assertive African Americans and gay men tend to be respected but are not so well liked. Traditionally subordinate African Americans and Hispanics, traditional women, less-masculine gay men, and people with disabilities tend to be seen as less competent but liked for their emotional, spiritual, artistic, or athletic qualities.

Some people, more than others, notice and justify status differences. Those high in **social dominance orientation** tend to view people in terms of hierarchies. They like their own social groups to be high status—they prefer being on the top. Being in a dominant, high-status position also tends to promote this orientation (Guimond & others, 2003). Jim Sidanius, Felicia Pratto, and their colleagues (Levin & others, 2011; Pratto & others, 1994; Sidanius & others, 2004) argue that this desire to be on top leads people high in social dominance to embrace prejudice and to support political positions that justify prejudice. Indeed, people high in social dominance orientation often support policies that maintain hierarchies, such as tax cuts for the well-off. They prefer professions, such as politics and business, that increase their status and maintain hierarchies. They avoid jobs, such as social work, that, by virtue of their aid to disadvantaged groups, undermine hierarchies. And they express more negative attitudes toward minority persons who exhibit strong racial identities (Kaiser & Pratt-Hyatt, 2009). Status may breed prejudice, but some people more than others seek to maintain status.

Social inequalities breed not only prejudice, but also mistrust. Experiments confirm that correlation: Groups receiving more unequal distributions exhibit less trust and cooperation (Cozzolino, 2011). Societies with the greatest income disparity tend also to exhibit less communal health and more anxiety, obesity, homicides, teen births, drug use, prisons, and police (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2011).

## Socialization

Prejudice springs from unequal status and from other social sources, including our acquired values and attitudes. The influence of family socialization appears in children's prejudices, which often mirror those perceived in their mothers (Castelli & others, 2007). Even children's implicit racial attitudes reflect their

### social dominance orientation

A motivation to have one's group dominate other social groups.

parents' explicit prejudice (Sinclair & others, 2004). Our families and cultures pass on all kinds of information—how to find mates, drive cars, and divide the household labors, and whom to distrust and dislike.

## THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

In the 1940s, University of California, Berkeley, researchers—two of whom had fled Nazi Germany—set out on an urgent research mission: to uncover the psychological roots of the poisonous right-wing anti-Semitism that caused the slaughter of millions of Jews in Nazi Germany. In studies of American adults, Theodor Adorno and his colleagues (1950) discovered that hostility toward Jews often coexisted with hostility toward other minorities. In those who were strongly prejudiced, prejudice appeared to be not specific to one group but an entire way of thinking about those who are “different.” Moreover, these judgmental, **ethnocentric** people shared certain tendencies: an intolerance for weakness, a punitive attitude, and a submissive respect for their group's authorities, as reflected in their agreement with such statements as “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.” From those findings, Adorno and his colleagues (1950) surmised that these tendencies define an **authoritarian personality** that is particularly prone to engage in prejudice and stereotyping.

More recent inquiry into authoritarian people's early lives has revealed that, as children, they often face harsh discipline. Militant extremism, on both the political left and the right, shares some common themes, such as catastrophizing, desiring vengeance, and dehumanizing the enemy (Saucier & others, 2009). This extremism supposedly leads the individuals affected to repress their hostilities and impulses, which they project onto outgroups. Research into authoritarianism also suggests that the insecurity of authoritarian individuals predisposes them toward an excessive concern with power and status and an inflexible right-wrong way of thinking that makes ambiguity difficult to tolerate. Such people therefore tend to be submissive to those with power over them and aggressive or punitive toward those whom they consider lower in status than themselves. In other words, “My way or the highway.”

Scholars have criticized research into the authoritarian personality for focusing on right-wing authoritarianism and overlooking similarly dogmatic authoritarianism of the left. Still, contemporary studies of right-wing authoritarians by University of Manitoba psychologist Bob Altemeyer (1988, 1992) confirmed that there *are* individuals whose fears and hostilities surface as prejudice. Their feelings of moral superiority may go hand in hand with brutality toward perceived inferiors. Altemeyer also concludes that right-wing authoritarians tend to be “equal opportunity bigots.” Different forms of prejudice—toward Blacks, gays and lesbians, women, Muslims, immigrants, the homeless—*do* tend to coexist in the same individuals (Zick & others, 2008). Moreover, authoritarian tendencies, sometimes reflected in ethnic tensions, surge during threatening times of economic recession and social upheaval (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Doty & others, 1991; Sales, 1973).

Particularly striking are people high in social dominance orientation and authoritarian personality. Altemeyer (2004) reports that these “Double Highs” are, not surprisingly, “among the most prejudiced persons in our society.” What is perhaps most surprising and more troubling is that they seem to display the worst qualities of each type of personality, striving for status often in manipulative ways while being dogmatic and ethnocentric. Altemeyer argues that although these people are relatively rare, they are predisposed to be leaders of hate groups.

## RELIGION AND PREJUDICE

Those who benefit from social inequalities while avowing that “all are created equal” need to justify keeping things the way they are. What could be a more powerful justification than to believe that God has ordained the existing social order? For all sorts of cruel deeds, noted William James, “piety is the mask” (1902, p. 264).

### ethnocentric

Believing in the superiority of one's own ethnic and cultural group, and having a corresponding disdain for all other groups.

### authoritarian personality

A personality that is disposed to favor obedience to authority and intolerance of outgroups and those lower in status.

In almost every country, leaders invoke religion to sanctify the present order. The use of religion to support injustice helps explain a consistent pair of findings concerning North American Christianity: (1) White church members express more racial prejudice than nonmembers, and (2) those professing fundamentalist beliefs express more prejudice than those professing more progressive beliefs (Hall & others, 2010; Johnson & others, 2011).

Knowing the correlation between two variables—religion and prejudice—tells us nothing about their causal connection. Consider three possibilities:

- There may be *no connection*. Perhaps people with less education are both more fundamentalist and more prejudiced. (In one study of 7,070 Brits, those scoring high on IQ tests at age 10 expressed more nontraditional and antiracist views at age 30 [Deary & others, 2008].)
- Perhaps *prejudice causes religion*, by leading people to create religious ideas to support their prejudices. People who feel hatred may use religion, even God, to justify their contempt for the other.
- Or perhaps *religion causes prejudice*, such as by leading people to believe that because all individuals possess free will, impoverished minorities have themselves to blame for their status.

If indeed religion causes prejudice, then more religious church members should also be more prejudiced. But three other findings consistently indicate otherwise.

- Among church members, faithful church attenders were, in 24 out of 26 comparisons, less prejudiced than occasional attenders (Batson & Ventis, 1982).
- Gordon Allport and Michael Ross (1967) found that those for whom religion is an end in itself (those who agree, for example, with the statement “My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life”) express *less* prejudice than those for whom religion is more a means to other ends (who agree “A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial social activity”). And those who score highest on Gallup’s “spiritual commitment” index are more welcoming of a person of another race moving in next door (Gallup & Jones, 1992).
- Protestant ministers and Roman Catholic priests gave more support to the U.S. civil rights movement than did laypeople (Fichter, 1968; Hadden, 1969). In Germany, 45 percent of clergy in 1934 had aligned themselves with the Confessing Church, which was organized to oppose Nazi influence on the German Protestant Church (Reed, 1989).

What, then, is the relationship between religion and prejudice? The answer we get depends on *how* we ask the question. If we define religiousness as church membership or willingness to agree at least superficially with traditional religious beliefs, then the more religious people are the more racially prejudiced. Bigots often rationalize bigotry with religion. But if we assess depth of religious commitment in any of several other ways, then the very devout are less prejudiced—hence the religious roots of the modern civil rights movement, among whose leaders were many ministers and priests. It was Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce’s faith-inspired values (“Love your neighbor as yourself”) that, two centuries ago, motivated their successful campaign to end the British Empire’s slave trade and the practice of slavery. As Gordon Allport concluded, “The role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice” (1958, p. 413).

“WE HAVE JUST ENOUGH  
RELIGION TO MAKE US  
HATE, BUT NOT ENOUGH  
TO MAKE US LOVE ONE  
ANOTHER.”

—JONATHAN SWIFT,  
THOUGHTS ON VARIOUS  
SUBJECTS, 1706

### CONFORMITY

Once established, prejudice is maintained largely by inertia. If prejudice is socially accepted, many people will follow the path of least resistance and conform to the fashion. They will act not so much out of a need to hate as out of



a need to be liked and accepted. Thus, people become more likely to favor (or oppose) discrimination after hearing someone else do so, and they are less supportive of women after hearing sexist humor (Ford & others, 2008; Zitek & Hebl, 2007).

During the 1950s, Thomas Pettigrew (1958) studied Whites in South Africa and the American South. His discovery: Those who conformed most to other social norms were also most prejudiced; those who were less conforming mirrored less of the surrounding prejudice.

The price of nonconformity was painfully clear to the ministers of Little Rock, Arkansas, where the U.S. Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision was implemented. Most ministers privately favored integration but feared that advocating it openly would decrease membership and financial contributions (Campbell & Pettigrew, 1959). Or consider the Indiana steelworkers and West Virginia coal miners of the same era. In the mills and the mines, the workers accepted integration. In the neighborhoods, the norm was rigid segregation (Minard, 1952; Reitzes, 1953). Prejudice was clearly not a manifestation of "sick" personalities but simply of the social norms.

Conformity also maintains gender prejudice. "If we have come to think that the nursery and the kitchen are the natural sphere of a woman," wrote George Bernard Shaw in an 1891 essay, "we have done so exactly as English children come to think that a cage is the natural sphere of a parrot—because they have never seen one anywhere else." Children who *have* seen women elsewhere—children of employed women—have expressed less stereotyped views of men and women (Hoffman, 1977). Women students exposed to female science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) experts likewise express more positive implicit attitudes toward STEM studies and display more effort on STEM tests (Stout & others, 2011).

In all this, there is a message of hope. If prejudice is not deeply ingrained in personality, then as fashions change and new norms evolve, prejudice can diminish. And so it has.

## Institutional Supports

Social institutions (schools, government, media) may bolster prejudice through overt policies such as segregation, or by passively reinforcing the status quo. Until the 1970s many banks routinely denied mortgages to unmarried women and to minority applicants, with the result that most homeowners were White married couples. Similarly, political leaders may both reflect and reinforce prevailing attitudes.

Schools are one of the institutions most prone to reinforce dominant cultural attitudes. An analysis of stories in 134 children's readers written before 1970 found that male characters outnumbered female characters three to one (Women on Words and Images, 1972). Who was portrayed as showing initiative, bravery, and competence? Note the answer in this excerpt from the classic *Dick and Jane* children's reader: Jane, sprawled out on the sidewalk, her roller skates beside her, listens as Mark explains to his mother:

"She cannot skate," said Mark.

"I can help her.

"I want to help her.

"Look at her, Mother.

"Just look at her.

"She's just like a girl.

"She gives up."

Institutional supports for prejudice, like that reader, are often unintended and unnoticed. Not until the 1970s, when changing ideas about males and females



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Neiburger. Reprinted by permission.

brought new perceptions of such portrayals, was this blatant (to us) stereotyping widely noticed and changed.

What contemporary examples of institutionalized biases still go unnoticed? Here is one that most of us failed to notice, although it was right before our eyes: By examining 1,750 photographs of people in magazines and newspapers, Dane Archer and his associates (1983) discovered that about two-thirds of the average male photo, but less than half of the average female photo, was devoted to the face. As Archer widened his search, he discovered that such “face-ism” is

common. He found it in the periodicals of 11 other countries, in 920 portraits gathered from the artwork of six centuries, and in the amateur drawings of students at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Georgia Nigro and her colleagues (1988) confirmed the face-ism phenomenon in more magazines, including *Ms.*, a feminist publication.

The researchers suspect that the visual prominence given the faces of men and the bodies of women both reflects and perpetuates gender bias. In research in Germany, Norbert Schwarz and Eva Kurz (1989) confirmed that people whose faces are prominent in photos seem more intelligent and ambitious.

Films and television programs also embody and reinforce prevailing cultural attitudes. The muddleheaded, wide-eyed African American butlers and maids in 1930s movies helped perpetuate the stereotypes they reflected. Today many people find such images offensive, yet even a modern TV comedy skit of a crime-prone African American can later make another African American who is accused of assault seem more guilty (Ford, 1997). Violent rap music from Black artists leads both Black and White listeners to stereotype Blacks as having violent dispositions (Johnson & others, 2000). Sexual rap music depictions of promiscuous Black females reduce listeners’ support for Black pregnant women in need (Johnson & others, 2009). And frowning and other negative nonverbal



Unintended bias: Is lighter skin “normal”?



behaviors—which are more prevalent toward Black than White TV characters—likewise increase viewers’ racial bias, without their awareness (Weisbuch & others, 2009).

Face-ism: Male photos in the media more often show just the face.

## SUMMING UP: What Are the Social Sources of Prejudice?

- The social situation breeds and maintains prejudice in several ways. A group that enjoys social and economic superiority will often use prejudicial beliefs to justify its privileged position.
- Children are also brought up in ways that foster or reduce prejudice. The family, religious communities, and the broader society can sustain or reduce prejudices.
- Social institutions (government, schools, media) also support prejudice, sometimes through overt policies and sometimes through unintentional inertia.

## WHAT ARE THE MOTIVATIONAL SOURCES OF PREJUDICE?

Identify and examine the motivational sources of prejudice.

Various kinds of motivations underlie the hostilities of prejudice. Motivations can also lead people to avoid prejudice.

### Frustration and Aggression: The Scapegoat Theory

As we will see in Chapter 10, pain and frustration (the blocking of a goal) often evoke hostility. When the cause of our frustration is intimidating or unknown, we often redirect our hostility. This phenomenon of “displaced aggression” may have contributed to the lynchings of African Americans in the South after the Civil War. Between 1882 and 1930, more lynchings occurred in years when cotton prices were low and economic frustration was therefore presumably high (Hepworth & West, 1988; Hovland & Sears, 1940). Hate crimes seem not to have fluctuated with unemployment in recent decades (Falk & others, 2011; Green & others, 1998). However, when living standards are rising, societies tend to be more open to diversity and to the passage and enforcement of antidiscrimination laws (Frank, 1999). Ethnic peace is easier to maintain during prosperous times.

Targets for displaced aggression vary. Following their defeat in World War I and their country’s subsequent economic chaos, many Germans saw Jews as villains. Long before Hitler came to power, one German leader explained: “The Jew is just convenient. . . . If there were no Jews, the anti-Semites would have to invent them”

(quoted by G. W. Allport, 1958, p. 325). In earlier centuries people vented their fear and hostility on witches, whom they sometimes burned or drowned in public. In our time, Americans who reacted to 9/11 with more anger than fear expressed greater intolerance toward immigrants and Middle Easterners (Skitka & others, 2004). Passions provoke prejudice. Special individuals who experience no negative emotional response to social threats—namely, children with the genetic disorder called Williams syndrome—display a notable lack of racial stereotypes and prejudice (Santos et al., 2010). No passion, no prejudice.

Competition is an important source of frustration that can fuel prejudice. When two groups compete for jobs, housing, or social prestige, one group's goal fulfillment can become the other group's frustration. Thus, the **realistic group conflict theory** suggests that prejudice arises when groups compete for scarce resources (Maddux & others, 2008; Pereira & others, 2010; Sassenberg & others, 2007). A corresponding ecological principle, Gause's law, states that maximum competition will exist between species with identical needs.

Consider how this has played out across the world:

- In Western Europe, economically frustrated people express relatively high levels of blatant prejudice toward ethnic minorities (Pettigrew & others, 2008, 2010).
- In Canada, opposition to immigration since 1975 has gone up and down with the unemployment rate (Palmer, 1996).
- In the United States, concerns about immigrants taking jobs are greatest among those with the lowest incomes (AP/Ipsos, 2006; Pew, 2006).
- In South Africa, dozens of African immigrants were killed by mobs and 35,000 people were hounded from squatter camps by poor South Africans who resented the economic competition. "These foreigners have no IDs, no papers, and yet they get the jobs," said one unemployed South African, noting that "They are willing to work for 15 rand [about \$2] a day" (Bearak, 2010). When interests clash, prejudice may be the result.

### realistic group conflict theory

The theory that prejudice arises from competition between groups for scarce resources.

"WHOEVER IS DISSATIS-  
FIED WITH HIMSELF IS  
CONTINUALLY READY FOR  
REVENGE."

—NIETZSCHE, *THE GAY  
SCIENCE*, 1882–1887

## Social Identity Theory: Feeling Superior to Others

Humans are a group-bound species. Our ancestral history prepares us to feed and protect ourselves—to live—in groups. Humans cheer for their groups, kill for their groups, die for their groups. Evolution prepares us, when encountering strangers, to make a quick judgment: friend or foe? Those from our group, those who look like us, even those who *sound* like us—with accents like our own—we instantly tend to like (Gluszek & Dovidio, 2010; Kinzler & others, 2009).

Not surprisingly, as noted by Australian social psychologists John Turner (1981, 2000), Michael Hogg (1992, 2008, 2010), and their colleagues, we also define ourselves by our groups. Self-concept—our sense of who we are—contains not just a *personal identity* (our sense of our personal attributes and attitudes) but also a **social identity** (Chen & others, 2006). Fiona identifies herself as a woman, an Aussie, a Labourite, a University of New South Wales student, a MacDonald family member. We carry such social identities like playing cards, playing them when appropriate. Prime American students to think of themselves as "Americans," and they will display heightened anger and disrespect toward Muslims; prime their "student" identity, and they will instead display heightened anger toward police (Ray & others, 2008).

Working with the late British social psychologist Henri Tajfel, a Polish native who lost family and friends in the Holocaust and then devoted much of his career to studying ethnic hatred, Turner (1947–2011) proposed *social identity theory*. Turner and Tajfel observed the following:

### social identity

The "we" aspect of our self-concept; the part of our answer to "Who am I?" that comes from our group memberships.



- *We categorize:* We find it useful to put people, ourselves included, into categories. To label someone as a Hindu, a Scot, or a bus driver is a shorthand way of saying some other things about the person.
- *We identify:* We associate ourselves with certain groups (our **ingroups**) and gain self-esteem by doing so.
- *We compare:* We contrast our groups with other groups (**outgroups**), with a favorable bias toward our own group.

We humans naturally divide others into those inside and those outside our group. We also evaluate ourselves partly by our group memberships. Having a sense of “we-ness” strengthens our self-concepts. It *feels* good. We seek not only *respect* for ourselves but also *pride* in our groups (Smith & Tyler, 1997). Moreover, seeing our groups as superior helps us feel even better. It’s as if we all think, “I am an X [name your group]. X is good. Therefore, I am good.”

Lacking a positive personal identity, people often seek self-esteem by identifying with a group. Thus, many disadvantaged youths find pride, power, security, and identity in gang affiliations. When people’s personal and social identities become fused—when the boundary between self and group blurs—they become more willing to fight or die for their group (Gómez & others, 2011; Swann & others, 2009). Many superpatriots, for example, define themselves by their national identities (Staub, 1997, 2005). And many people at loose ends find identity in their associations with new religious movements, self-help groups, or fraternal clubs (Figure 9.4).

Because of our social identifications, we conform to our group norms. We sacrifice ourselves for team, family, nation. And the more important our social identity and the more strongly attached we feel to a group, the more we react prejudicially to threats from another group (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Hinkle & others, 1992).

## INGROUP BIAS

The group definition of who you are—your gender, race, religion, marital status, academic major—implies a definition of who you are not. The circle that includes “us” (the ingroup) excludes “them” (the outgroup). The more that ethnic Turks

### ingroup

“Us”—a group of people who share a sense of belonging, a feeling of common identity.

### outgroup

“Them”—a group that people perceive as distinctively different from or apart from their ingroup.



FIGURE :: 9.4

Personal identity and social identity together feed self-esteem.

**ingroup bias**

The tendency to favor one's own group.

"THERE IS A TENDENCY TO DEFINE ONE'S OWN GROUP POSITIVELY IN ORDER TO EVALUATE ONE-SELF POSITIVELY."

—JOHN C. TURNER (1984)

in the Netherlands see themselves as Turks or as Muslims, the less they see themselves as Dutch (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007).

The mere experience of being formed into groups may promote **ingroup bias**. Ask children, "Which are better, the children in your school or the children at [another school nearby]?" Virtually all will say their own school has the better children.

For adults, too, the closer to home, the better things seem. More than 80 percent of both Whites and Blacks say race relations are generally good in their own neighborhoods, but fewer than 60 percent see relations as generally good in the country as a whole (Sack & Elder, 2000). Merely sharing a birthday with someone creates enough of a bond to evoke heightened cooperation in a laboratory experiment (Miller & others, 1998).

**INGROUP BIAS EXPRESSES AND SUPPORTS A POSITIVE SELF-CONCEPT**

Ingroup bias is one more example of the human quest for a positive self-concept (Chapter 2). Most people have a positive self-image, which they project to their ingroups more than to outgroups (DiDonato & others, 2011). Their ingroup bias expresses their positive self-concept, but it also supports their self-concept. When our group has been successful, we can make ourselves feel better by identifying more strongly with it. College students whose team has just been victorious frequently report, "We won." After their team's defeat, students are more likely to say, "They lost." Basking in the reflected glory of a successful ingroup is strongest among those who have just experienced an ego blow, such as learning they did poorly on a "creativity test" (Cialdini & others, 1976). We can also bask in the reflected glory of a friend's achievement—except when the friend outperforms us on something pertinent to our identity (Tesser & others, 1988). If you think of yourself as an outstanding psychology student, you will likely take more pleasure in a friend's excellence in mathematics.

**INGROUP BIAS FEEDS FAVORITISM** We are so group conscious that, given any excuse to think of ourselves as a group, we will do so—and we will then exhibit ingroup bias. Even forming conspicuous groups on no logical basis—for instance, merely by composing groups X and Y with the flip of a coin—will produce some

ingroup bias (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Brewer & Silver, 1978; Locksley & others, 1980). In Kurt Vonnegut's novel *Slapstick*, computers gave everyone a new middle name; all "Daffodil-11s" then felt unity with one another and distance from "Raspberry-13s." The self-serving bias (Chapter 2) rides again, enabling people to achieve a more positive social identity: "We" are better than "they," even when "we" and "they" are defined randomly!

In a series of experiments, Tajfel and Michael Billig (1974; Tajfel, 1970, 1981, 1982) further explored how little it takes to provoke favoritism toward *us* and unfairness toward *them*. In one study, Tajfel and Billig had individual British teenagers evaluate modern abstract paintings and then told them that they and some other teens had favored the art of Paul Klee over that of Wassily Kandinsky, while others

Basking in reflected glory. After Jamaican-Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson won the Olympic 100-meter race, Canadian media described his victory as that of a "Canadian." After Johnson's gold medal was taken away because of steroid use, Canadian media then emphasized his "Jamaican" identity (Stelzl & others, 2008).



avored Kandinsky. Finally, without ever meeting the other members of their Klee-favoring group, each teen divided some money among members of the Klee- and Kandinsky-favoring groups. In this and other experiments, defining groups even in this trivial way produced ingroup favoritism. David Wilder (1981) summarized the typical result: "When given the opportunity to divide 15 points [worth money], subjects generally award 9 or 10 points to their own group and 5 or 6 points to the other group."

We are more prone to ingroup bias when our group is small and lower in status relative to the outgroup (Ellemers & others, 1997; Mullen & others, 1992). When we're part of a small group surrounded by a larger group, we are more conscious of our group membership. When our ingroup is the majority, we think less about it. To be a foreign student, to be gay or lesbian, or to be of a minority race or gender at some social gathering is to feel one's social identity more keenly and to react accordingly.



Something favored by an "outgroup" may be cast in a negative light.

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www.cartoonbank.com

**MUST INGROUP LIKING FOSTER OUTGROUP DISLIKING?** Does ingroup bias reflect liking for the ingroup, dislike for the outgroup, or both? Does ethnic pride cause prejudice? Does a strong feminist identity lead feminists to dislike nonfeminists? Does loyalty to a particular fraternity or sorority lead its members to deprecate independents and members of other fraternities and sororities? Or do people merely favor their own group without any animosity toward others?

Experiments support both liking for the ingroup and dislike for the outgroup. Love and hate are sometimes opposite sides of the same coin. If you love the Boston Red Sox, you may hate the New York Yankees. A patriot's love of tribe or country motivates dying to defend it against enemies. To the extent that we see virtue in *us*, we likely see evil in *them*. Moreover, outgroup stereotypes prosper when people feel their ingroup identity most keenly (Wilder & Shapiro, 1991).

We also ascribe uniquely human emotions (love, hope, contempt, resentment) to ingroup members, and are more reluctant to see such human emotions in outgroup members (Demoulin & others, 2008; Leyens & others, 2003, 2007). There is a long history of denying human attributes to outgroups—a process called "infra-humanization." European explorers pictured many of the peoples they encountered as savages ruled by animal instinct. "Africans have been likened to apes, Jews to vermin, and immigrants to parasites," note Australian social psychologists Stephen Loughman and Nick Haslam (2007). We humanize pets and dehumanize outgroups.

Yet ingroup bias results at least as much from perceiving that one's own group is good (Brewer, 2007) as from a sense that other groups are bad (Rosenbaum & Holtz, 1985). Even when there is no "them" (imagine yourself bonding with a handful of fellow survivors on a deserted island), one can come to love "us" (Gaertner & others, 2006). So it seems that positive feelings for our own groups need not be mirrored by equally strong negative feelings for outgroups.

FATHER, MOTHER, AND ME,  
SISTER AND AUNTIE SAY  
ALL THE PEOPLE LIKE US  
ARE  
WE, AND EVERY ONE ELSE  
IS THEY.  
AND THEY LIVE OVER THE  
SEA, WHILE WE LIVE OVER  
THE WAY.  
BUT WOULD YOU BELIEVE  
IT?  
THEY LOOK UPON WE  
AS ONLY A SORT OF THEY!

—RUDYARD KIPLING, 1926

(QUOTED BY MULLEN, 1991)



“BY EXCITING EMULATION AND COMPARISONS OF SUPERIORITY, YOU LAY THE FOUNDATION OF LASTING MISCHIEF; YOU MAKE BROTHERS AND SISTERS HATE EACH OTHER.”

—SAMUEL JOHNSON, QUOTED  
IN JAMES BOSWELL'S *LIFE OF*  
SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1791

### terror management

According to “terror management theory,” people’s self-protective emotional and cognitive responses (including adhering more strongly to their cultural worldviews and prejudices) when confronted with reminders of their mortality.

### NEED FOR STATUS, SELF-REGARD, AND BELONGING

Status is relative: To perceive ourselves as having status, we need people below us. Thus, one psychological benefit of prejudice, or of any status system, is a feeling of superiority. Most of us can recall a time when we took secret satisfaction in another’s failure—perhaps seeing a brother or sister punished or a classmate failing a test. In Europe and North America, prejudice is often greater among those low or slipping on the socioeconomic ladder and among those whose positive self-image is threatened (Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Pettigrew & others, 1998; Thompson & Crocker, 1985). In one study, members of lower-status sororities were more disparaging of competing sororities than were members of higher-status sororities (Crocker & others, 1987). If our status is secure, we have less need to feel superior.

In study after study, thinking about your own mortality—by writing a short essay on dying and the emotions aroused by thinking about death—provokes enough insecurity to intensify ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice (Greenberg & others, 1990, 2009; Harmon-Jones & others, 1996; Schimel & others 1999). One study found that among Whites, thinking about death can even promote liking for racists who argue for their group’s superiority (Greenberg & others, 2001, 2008). With death on their minds, people exhibit **terror management**. They shield themselves from the threat of their own death by derogating those who further arouse their anxiety by challenging their worldviews. When people are already feeling vulnerable about their mortality, prejudice helps bolster a threatened belief system. Thinking about death can also heighten communal feelings, such as ingroup identification, togetherness, and altruism (McGregor & others, 2001; Sani & others, 2009).

Reminding people of their death can also affect support for important public policies. Before the 2004 presidential election, giving people cues related to death—including asking them to recall their emotions related to the 9/11 attack, or subliminally exposing them to 9/11 related pictures—increased support for President George W. Bush and his antiterrorism policies (Landau & others, 2004). In Iran, reminders of death increased college students’ support for suicide attacks against the United States (Pyszczynski & others, 2006).

All this suggests that a man who doubts his own strength and independence might, by proclaiming women to be weak and dependent, boost his masculine image. Indeed, when Joel Grube, Randy Kleinhesselink, and Kathleen Kearney (1982) had Washington State University men view young women’s videotaped job interviews, men with low self-acceptance disliked strong, nontraditional women. Men with high self-acceptance preferred them. Experiments confirm the connection between self-image and prejudice: Affirm people and they will evaluate an outgroup more positively; threaten their self-esteem and they will restore it by denigrating an outgroup (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Spencer & others, 1998).

Despising outgroups can also serve to strengthen the ingroup. As we will explore further in Chapter 13, the perception of a common enemy unites a group. School spirit is seldom so strong as when the game is with the archrival. The sense of comradeship among workers is often highest when they all feel a common antagonism toward management. To solidify the Nazi hold over the Germany people, Hitler threatened them with the “Jewish menace.” But when the need to belong is met, people become more accepting of outgroups, report Mario Mikulincer and Phillip Shaver (2001). They subliminally primed some



*“It’s not enough that we succeed. Cats must also fail.”*



Israeli students with words that fostered a sense of belonging (*love, support, hug*) and others with neutral words. The students then read an essay that was supposedly written by a fellow Jewish student and another by an Arab student. When primed with neutral words, the Israeli students evaluated the supposed Israeli student's essay as superior to the supposed Arab student's essay. When the participants were primed with a sense of belonging, that bias disappeared.

## Motivation to Avoid Prejudice

Motivations not only lead people to be prejudiced but also lead people to avoid prejudice. Try as we might to suppress unwanted thoughts—thoughts about food, thoughts about romance with a friend's partner, judgmental thoughts about another group—they sometimes refuse to go away (Macrae & others, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992). This is especially so for older adults, and people under alcohol's influence who lose some of their ability to inhibit unwanted thoughts and therefore to suppress old stereotypes (Bartholow & others, 2006; von Hippel & others, 2000). Patricia Devine and her colleagues (1989, 2005; Amodio & Devine, 2010; Plant & others, 2010) report that people low and high in prejudice sometimes have similar automatic prejudicial responses. The result: Unwanted (dissonant) thoughts and feelings often persist. Breaking the prejudice habit is not easy.

In real life, a majority person's encountering a minority person may trigger a knee-jerk stereotype. Those with accepting and those with disapproving attitudes toward homosexuals may both feel uncomfortable sitting with a gay male on a bus seat (Monteith, 1993). Encountering an unfamiliar Black male, people—even those who pride themselves on not being prejudiced—may respond warily. Seeking not to appear prejudiced, they may divert their attention away from the person (Richeson & Trawalter, 2008).

In one experiment by E. J. Vanman and colleagues (1990), White people viewed slides of White and Black people, imagined themselves interacting with them, and rated their probable liking of the person. Although the participants saw themselves liking the Black more than the White persons, their facial muscles told a different story. Instruments revealed that when a Black face appeared, there tended to be more frowning muscular activity than smiling. An emotion processing center in the brain also becomes more active as a person views an unfamiliar person of another race (Hart & others, 2000).

Researchers who study stereotyping contend, however, that prejudicial reactions are not inevitable (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003; Kunda & Spencer, 2003). The motivation to avoid prejudice can lead people to modify their thoughts and actions. Aware of the gap between how they *should* feel and how they *do* feel, self-conscious people will feel guilt and try to inhibit their prejudicial response (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006; Zuwerink & others, 1996). Even automatic prejudices subside, note Devine and her colleagues (2005), when people's motivation to avoid prejudice is internal (because prejudice is wrong) rather than external (because they don't want others to think badly of them).

The moral: Overcoming what Devine calls "the prejudice habit" isn't easy. But it can be done, as Devine and her colleagues (2012) discovered, after raising the awareness and concern of willing volunteers and training them to replace biased with unbiased knee-jerk responses. Throughout the two-year study follow-up period, participants in the experimental intervention condition displayed reduced implicit prejudice. If you find yourself reacting with knee-jerk presumptions or feelings, don't despair; that's not unusual. It's what you do with that awareness that matters. Do you let those feelings hijack your behavior? Or do you compensate by monitoring and correcting your behavior in future situations?

## SUMMING UP: What Are the Motivational Sources of Prejudice?

- People’s motivations affect prejudice. Frustration breeds hostility, which people sometimes vent on scapegoats and sometimes express more directly against competing groups.
- People also are motivated to view themselves and their groups as superior to other groups. Even trivial group memberships lead people to favor their group over others. A threat to self-image heightens such *ingroup* favoritism, as does the need to belong.
- On a more positive note, if people are motivated to avoid prejudice, they can break the prejudice habit.

## WHAT ARE THE COGNITIVE SOURCES OF PREJUDICE?

Describe the different cognitive sources of prejudice.


How does the way we think about the world influence our stereotypes? And how do our stereotypes affect our judgments? Fueled by a surge in studies of stereotyping (Figure 9.5), new approaches to prejudice apply new research on social thinking. Stereotyped beliefs and prejudiced attitudes exist not only because of social conditioning and because they enable people to displace hostilities, but also as by-products of normal thinking processes. Many stereotypes spring less from malice of the heart than from the machinery of the mind. Like perceptual illusions, by-products of our knack for interpreting the world, stereotypes can be by-products of how we simplify our complex worlds.

### Categorization: Classifying People into Groups

One way we simplify our environment is to *categorize*—to organize the world by clustering objects into groups (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000, 2001). A biologist classifies plants and animals. A human classifies people. Having done so, we think about them more easily. If persons in a group share some similarities—if most MENSA members are smart, and most basketball players are tall—knowing their

FIGURE :: 9.5

Number of Psychological Articles Mentioning “Stereotypes” (or Derivative Word), by Decade  
Source: PsycINFO.



group memberships can provide useful information with minimal effort (Macrae & others, 1994). Stereotypes sometimes offer “a beneficial ratio of information gained to effort expended” (Sherman & others, 1998). Stereotypes represent cognitive efficiency. They are energy-saving schemes for making speedy judgments and predicting how others will think and act. Thus, stereotypes and outgroup bias may, as Carlos David Navarrete and others (2010) have noted, “serve ultimate, evolutionary functions,” by enabling our ancestors to cope and survive.

## SPONTANEOUS CATEGORIZATION

We find it especially easy and efficient to rely on stereotypes when we are

- pressed for time (Kaplan & others, 1993).
- preoccupied (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).
- tired (Bodenhausen, 1990).
- emotionally aroused (Esses & others, 1993b; Stroessner & Mackie, 1993).
- too young to appreciate diversity (Biernat, 1991).

Ethnicity and sex are powerful ways of categorizing people. Imagine Tom, a 45-year-old African American real-estate agent in Atlanta. I suspect that your image of “Black male” predominates over the categories “middle-aged,” “business-person,” and “American southerner.”

Experiments expose our spontaneous categorization of people by race. Much as we organize what is actually a color continuum into what we perceive as distinct colors, such as red, blue, and green, so our “discontinuous minds” (Dawkins, 1993) cannot resist categorizing people into groups. We label people of widely varying ancestry as simply “Black” or “White,” as if such categories were black and white. When individuals view different people making statements, they often forget who said what but remember the race of the person who made each statement (Hewstone & others, 1991; Stroessner & others, 1990; Taylor & others, 1978). By itself, such categorization is not prejudice, but it does provide a foundation for prejudice.

Indeed, categorization is necessary for prejudice. Those who feel their social identity keenly will concern themselves with correctly categorizing people as *us* or *them*. Jim Blascovich and his co-researchers (1997) compared racially prejudiced people (who feel their racial identity keenly) with nonprejudiced people. Both groups were equally speedy at classifying white, black, and gray ovals. But how much time did each group take to categorize *people* by race? Especially when shown faces whose race was somewhat ambiguous (Figure 9.6), prejudiced people took longer, with more apparent concern for classifying people as either “us” (one’s own race) or “them” (another race). Prejudice requires racial categorization.

## PERCEIVED SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Picture the following objects: apples, chairs, pencils.

There is a strong tendency to see objects within a group as being more uniform than they really are. Were your apples all red? Your chairs all straight-backed? Your pencils all yellow? Once we classify two days in the same month, they seem more alike, temperature-wise, than the same interval



**FIGURE :: 9.6**

### Racial Categorization

Quickly: What race is this person? Less-prejudiced people respond more quickly, with less apparent concern with possibly misclassifying someone (as if thinking, “who cares?”).

across months. People guess the 8-day average temperature difference between, for instance, November 15 and 23 to be less than the 8-day difference between November 30 and December 8 (Krueger & Clement, 1994).

It's the same with people. When we assign people to groups—athletes, drama majors, math professors—we are likely to exaggerate the similarities within the groups and the differences between them (S. E. Taylor, 1981; Wilder, 1978). We assume that other groups are more homogeneous than our own. Mere division into groups can create an **outgroup homogeneity effect**—a sense that *they* are “all alike” and different from “us” and “our” group (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). We generally like people we perceive as similar to us and dislike those we perceive as different, so the result is ingroup bias (Byrne & Wong, 1962; Rokeach & Mezei, 1966; Stein & others, 1965).

The mere fact of a group decision can also lead outsiders to overestimate a group's unanimity. If a conservative wins a national election by a slim majority, observers infer that “the people have turned conservative.” If a liberal won by an equally slim margin, voter attitudes would barely differ, but observers would now attribute a “liberal mood” to the country. When the group is our own, we are more likely to see diversity:

- Many non-Europeans see the Swiss as a fairly homogeneous people. But to the people of Switzerland, the Swiss are diverse, encompassing French-, German-, Italian-, and Romansh-speaking groups.
- Many Anglo Americans lump “Latinos” together. Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, and Puerto Ricans—among others—see important differences (Huddy & Virtanen, 1995).
- Sorority sisters perceive the members of any other sorority as less diverse than the members of their own (Park & Rothbart, 1982).

In general, the greater our familiarity with a social group, the more we see its diversity (Brown & Wootton-Millward, 1993; Linville & others, 1989). The less our familiarity, the more we stereotype. Also, the smaller and less powerful the group, the less we attend to them and the more we stereotype (Fiske, 1993; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Mullen & Hu, 1989).

Perhaps you have noticed: *They*—the members of any racial group other than your own—even *look* alike. Many of us can recall embarrassing ourselves by confusing two people of another racial group, prompting the person we've misnamed to say, “You think we all look alike.” Experiments in the United States, Scotland, and Germany reveal that people of other races do in fact *seem* to look more alike than do people of one's own race (Chance & Goldstein, 1981, 1996; Ellis, 1981; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Sporer & Horry, 2011). When White students are shown faces of a few White and a few Black individuals and then asked to pick those individuals out of a photographic lineup, they show an **own-race bias**: They more accurately recognize the White faces than the Black ones, and they often falsely recognize Black faces never before seen.

As Figure 9.7 illustrates, Blacks more easily recognize another Black than they do a White (Bothwell & others, 1989). Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians all recognize faces from their own races better than from one another's (Gross, 2009). Likewise, British South Asians are quicker than White Brits to recognize South Asian faces (Walker & Hewstone, 2008). And 10- to 15-year-old Turkish children are quicker than Austrian children to recognize Turkish faces

### outgroup homogeneity effect

Perception of outgroup members as more similar to one another than are ingroup members. Thus “they are alike; we are diverse.”

“WOMEN ARE MORE LIKE EACH OTHER THAN MEN [ARE]”

—LORD (NOT LADY)

CHESTERFIELD

### own-race bias

The tendency for people to more accurately recognize faces of their own race. (Also called the *cross-race effect* or *other-race effect*.)



“It turns out I was having an affair and I didn't even know it.”

To a human cartoonist, all penguins look alike.

© Shannon Miller/The New Yorker Collection/www.cartoonbank.com






FIGURE :: 9.7

**The Own-Race Bias**

White subjects more accurately recognize the faces of Whites than of Blacks; Black subjects more accurately recognize the faces of Blacks than of Whites.

Source: From P. G. Devine & R. S. Malpass, 1985.

(Sporer & others, 2007). Even infants as young as 9 months display better own-race recognition of faces (Kelly & others, 2005, 2007).

It's true outside the laboratory as well, as Daniel Wright and his colleagues (2001) found after either a Black or a White researcher approached Black and White people in South African and English shopping malls. When later asked to identify the researcher from lineups, people better recognized those of their own race. It's not that we cannot perceive differences among faces of another group. Rather, when looking at a face from another racial group we often attend, first, to group ("that man is Black") rather than to individual features. When viewing someone of our own group, we are less attentive to the race category and more attentive to individual details (Bernstein & others, 2007; Hugenberg & others, 2010; Shriver & others, 2008; Young & others, 2010).

Our attending to someone's being in a different social category may also be contributing to a parallel *own-age bias*—the tendency for both children and older adults to more accurately identify faces from their own age groups (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005, 2006; Wright & Stroud, 2002; He & others, 2011). (Perhaps you have noticed that senior citizens look more alike than do your fellow students?)

## Distinctiveness: Perceiving People Who Stand Out

Other ways we perceive our worlds also breed stereotypes. Distinctive people and vivid or extreme occurrences often capture attention and distort judgments.

### DISTINCTIVE PEOPLE

Have you ever found yourself in a situation where you were the only person of your gender, race, or nationality? If so, your difference from the others probably made you more noticeable and the object of more attention. A Black in an otherwise White group, a man in an otherwise female group, or a woman in an otherwise male group seems more prominent and influential and to have exaggerated good and bad qualities (Crocker & McGraw, 1984; S. E. Taylor & others, 1979). When someone in a group is made conspicuous, we tend to see that person as causing whatever happens (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). If we are positioned to look at Joe, even if Joe is merely an average group member, Joe will seem to have a greater-than-average influence on the group.

Have you noticed that people also define you by your most distinctive traits and behaviors? Tell people about someone who is a skydiver and a tennis player, report Lori Nelson and Dale Miller (1995), and they will think of the person as a skydiver. Asked to choose a gift book for the person, they will pick a skydiving



Distinctive people, such as Houston Rockets 7'6" former player Yao Ming, draw attention.

book over a tennis book. A person who has both a pet snake and a pet dog is seen more as a snake owner than a dog owner.

People also take note of those who violate expectations (Bettencourt & others, 1997). "Like a flower blooming in winter, intellect is more readily noticed where it is not expected," reflected Stephen Carter (1993, p. 54) on his own experience as an African American intellectual. Such perceived distinctiveness makes it easier for highly capable job applicants from low-status groups to get noticed, although they also must work harder to prove that their abilities are genuine (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997).

Ellen Langer and Lois Imber (1980) cleverly demonstrated the attention paid to distinctive people. They asked Harvard students to watch a video of a man reading. The students paid closer attention when they were led to think he was out of the ordinary—a cancer patient, a homosexual, or a millionaire. They noticed characteristics that other viewers ignored, and their evaluation of him was more extreme. Those who thought the man was a cancer patient noticed distinctive facial characteristics and bodily movements and thus perceived him to be much more "different from most people" than did the other viewers. The extra attention we pay to distinctive people creates an illusion that they differ from others more than they really do. If people thought you had the IQ of a genius, they would probably notice things about you that otherwise would pass unnoticed.

**DISTINCTIVENESS FEEDS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS** When surrounded by Whites, Blacks sometimes detect people reacting to their distinctiveness. Many report being stared or glared at, being subject to insensitive comments, and receiving bad service (Swim & others, 1998). Sometimes, however, we misperceive others as reacting to our distinctiveness. Researchers Robert Kleck and Angelo Strenta (1980) discovered this when they led Dartmouth College women to feel disfigured. The women thought the purpose of the experiment was to assess how someone would react to a facial scar created with theatrical makeup; the scar was on the right cheek, running from the ear to the mouth. Actually, the purpose was to see how the women themselves, when made to feel deviant, would perceive others' behavior toward them. After applying the makeup, the experimenter gave each woman a small hand mirror so she could see the authentic-looking scar. When she put the mirror down, he then applied some "moisturizer" to "keep the makeup from cracking." What the "moisturizer" really did was remove the scar.

The scene that followed was poignant. A young woman, feeling terribly self-conscious about her supposedly disfigured face, talked with another woman who saw no such disfigurement and knew nothing of what had gone on before. If you have ever felt similarly self-conscious—perhaps about a physical handicap, acne, even just a bad hair day—then perhaps you can sympathize with the self-conscious woman. Compared with women who were led to believe their conversational partners merely thought they had an allergy, the "disfigured" women became acutely sensitive to how their partners were looking at them. They rated their partners as more tense, distant, and patronizing. Observers who later analyzed videotapes of how the partners treated "disfigured" persons could find no such differences in treatment. Self-conscious about being different, the "disfigured" women had misinterpreted mannerisms and comments they would otherwise not have noticed.

Self-conscious interactions between a majority and a minority person can therefore feel tense even when both are well intentioned (Devine & others, 1996). Tom,

who is known to be gay, meets tolerant Bill, who is straight and wants to respond without prejudice. But feeling unsure of himself, Bill holds back a bit. Tom, expecting negative attitudes from most people, misreads Bill's hesitancy as hostility and responds with a seeming chip on his shoulder.

Anyone can experience this phenomenon. Majority group members (in one study, White residents of Manitoba) often have beliefs—"meta-stereotypes"—about how minorities stereotype them (Vorauer & others, 1998). Even relatively unprejudiced Canadian Whites, Israeli Jews, or American Christians may sense that outgroup minorities stereotype them as prejudiced, arrogant, or patronizing. If George worries that Gamal perceives him as "your typical educated racist," he may be on guard when talking with Gamal.

**STIGMA CONSCIOUSNESS** People vary in **stigma consciousness**—in how much they expect others to stereotype them. Gays and lesbians, for example, differ in how much they suppose others "interpret all my behaviors" in terms of their homosexuality (Lewis & others, 2006; Pinel, 1999, 2004).

Seeing oneself as a victim of pervasive prejudice has its ups and downs (Branscombe & others, 1999; Dion, 1998). The downside is that those who perceive themselves as frequent victims live with the stress of presumed stereotypes and antagonism, and therefore experience lower well-being. While living in Europe, stigma-conscious Americans—Americans who perceive Europeans as resenting them—live more fretfully than those who feel accepted.

The upside is that perceptions of prejudice buffer individual self-esteem. If someone is nasty, "Well, it's not directed at me personally." Moreover, perceived prejudice and discrimination enhance our feelings of social identity and prepare us to join in collective social action.

## VIVID CASES

Our minds also use distinctive cases as a shortcut to judging groups. Are the Japanese good baseball players? "Well, there's Ichiro Suzuki and Hideki Matsui and Kosuke Fukudome. Yeah, I'd say so." Note the thought processes at work here: Given limited experience with a particular social group, we recall examples of it and generalize from those (Sherman, 1996). Moreover, encountering an example of a negative stereotype (for instance, a hostile Black) can prime the stereotype, leading us to minimize contact with the group (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996).



## stigma consciousness

A person's expectation of being victimized by prejudice or discrimination.

Self-consciousness about being different affects how we interpret others' behavior.  
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Such generalizing from a single case can cause problems. Vivid instances, though more available in memory, seldom represent the larger group. Exceptional athletes, though distinctive and memorable, are not the best basis for judging the distribution of athletic talent among an entire group.

Those in a numerical minority, being more distinctive, also may be numerically overestimated by the majority. What proportion of your country's population would you say is Muslim? People in non-Muslim countries often overestimate this proportion. (In the United States, a Pew Research Center [2011] study reported that 0.8 percent of the population were Muslim.)

Consider a 2011 Gallup survey, in which the average American guessed that 25 percent of people are exclusively homosexual (Morales, 2011). The best evidence suggests that about 3 percent of men and 1 or 2 percent of women have a same-sex orientation (Chandra & others, 2011; Herbenick & others, 2010).

Myron Rothbart and his colleagues (1978) showed how distinctive cases also fuel stereotypes. They had University of Oregon students view 50 slides, each of which stated a man's height. For one group of students, 10 of the men were slightly over 6 feet (up to 6 feet, 4 inches). For other students, these 10 men were well over 6 feet (up to 6 feet, 11 inches). When asked later how many of the men were over 6 feet, those given the moderately tall examples recalled 5 percent too many. Those given the extremely tall examples recalled 50 percent too many. In a follow-up experiment, students read descriptions of the actions of 50 men, 10 of whom had committed either nonviolent crimes, such as forgery, or violent crimes, such as rape. Of those shown the list with the violent crimes, most overestimated the number of criminal acts.

### DISTINCTIVE EVENTS FOSTER ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS

Stereotypes assume a correlation between group membership and individuals' presumed characteristics ("Italians are emotional," "Jews are shrewd," "Accountants are perfectionists"). Often, people's stereotypes are accurate (Jussim, 2012). But sometimes our attentiveness to unusual occurrences creates illusory correlations. Because we are sensitive to distinctive events, the co-occurrence of two such events is especially noticeable—more noticeable than each of the times the unusual events do *not* occur together.

David Hamilton and Robert Gifford (1976) demonstrated illusory correlation in a classic experiment. They showed students slides in which various people, members of "Group A" or "Group B," were said to have done something desirable or undesirable. For example, "John, a member of Group A, visited a sick friend in the hospital." Twice as many statements described members of Group A as Group B. But both groups did nine desirable acts for every four undesirable behaviors. Since both Group B and the undesirable acts were less frequent, their co-occurrence—for example, "Allen, a member of Group B, dented the fender of a parked car and didn't leave his name"—was an unusual combination that caught people's attention. The students therefore overestimated the frequency with which the "minority" group (B) acted undesirably, and they judged Group B more harshly.

Remember, Group A members outnumbered Group B members two to one, and Group B members committed undesirable acts in the same *proportion* as Group A members (thus, they committed only half as many). Moreover, the students had no preexisting biases for or against Group B, and they received the information more systematically than daily experience ever offers it. Although researchers debate why it happens, they agree that illusory correlation occurs and provides yet another source for the formation of racial stereotypes (Berndsen & others, 2002). Thus, the features that most distinguish a minority from a majority are those that become associated with it (Sherman & others, 2009). Your ethnic or social group may be like other groups in most ways, but people will notice how it differs.

In experiments, even single co-occurrences of an unusual act by someone in an atypical group—"Ben, a Jehovah's Witness, owns a pet sloth"—can embed illusory



correlations in people's minds (Risen & others, 2007). This enables the mass media to feed illusory correlations. When a self-described homosexual person murders or sexually abuses someone, homosexuality is often mentioned. When a heterosexual does the same, the person's sexual orientation is seldom mentioned. Likewise, when ex-mental patients Mark Chapman and John Hinckley, Jr., shot John Lennon and President Reagan, respectively, the assailants' mental histories commanded attention. Assassins and mental hospitalization are both relatively infrequent, making the combination especially newsworthy. Such reporting adds to the illusion of a large correlation between (1) violent tendencies and (2) homosexuality or mental hospitalization.

Unlike the students who judged Groups A and B, we often have preexisting biases. David Hamilton's further research with Terrence Rose (1980) revealed that our preexisting stereotypes can lead us to "see" correlations that aren't there. The researchers had University of California at Santa Barbara students read sentences in which various adjectives described the members of different occupational groups ("Juan, an accountant, is timid and thoughtful"). In actuality, each occupation was described equally often by each adjective; accountants, doctors, and salespeople were equally often timid, wealthy, and talkative. The students, however, *thought* they had more often read descriptions of timid accountants, wealthy doctors, and talkative salespeople. Their stereotyping led them to perceive correlations that weren't there, thus helping to perpetuate the stereotypes.

Likewise, guess what happened when Vaughn Becker and his colleagues (2010) invited university students to view a White and a Black face—one angry, one not—for one-tenth of a second. Then, as a brief distraction, they added two numbers that accompanied the faces (as in Figure 9.8). The participants' subsequent recollections of what they had viewed revealed racial bias. "White anger flowed to neutral Black faces (34 percent likelihood) more readily than Black anger flowed to neutral White faces (19 percent likelihood)."

### Attribution: Is It a Just World?

In explaining others' actions, we frequently commit the fundamental attribution error that was discussed in Chapter 3: We attribute others' behavior so much to their inner dispositions that we discount important situational forces. The error occurs partly because our attention focuses on the person, not on the situation. A person's race or sex is vivid and gets attention; the situational forces working upon that person are usually less visible. Slavery was often overlooked as an explanation for slave behavior; the behavior was instead attributed to the slaves' own nature. Until recently, the same was true of how we explained the perceived differences between women and men. Because gender-role constraints were hard to see, we



FIGURE :: 9.8

Ingroup biases influence perceptions. When briefly shown two faces, one neutral, one angry, people more often misrecalled the Black rather than the White face as angry (Becker & others, 2010).

attributed men's and women's behavior solely to their presumed innate dispositions. The more people assume that human traits are fixed dispositions, the stronger are their stereotypes and the greater their acceptance of racial inequities (Levy & others, 1998; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008).

### GROUP-SERVING BIAS

Thomas Pettigrew (1979, 1980) showed how attribution errors bias people's explanations of group members' behaviors. We grant members of our own group the benefit of the doubt: "She donated because she has a good heart; he refused because he's using every penny to help support his mother." When explaining acts by members of other groups, we more often assume the worst: "She donated to gain favor; he refused because he's selfish." In one classic study, the light shove that Whites perceived as mere "horsing around" when done by another White became a "violent gesture" when done by a Black (Duncan, 1976).


Positive behavior by outgroup members is more often dismissed. It may be seen as a "special case" ("He is certainly bright and hardworking—not at all like other . . ."), as owing to luck or some special advantage ("She probably got admitted just because her med school had to fill its quota for women applicants"), as demanded by the situation ("Under the circumstances, what could the cheap Scot do but pay the whole check?"), or as attributable to extra effort ("Asian students get better grades because they're so compulsive"). Disadvantaged groups and groups that stress modesty (such as the Chinese) exhibit less of this **group-serving bias** (Fletcher & Ward, 1989; Heine & Lehman, 1997; Jackson & others, 1993). Social psychologists Jacquie Vorauer and Stacey Sasaki (2010, 2011) note that multiculturalism's focus on differences, which can be positive in the absence of conflict (making intergroup exchanges seem interesting and stimulating), sometimes comes at a cost. When there is conflict or threat, a focus on differences can foster group-level attributions and increased hostility.

#### group-serving bias

Explaining away outgroup members' positive behaviors; also attributing negative behaviors to their dispositions (while excusing such behavior by one's own group).



Just-world thinking? Some people argued against giving legal rights to American prisoners in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp that housed alleged combatants from Afghanistan and Iraq. One argument was that these people would not be confined there if they had not done horrendous things, so why allow them to argue their innocence in U.S. courts?



The just-world phenomenon.  
© Robert Mankoff/The New Yorker  
Collection/www.cartoonbank.com

TABLE :: 9.1 How Self-Enhancing Social Identities Support Stereotypes

	Ingroup	Outgroup
Attitude	Favoritism	Denigration
Perceptions	Heterogeneity (we differ)	Homogeneity (they're alike)
Attributions for negative behavior	To situations	To dispositions

The group-serving bias can subtly color our language. A team of University of Padua (Italy) researchers led by Anne Maass (1995, 1999) has found that positive behaviors by another ingroup member are often described as general dispositions (for example, “Karen is helpful”). When performed by an outgroup member, the same behavior is often described as a specific, isolated act (“Carmen opened the door for the man with the cane”). With negative behavior, the specificity reverses: “Eric shoved her” (an isolated act by an ingroup member) but “Enrique was aggressive” (an outgroup member’s general disposition). Maass calls this group-serving bias the *linguistic intergroup bias*.

Earlier we noted that blaming the victim can justify the blamer’s own superior status (Table 9.1). Blaming occurs as people attribute an outgroup’s failures to its members’ flawed dispositions, notes Miles Hewstone (1990): “They fail because they’re stupid; we fail because we didn’t try.” If women, Blacks, or Jews have been abused, they must somehow have brought it on themselves. When the British made a group of German civilians walk through the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp at the close of World War II, one German responded: “What terrible criminals these prisoners must have been to receive such treatment.” (Such group-serving bias illustrates the motivations that underlie prejudice, as well as the cognition. Motivation and cognition, emotion and thinking, are inseparable.)

## THE JUST-WORLD PHENOMENON

In a series of experiments conducted at the universities of Waterloo and Kentucky, Melvin Lerner and his colleagues (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978) discovered that merely *observing* another innocent person being victimized is enough to make the victim seem less worthy.

Lerner (1980) noted that such disparaging of hapless victims results from the need to believe that “I am a just person living in a just world, a world where people

“FOR IF [PEOPLE WERE] TO CHOOSE OUT OF ALL THE CUSTOMS IN THE WORLD SUCH AS SEEMED TO THEM THE BEST, THEY WOULD EXAMINE THE WHOLE NUMBER, AND END BY PREFERRING THEIR OWN.”

—GREEK HISTORIAN  
HERODOTUS, *THE HISTORIES*,  
BOOK III, 440 B.C.



### just-world phenomenon

The tendency of people to believe that the world is just and that people therefore get what they deserve and deserve what they get.

*The classic illustration of “just-world thinking” comes from the Old Testament story of Job, a good person who suffers terrible misfortune. Job’s friends surmise that, this being a just world, Job must have done something wicked to elicit such terrible suffering.*

**“IF YOU DON’T HAVE A JOB AND YOU’RE NOT RICH, BLAME YOURSELF!”**

—U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HERMAN CAIN, 2011

get what they deserve.” From early childhood, he argues, we are taught that good is rewarded and evil punished. Hard work and virtue pay dividends; laziness and immorality do not. From this it is but a short leap to assuming that those who flourish must be good and those who suffer must deserve their fate.

Numerous studies have confirmed this **just-world phenomenon** (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). Imagine that you, along with some others, are participating in one of Lerner’s studies—supposedly on the perception of emotional cues (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). One of the participants, a confederate, is selected by lottery to perform a memory task. This person receives painful shocks whenever she gives a wrong answer. You and the others note her emotional responses.

After watching the victim receive these apparently painful shocks, the experimenter asks you to evaluate her. How would you respond? With compassionate sympathy? We might expect so. As Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “The martyr cannot be dishonored.” On the contrary, in these experiments the martyrs *were* dishonored. When observers were powerless to alter the victim’s fate, they often rejected and devalued the victim. Juvenal, the Roman satirist, anticipated these results: “The Roman mob follows after Fortune . . . and hates those who have been condemned.” And the more ongoing the suffering, as with Jews even after the Holocaust, the greater the dislike of the victims (Imhoff & Banse, 2009).

Linda Carli and her colleagues (1989, 1999) report that the just-world phenomenon colors our impressions of rape victims. Carli had people read detailed descriptions of interactions between a man and a woman. In one scenario, a woman and her boss meet for dinner, go to his home, and each have a glass of wine. Some read this scenario with a happy ending: “Then he led me to the couch. He held my hand and asked me to marry him.” In hindsight, people find the ending unsurprising and admire the man’s and woman’s character traits. Others read the same scenario with a terrible ending: “But then he became very rough and pushed me onto the couch. He held me down on the couch and raped me.” Given this ending, people see the rape as inevitable and blame the woman for provocative behavior that seems faultless in the first scenario.

This line of research suggests that people are indifferent to social injustice not because they have no concern for justice but because they see no injustice. Those who assume a just world believe that rape victims must have behaved seductively (Borgida & Brekke, 1985), that battered spouses must have provoked their beatings (Summers & Feldman, 1984), that poor people don’t deserve better (Furnham & Gunter, 1984), and that sick people are responsible for their illnesses (Gruman & Sloan, 1983). When researchers activate the concept of choice by having people record others’ choices, participants (in the United States) display less empathy for disadvantaged individuals, engage in more victim-blaming, and show reduced support for social policies such as affirmative action (Savani & others, 2011).

Such beliefs enable successful people to reassure themselves that they, too, deserve what they have. The wealthy and healthy can see their own good fortune, and others’ misfortune, as justly deserved. Linking good fortune with virtue and misfortune with moral failure enables the fortunate to feel pride and to avoid responsibility for the unfortunate.

People loathe a loser even when the loser’s misfortune quite obviously stems substantially from bad luck. Children, for example, tend to view lucky others—such as someone who has found money on a sidewalk—as more likely than unlucky children to do good things and be a nice person (Olson & others, 2008). Adults *know* that gambling outcomes are just good or bad luck and should not affect their evaluations of the gambler. Still, they can’t resist playing Monday-morning quarterback—judging people by their results. Ignoring the fact that reasonable decisions can bring bad results, they judge losers as less competent (Baron & Hershey, 1988). Lawyers and stock market investors may similarly judge themselves by their outcomes, becoming smug after successes and self-reproachful after failures. Talent and initiative matter. But the just-world assumption discounts the uncontrollable factors that can derail good efforts even by talented people.



Just-world thinking also leads people to justify their culture's familiar social systems (Jost & others, 2009; Kay & others, 2009). The way things are, we're inclined to think, is the way things ought to be. Such natural conservatism makes it difficult to pass new social policies, such as voting rights laws or tax or health care reform. But after a new policy is in place, our "system justification" works to sustain it. Thus, Canadians mostly approve of their government policies, such as national health care, strict gun control, and no capital punishment, whereas Americans likewise mostly support differing policies to which they are accustomed.

## SUMMING UP: What Are the Cognitive Sources of Prejudice?

- Recent research shows how the stereotyping that underlies prejudice is a by-product of our thinking—our ways of simplifying the world. Clustering people into categories exaggerates the uniformity within a group and the differences between groups.
- A distinctive individual, such as a lone minority person, has a compelling quality that makes us aware of differences that would otherwise go unnoticed. The occurrence of two distinctive events (for example, a minority person committing an unusual crime) helps create an illusory correlation between people and behavior. Attributing others' behavior to their dispositions can lead to the *group-serving bias*: assigning outgroup members' negative behavior to their natural character while explaining away their positive behaviors.
- Blaming the victim results from the common presumption that because this is a *just world*, people get what they deserve.

## WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREJUDICE?

Identify and understand the consequences of prejudice.

How can stereotypes create their own reality? How can prejudice undermine people's performance? Prejudice has consequences as well as causes.

### Self-Perpetuating Prejudgments

Prejudice involves preconceived judgments. Prejudgments are inevitable: None of us is a dispassionate bookkeeper of social happenings, tallying evidence for and against our biases.

*Prejudgments guide our attention and our memories.* People who accept gender stereotypes often misrecall their own school grades in stereotype-consistent ways. For example, women often recall receiving worse math grades and better arts grades than were actually the case (Chatard & others, 2007).

Moreover, after we judge an item as belonging to a category such as a particular race or sex, our memory for it later shifts toward the features we associate with that category. Johanne Huart and his colleagues (2005) demonstrated this by showing Belgian university students a face that was a blend of 70 percent of the features of a typical male and 30 percent female (or vice versa). Later, those shown the 70 percent male face recalled seeing a male (as you might expect), but also misrecalled the face as being even more prototypically male (as, say, the 80 percent male face shown in Figure 9.9).

*Prejudgments are self-perpetuating.* Whenever a member of a group behaves as expected, we duly note the fact; our prior belief is confirmed. When a member of a group behaves inconsistently with our expectation, we may interpret or explain away the behavior as due to special circumstances (Crocker & others, 1983). The




FIGURE :: 9.9

### Categorization Influences Memories

Shown a face that was 70 percent male, people usually classified the person as a male, and then recollected the face as more male-typical than it was (Huart & others, 2005).

contrast to a stereotype can also make someone seem exceptional. Telling some people that “Maria played basketball” and others that “Mark played basketball” may make Maria seem more athletic than Mark (Biernat, 2003). Stereotypes therefore influence how we construe someone’s behavior. Prime White folks with negative media images of Black folks (for example, looting after Hurricane Katrina), and the activated stereotype may be poisonous. In one experiment, such images produced reduced empathy for other Black people in need (Johnson & others, 2008).


Perhaps you, too, can recall a time when, try as you might, you could not overcome someone’s opinion of you, when no matter what you did you were misinterpreted. Misinterpretations are likely when someone *expects* an unpleasant encounter with you (Wilder & Shapiro, 1989). William Ickes and his colleagues (1982) demonstrated this in an experiment with pairs of college-age men. As the men arrived, the experimenters falsely forewarned one member of each pair that the other person was “one of the unfriendliest people I’ve talked to lately.” The two were then introduced and left alone together for five

minutes. Students in another condition of the experiment were led to think the other participant was exceptionally friendly.


Those in both conditions were friendly to the new acquaintance. In fact, those who expected him to be *unfriendly* went out of their way to be friendly, and their friendly behavior elicited a warm response. But unlike the positively biased students, those expecting an unfriendly person attributed this reciprocal friendliness to their own “kid-gloves” treatment of him. They afterward expressed more mistrust and dislike for the person and rated his behavior as less friendly. Despite their partner’s actual friendliness, the negative bias induced these students to “see” hostilities lurking beneath his “forced smiles.” They would never have seen it if they hadn’t believed it.

“LABELS ACT LIKE SHRIEKING SIRENS, DEAFENING US TO ALL FINER DISCRIMINATIONS THAT WE MIGHT OTHERWISE PERCEIVE.”

—GORDON ALLPORT, *THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE*, 1954



When people violate our stereotypes, we salvage the stereotype by splitting off a new subgroup stereotype, such as “senior Olympians.”



We do notice information that is strikingly inconsistent with a stereotype, but even that information has less impact than might be expected. When we focus on an atypical example, we can salvage the stereotype by splitting off a new category (Brewer & Gaertner, 2004; Hewstone, 1994; Kunda & Oleson, 1995, 1997). The positive image that British schoolchildren form of their friendly school police officers (whom they perceive as a special category) doesn't improve their image of police officers in general (Hewstone & others, 1992). This **subtyping**—seeing people who deviate as exceptions—helps maintain the stereotype that police officers are unfriendly and dangerous.

A different way to accommodate the inconsistent information is to form a new stereotype for those who don't fit. Recognizing that the stereotype does not apply for everyone in the category, homeowners who have “desirable” Black neighbors can form a new and different stereotype of “professional, middle-class Blacks.” This **subgrouping**—forming a subgroup stereotype—tends to lead to modest change in the stereotype as the stereotype becomes more differentiated (Richards & Hewstone, 2001). Subtypes are *exceptions* to the group; subgroups are acknowledged as a *part* of the overall group.

### subtyping

Accommodating individuals who deviate from one's stereotype by thinking of them as “exceptions to the rule.”

### subgrouping

Accommodating individuals who deviate from one's stereotype by forming a new stereotype about this subset of the group.

## Discrimination's Impact: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Attitudes may coincide with the social hierarchy not only as a rationalization for it but also because discrimination affects its victims. “One's reputation,” wrote Gordon Allport, “cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered into one's head without doing something to one's character” (1958, p. 139). If we could snap our fingers and end all discrimination, it would be naive for the White majority to say to Blacks, “The tough times are over, folks! You can now all be attaché-carrying executives and professionals.” When the oppression ends, its effects linger, like a societal hangover.

In *The Nature of Prejudice*, Allport catalogued 15 possible effects of victimization. Allport believed these reactions were reducible to two basic types—those that involve blaming oneself (withdrawal, self-hate, aggression against one's own group) and those that involve blaming external causes (fighting back, suspiciousness, increased group pride). If victimization takes a toll—for instance, higher rates of crime—people can use the result to justify the discrimination: “If we let those people in our nice neighborhood, property values will plummet.”

Does discrimination indeed affect its victims? We must be careful not to overstate the point. The soul and style of Black culture is for many a proud heritage, not just a response to victimization (Jones, 2003). Nevertheless, social beliefs *can* be self-confirming, as demonstrated in a clever pair of experiments by Carl Word, Mark Zanna, and Joel Cooper (1974). In the first experiment, Princeton University White male volunteers interviewed White and Black research assistants posing as

“IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE SUPPRESSED PEOPLE SHOULD DEVELOP AN INTENSE HOSTILITY TOWARDS A CULTURE WHOSE EXISTENCE THEY MAKE POSSIBLE BY THEIR WORK, BUT IN WHOSE WEALTH THEY HAVE TOO SMALL A SHARE.”

—SIGMUND FREUD, *THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION*, 1927

“IF WE FORESEE EVIL IN  
OUR FELLOW MAN, WE  
TEND TO PROVOKE IT; IF  
GOOD, WE ELICIT IT.”

—GORDON ALLPORT, *THE  
NATURE OF PREJUDICE*, 1958

### stereotype threat

A disruptive concern, when facing a negative stereotype, that one will be evaluated based on a negative stereotype. Unlike self-fulfilling prophecies that hammer one’s reputation into one’s self-concept, stereotype threat situations have immediate effects.

job applicants. When the applicant was Black, the interviewers sat farther away, ended the interview 25 percent sooner, and made 50 percent more speech errors than when the applicant was White. Imagine being interviewed by someone who sat at a distance, stammered, and ended the interview rather quickly. Would it affect your performance or your feelings about the interviewer?

To find out, the researchers conducted a second experiment in which trained interviewers treated people as the interviewers in the first experiment had treated either the White or the Black applicants. When videotapes of the interviews were later rated, those who were treated like the Blacks in the first experiment seemed more nervous and less effective. Moreover, the interviewees could themselves sense a difference; those treated the way the Blacks had been treated judged their interviewers to be less adequate and less friendly. The experimenters concluded that part of “the ‘problem’ of Black performance resides . . . within the interaction setting itself.” As with other self-fulfilling prophecies (recall Chapter 3), prejudice affects its targets.

## Stereotype Threat


Just being sensitive to prejudice is enough to make us self-conscious when living as a numerical minority—perhaps as a Black person in a White community or as a White person in a Black community. As with other circumstances that siphon off our mental energy and attention, the result can be diminished mental and physical stamina (Inzlicht & others, 2006). Placed in a situation where others expect you to perform poorly, your anxiety may also cause you to confirm the belief. I am a short guy in my 60s. When I join a pickup basketball game with bigger, younger players, I presume that they expect me to be a detriment to their team, and that tends to undermine my confidence and performance. Claude Steele and his colleagues call this phenomenon **stereotype threat**—a self-confirming apprehension that one will be evaluated based on a negative stereotype (Steele, 2010; Steele & others, 2002; see also [reducingstereotypethreat.org](http://reducingstereotypethreat.org)).

In several experiments, Steven Spencer, Claude Steele, and Diane Quinn (1999) gave a very difficult math test to men and women students who had similar math backgrounds. When told that there were *no* gender differences on the test and no evaluation of any group stereotype, the women’s performance consistently equaled the men’s. Told that there *was* a gender difference, the women dramatically confirmed the stereotype (Figure 9.10). Frustrated by the extremely difficult test

FIGURE :: 9.10

### Stereotype Vulnerability and Women’s Math Performance

Steven Spencer, Claude Steele, and Diane Quinn (1999) gave equally capable men and women a difficult math test. When participants were led to believe there were gender differences on the test, women scored lower than men. When the threat of confirming the stereotype was removed (when gender differences were not expected), women did just as well as men.





questions, they apparently felt added apprehension, which undermined their performances. For female engineering students, interacting with a sexist man likewise undermines test performance (Logel & others, 2009). Even before exams, stereotype threat can also hamper women's learning math rules and operations (Rydell & others, 2010).

The media can provoke stereotype threat. Paul Davies and his colleagues (2002, 2005) had women and men watch a series of commercials while expecting that they would be tested for their memory of details. For half the participants, the commercials contained only neutral stimuli; for the other half, some of the commercials contained images of "airheaded" women. After seeing the stereotypical images, women not only performed worse than men on a math test but also reported less interest in obtaining a math or science major or entering a math or science career.

Might racial stereotypes be similarly self-fulfilling? Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995) gave difficult verbal abilities tests to Whites and Blacks. Blacks underperformed Whites only when taking the tests under conditions high in stereotype threat. A similar stereotype threat effect has occurred with Hispanic Americans (Nadler & Clark, 2011).


Jeff Stone and his colleagues (1999) report that stereotype threat affects athletic performance, too. Blacks did worse than usual when a golf task was framed as a test of "sports intelligence," and Whites did worse when it was a test of "natural athletic ability." "When people are reminded of a negative stereotype about themselves—'White men can't jump' or 'Black men can't think'—it can adversely affect performance," Stone (2000) surmised.

If you tell students they are at risk of failure (as is often suggested by minority support programs), the stereotype may erode their performance, says Steele (1997). It may cause them to "disidentify" with school and seek self-esteem elsewhere (Figure 9.11, and see "The Inside Story, Claude Steele on Stereotype Threat"). Indeed, as African American students move from eighth to tenth grade, there has been a weakening connection between their school performance and self-esteem (Osborne, 1995). Moreover, students who are led to think they have benefited from gender- or race-based preferences in gaining admission to a college or an academic group tend to underperform those who are led to feel competent (Brown & others, 2000).

"MATH CLASS IS TOUGH!"

—"TEEN TALK" BARBIE DOLL

(LATER REMOVED FROM THE  
MARKET)



**FIGURE :: 9.11**  
**Stereotype Threat**

Threat from facing a negative stereotype can produce performance deficits and disidentification.

# THE inside STORY

## Claude Steele on Stereotype Threat

During a committee meeting on campus diversity at the University of Michigan in the late 1980s, I noticed an interesting fact: At every ability level (as assessed by SAT scores), minority students were getting lower college grades than their nonminority counterparts. Soon, Steven Spencer, Joshua Aronson, and I found that this was a national phenomenon; it happened at most colleges and it happened to other groups whose abilities were negatively stereotyped, such as women in advanced math classes. This underperformance wasn't caused by group differences in preparation. It happened at all levels of preparation (as measured by SATs).

Eventually, we produced this underperformance in the laboratory by simply having motivated people perform a difficult task in a domain where their group was negatively stereotyped. We also found that we could eliminate this

underperformance by making the same task irrelevant to the stereotype, by removing the "stereotype threat," as we had come to call it. This latter finding spawned more research: figuring out how to reduce stereotype threat and its ill effects. Through this work, we have gained an appreciation for two big things: first, the importance of life context in shaping psychological functioning, and second, the importance of social identities such as age, race, and gender in shaping that context.



Claude Steele  
Stanford University

Better, therefore, to challenge students to believe in their potential, observes Steele. In another of his research team's experiments, Black students responded well to criticism of their writing when also told, "I wouldn't go to the trouble of giving you this feedback if I didn't think, based on what I've read in your letter, that you are capable of meeting the higher standard that I mentioned" (Cohen & others, 1999).

*How does stereotype threat undermine performance?* It does so in three ways, contend Topni Schmader, Michael Johns, and Chad Forbes (2008):

1. *Stress.* fMRI brain scans suggest that the stress of stereotype threat impairs brain activity associated with mathematical processing and increases activity in areas associated with emotion processing (Derks & others, 2008; Krendl & others, 2008; Wraga & others, 2007).
2. *Self-monitoring.* Worrying about making mistakes disrupts focused attention (Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Seibt & Forster, 2004). In interracial interactions, Blacks and Latinos (concerned with stereotypes of their intelligence) seek respect and to be seen as competent, whereas Whites (concerned with their image as racist) seek to be liked and seen as moral (Bergsieker & others, 2010).
3. *Suppressing unwanted thoughts and emotions.* The effort required to regulate one's thinking takes energy and disrupts working memory (Bonnot & Croizet, 2007).

*If stereotype threats can disrupt performance, could positive stereotypes enhance it?* Margaret Shih, Todd Pittinsky, and Nalini Ambady (1999) confirmed that possibility. When Asian American females were asked biographical questions that reminded them of their gender identity before taking a math test, their performance plunged (compared with a control group). When similarly reminded of their Asian identity, their performance rose. Negative stereotypes disrupt performance, and positive stereotypes, it seems, facilitate performance (Rydell & others, 2009).

## Do Stereotypes Bias Judgments of Individuals?

Yes, stereotypes bias judgments, but here is some good news: First, *our stereotypes mostly reflect* (though sometimes distort) *reality*. As multiculturalism recognizes, people differ—and can perceive and appreciate those differences. "Stereotype

accuracy is one of the largest effects in all of social psychology,” argues Lee Jussim (2012). Second, *people often evaluate individuals more positively than the groups they compose* (Miller & Felicio, 1990). Anne Locksley, Eugene Borgida, and Nancy Brekke found that after someone knows a person, “stereotypes may have minimal, if any, impact on judgments about that person” (Borgida & others, 1981; Locksley & others, 1980, 1982). They discovered this by giving University of Minnesota students anecdotal information about recent incidents in the life of “Nancy.” In a supposed transcript of a telephone conversation, Nancy told a friend how she responded to three different situations (for example, being harassed by a seedy character while shopping). Some of the students read transcripts portraying Nancy responding assertively (telling the seedy character to leave); others read a report of passive responses (simply ignoring the character until he finally drifts away). Still other students received the same information, except that the person was named “Paul” instead of Nancy. A day later the students predicted how Nancy (or Paul) would respond to other situations.

Did knowing the person’s gender have any effect on those predictions? None at all. Expectations of the person’s assertiveness were influenced solely by what the students had learned about that individual the day before. Even their judgments of masculinity and femininity were unaffected by knowing the person’s gender. Gender stereotypes had been left on the shelf; the students evaluated Nancy and Paul as individuals.

An important principle discussed in Chapter 3 explains this finding. Given (1) general (base-rate) information about a group and (2) trivial but vivid information about a particular group member, the vivid information usually overwhelms the effect of the general information. This is especially so when the person doesn’t fit our image of the typical group member (Fein & Hilton, 1992; Lord & others, 1991). For example, imagine yourself being told how most people in a conformity experiment actually behaved and then viewing a brief interview with one of the supposed participants. Would you, like the typical viewer, guess the person’s behavior solely from the interview? Would you ignore the base-rate information on how most people actually behaved?

People often believe stereotypes, yet ignore them when given personalized, anecdotal information. Thus, many people believe “politicians are crooks” but “our Senator Jones has integrity.” No wonder many people have a low opinion of politicians yet usually vote to reelect their own representatives. These findings resolve a puzzling set of findings considered early in this chapter. We know that gender stereotypes are strong, yet they have little effect on people’s judgments of work attributed to a man or a woman. Now we see why. People may have strong gender stereotypes, but ignore them when judging a particular individual.

### STRONG STEREOTYPES MATTER

However, stereotypes, when *strong*, do color our judgments of individuals (Krueger & Rothbart, 1988). When Thomas Nelson, Monica Biernat, and Melvin Manis (1990) had students estimate the heights of individually pictured men and women, they judged the individual men as taller than the women—even when their heights were equal, even when they were told that sex didn’t predict height in this sample, and even when they were offered cash rewards for accuracy.



People sometimes maintain general prejudices (such as against gays and lesbians) without applying their prejudice to particular individuals whom they know and respect, such as Ellen DeGeneres.

In a follow-up study, Nelson, Michele Acker, and Manis (1996) showed University of Michigan students photos of other students from the university's engineering and nursing schools, along with descriptions of each student's interests. Even when informed that the sample contained an equal number of males and females from each school, the same description was judged more likely to come from a nursing student when attached to a female face. Thus, even when a strong gender stereotype is known to be irrelevant, it has an irresistible force.

### STEREOTYPES BIAS INTERPRETATION

Stereotypes also color how we interpret events, note David Dunning and David Sherman (1997). If people are told, "Some felt the politician's statements were untrue," they will infer that the politician was lying. If told, "Some felt the physicist's statements were untrue," they infer only that the physicist was mistaken. When told two people had an altercation, people perceive it as a fistfight if told it involved two lumberjacks, but as a verbal spat if told it involved two marriage counselors. A person concerned about her physical condition seems vain if she is a model but health conscious if she is a triathlete. As a prison guides and constrains its inmates, conclude Dunning and Sherman, the "cognitive prison" of our stereotypes guides and constrains our impressions.

Sometimes we make judgments or begin interacting with someone with little to go on but our stereotype. In such cases, stereotypes can strongly bias our interpretations and memories of people. For example, Charles Bond and his colleagues (1988) found that after getting to know their patients, White psychiatric nurses put Black and White patients in physical restraints equally often. But they restrained *incoming* Black patients more often than their White counterparts. With little else to go on, stereotypes mattered.

Such bias can also operate more subtly. In an experiment by John Darley and Paget Gross (1983), Princeton University students viewed a videotape of a fourth-grade girl, Hannah. The tape depicted her either in a depressed urban neighborhood, supposedly the child of lower-class parents, or in an affluent suburban setting, the child of professional parents. Asked to guess Hannah's ability level in various subjects, both groups of viewers refused to use Hannah's class background to prejudge her ability level; each group rated her ability level at her grade level.

Other students also viewed a second videotape, showing Hannah taking an oral achievement test in which she got some questions right and some wrong. Those who had previously been introduced to professional-class Hannah judged her answers as showing high ability and later recalled her getting most questions right; those who had met lower-class Hannah judged her ability as below grade level and recalled her missing almost half the questions. But remember: The second videotape was *identical* for the two groups. So we see that when stereotypes are strong and the information about someone is ambiguous (unlike the cases of Nancy and Paul), stereotypes can *subtly* bias our judgments of individuals.

Finally, we evaluate people more extremely when their behavior violates our stereotypes (Bettencourt & others, 1997). A woman who rebukes someone cutting in front of her in a movie line ("Shouldn't you go to the end of the line?") may seem more assertive than a man who reacts similarly (Manis & others, 1988). Aided by the testimony of social psychologist Susan Fiske and her colleagues (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court saw such stereotyping at work when Price Waterhouse, one of the nation's top accounting firms, denied Ann Hopkins's promotion to partner. Among the 88 candidates for promotion, Hopkins, the only woman, was number one in the amount of business she brought in to the company and, according to testimony, was hardworking and exacting. But others testified that Hopkins needed a "course at charm school," where she could learn to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely. . . ." After reflecting on the case and on stereotyping research, the Supreme Court in 1989 decided that encouraging men, but not women, to be aggressive, is to act "on the basis of gender":



We sit not to determine whether Ms. Hopkins is nice, but to decide whether the partners reacted negatively to her personality because she is a woman. . . . An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable Catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they don't.

## SUMMING UP: What Are the Consequences of Prejudice?

- Prejudice and stereotyping have important consequences, especially when strongly held, when judging unknown individuals, and when deciding policies regarding whole groups.
- Once formed, stereotypes tend to perpetuate themselves and resist change. They also create their own realities through self-fulfilling prophecies.
- Prejudice can also undermine people's performance through *stereotype threat*, by making people apprehensive that others will view them stereotypically.
- Stereotypes, especially when strong, can predispose how we perceive people and interpret events.

## POSTSCRIPT: Can We Reduce Prejudice?

Social psychologists have been more successful in explaining prejudice than in alleviating it. Because prejudice results from many interrelated factors, no simple remedy exists. Nevertheless, we can now anticipate techniques for reducing prejudice (discussed further in chapters to come): If unequal status breeds prejudice, we can seek to create cooperative, equal-status relationships. If prejudice rationalizes discriminatory behavior, we can mandate nondiscrimination. If social institutions support prejudice, we can pull out those supports (for example, with media that model interracial harmony). If outgroups seem more homogeneous than they really are, we can make efforts to personalize their members. If automatic prejudices lead us to engage in behaviors that make us feel guilty, we can use that guilt to motivate ourselves to break the prejudice habit.

Since the end of World War II in 1945, a number of those antidotes have been applied, and racial and gender prejudices have indeed diminished. Social-psychological research also has helped break down discriminatory barriers. The social psychologist Susan Fiske (1999), who testified on behalf of Ann Hopkins, the Price Waterhouse executive denied promotion to partner, later wrote:

We risked a lot by testifying on Ann Hopkins's behalf, no doubt about it . . . As far as we knew, no one had ever introduced the social psychology of stereotyping in a gender case before. . . . If we succeeded, we would get the latest stereotyping research out of the dusty journals and into the muddy trenches of legal debate, where it might be useful. If we failed, we might hurt the client, slander social psychology, and damage my reputation as a scientist. At the time I had no idea that the testimony would eventually make it successfully through the Supreme Court.

It now remains to be seen whether, during this century, progress will continue, or whether, as could easily happen in a time of increasing population and diminishing resources, antagonisms will again erupt into open hostility.